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Representing conflict: A study of the Indian government’s use of legitimisation 
and delegitimization in its internal security policy 
Priyanka Talwar 
 
Amongst the various internal challenges facing states, armed conflict presents one of 
the most serious policy issues. The representation of such conflicts is closely 
intertwined with the policy measures taken to address them. The legitimization and 
delegitimization of certain kinds of actors or demands is not however fixed; these often 
change over time, creating space for alternative policy options.   India, in the unique 
position of being one of the few countries with the existence of simultaneous but 
different internal conflicts, offers a ready canvas for studying the discursive 
representations of conflict and conflict resolution. In this thesis, state discourses on the 
conflicts in Punjab, Kashmir and Naxalism are analysed in order to draw a comparative 
framework of India’s internal security strategy which, in the absence of a cohesive 
declared policy, highlights certain common patterns. The analyses show how identities, 
policies and demands are represented in the framing of these internal conflicts and 
point to India’s ambiguous, and often ad hoc, internal security strategy. Moreover, this 
study shows that as the representation of these conflicts changes over time, policies 
exhibit certain continuities and changes, suggesting an inter-relatedness between 
discourse and policy. The public discourse of the Indian Government on the legitimacy 
of political actors involved in armed insurgency strongly reflects and in turn influences 




Chapter 1: Democracy, Domestic Conflict and Security 
Strategy: The Curious Case of India 
The central focus of this thesis is on the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
representation of domestic conflicts by state agencies and policies intended to address 
them. Conflict management and conflict resolution have much to do with how conflicts 
are represented—whether they are represented as secessionist conflicts, revolutionary 
conflicts, conflicts over resources or religious extremism.  These characterizations and 
the inter-relatedness of security strategies have important consequences for their 
trajectory—whether they are exacerbated or resolved.   
Intra-state conflicts have far outweighed inter-state conflicts since the end of the Cold 
War. Indeed, some of the most intractable conflicts that exist at present are domestic 
conflicts such as the ones in the Basque country, Kashmir or Chechnya. States spend a 
large proportion of their resources in combating these internal disturbances even if they 
lack a coherent internal security strategy in responding to them. Changes in leadership-
both of the state and the rebel movement, leads to changes in demands and changes 
over time influence policy responses, as do local and international contexts. Policy 
decision making is therefore a complex process that reflects the dominant state 
narrative on security and can offer useful insights into the identities of states.     
I argue in this thesis that these decisions are not based on an objective, observed 
‘reality’ of the conflict, but are the result of a complex and inter-related set of factors 
that inscribe the construction of insecurity, identity and interests within the broader 
social and political context in which these decisions are made. Even before conflict 
situations can be responded to, they require some assessment, some meaning assigned 
to them. What constitutes national interest? National security has come to encompass a 
host of challenges-external and domestic, related to military, political or economic 
issues that it faces. Are the actors involved misguided youth or terrorists? Who can be 
negotiated with, if at all? Are the demands of the local rebels’ demands for secession or 
autonomy? Essentially, these are basic questions for determining the legitimacy or 




The association of domestic strife with failed/weak states or newly emerging 
democracies has received a fair deal of attention.1 A dominant analysis  is that these 
states lack democratic institutions or have yet to establish stable and functioning 
regimes, in the absence of which domestic instability is inevitable. However, with 
regard to democracies and their internal challenges the literature is much weaker. How 
do these states deal with conflict within their borders? What do these states understand 
by security? Crucially, how are democracies able to use force against their own citizens 
and undermine democratic values?  
Literature on democracy and conflict has tended to focus on international relations 
between states. Modern democratic peace theory holds that democracies are less likely 
to go to war with each other.2 Two variants of this thesis-monadic and dyadic elaborate 
on the incidence of inter-state conflict. The monadic thesis states that democratic states 
have more peaceful relations with all states irrespective of regime type, while the 
dyadic version holds that democracies are more peaceful with other democracies 
(Doyle 1983a). It is held that democracies have liberal institutions that foster shared 
norms and cultures which encourage dialogue, negotiation and restraint over violence. 
The idea that societies would be unwilling to support their elected governments to 
engage in war arises from this notion of liberal values in democracies (Doyle 1983a). In 
his elaboration of the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory, Doyle (Doyle 
1983b) recognises that liberal states’ relations with non-liberal states is determined on 
the basis of its perception of other states and therefore, since the latter is inherently 
illiberal and undemocratic, there is less hesitation in using force by the former.  
The theory of democratic peace has received considerably less examination in internal 
conflicts (Kinsella & Rousseau 2009). The role of democracy in political theories of 
internal conflict has highlighted that internal conflicts are less likely to occur under 
democratic regimes since these allow space for political dissent and rule of law. 
According to Krain and Myers (Krain & Myers 1997), the democratic peace thesis 
holds in intra state conflicts and they demonstrate empirically that the incidence of 
regime type affects internal war participation. The incidence of civil war is shown to be 
                                                             
1 See for example, (Fearon & Laitin 2003). 
2 Various scholars have written on the democratic peace theory. See for example, (Russett 1994)  
(Doyle, M. 1983).  
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higher for non-democratic regimes. Later research has distinguished between different 
types of democracies to understand whether this would have an effect on democratic 
peace theory. These studies have refined the theory to argue that the higher the level of 
democracy or higher the ranking of democratic indicators, the less likely is the use of 
force used by the state.3  
Extending the dyadic argument, we may envision a similar process at work in the 
domestic sphere. The way the centre responds to insurgents, criminals or anti-state 
elements may have to do with how it represents these actors. Since not all such internal 
disturbances are treated the same, it is possible that the state considers certain types of 
activities more threatening than others. The decision to use force therefore may stem 
from how big a threat it considers the actors or their demands to be. 
What requires deeper analysis is the role of democratic governments in intra-state 
conflicts, especially in the use of force. Davenport (2007) argues in his empirical study 
of democracy and domestic repression that while democracy does lead to reduced 
levels of suppression, when there emerges a situation of domestic conflict that poses a 
threat to the political system, or the magnitude of threat is seen to be beyond an 
acceptable level, there is a higher possibility of a consensus on the use of force 
(Davenport 2007), p.28) but even here it is more likely to curtail political and civil 
liberties rather than resort to lethal force. He contends that democratic leaders try to use 
those forms of repression that are less controversial or noticeable so as to avoid being 
detected (Davenport 2007, p.189). 
An overview of some of the literature on domestic conflict and the democratic peace 
thesis seems to suggest that by and large democracies are less willing to engage in 
violent suppression of dissent. At the same time, the use of force in situations of what is 
known as emergency, or when these situations appear as threats to internal security, has 
been rampant across the world in countries like India, Turkey, Colombia and Spain  
It is in this context of security, force and democracy that the study of India can provide 
a useful case for in-depth analyses to understand the responses to domestic conflicts in 
relatively strong states. India provides a ready canvas for studying a myriad of 
conflicts; since its independence it has faced conflicts across the length and breadth of 
                                                             
3 For example, (Reynal-Querol 2005; Davenport & Armstrong 2004)  
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its territory. While some have been resolved or managed, others have continued and 
new ones have arisen. It is this multiplicity of conflicts that gives India uniqueness 
unparalleled by the experience of any other state in the world. Demands for ethnic 
recognition, autonomy and separation have often resulted in violent conflicts directed at 
the state.  
In spite of these internal conflicts, the Indian state has remained a viable and strong 
entity and has managed to keep international attention largely away from its domestic 
disturbances. Kashmir is an exception owing perhaps to the fact that it is considered in 
the international system as a bilateral conflict between two nuclear powers. 
Domestically too, these pockets of conflict have been restricted, such that these coexist 
with a robust political and economic life. As compared to other countries in the South 
Asian region also affected by internal upheavals-such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, and other countries fighting domestic insurgency such as 
Turkey and Spain, the Indian state has simultaneously been dealing with more than one 
insurgency and in spite of them, been able to prosper and emerge as a powerful global 
force in recent times. The government structure has continued to remain stable even if 
the makeup of ruling political parties has shown changes.  
The literature on Indian exceptionalism explores democracy and federalism as 
important factors for India’s success in maintaining stability in spite of the tensions 
between and within various ethnicities (see, for example, (Hardgrave 1993; Kohli 
1997). Much of the literature on conflict in India has focused on ethnic conflicts and 
the relative success of India’s federalism and democracy in accommodating ethnic and 
political grievances. Kohli (1997) argues that the institutional arrangements in India’s 
federal polity allows for a greater willingness to negotiate and accommodate ethnic 
demands for self-determination. His analysis of self-determination movements is based 
on two variables, institutionalisation and leadership strategy, that play a key role in 
determining the trajectory of such movements. He uses self-determination movements 
to refer to demands for regional separateness based on ethnic criteria such as language 
or religion. The argument is that effective institutions and willingness of the leadership 
to accommodate demands through some form of power sharing can succeed in 




India’s rich and varied experience in dealing with these conflicts can offer useful 
insights into conflict resolution processes. The decision making and policy 
implementation process that occurs during the course of conflict can have important 
implications for how it develops-whether it exacerbates violence or results in successful 
resolution.  
To highlight the various conflicts that have challenged the state, the next section gives 
an overview of some of these contemporary conflicts in the wake of India’s 
independence in 1947. 
India’s Internal Conflicts: An Overview 
After independence, the Indian State faced a host of challenges stemming from its large 
and varied demography (Bhargava et al. 1999).  An integral challenge stemmed from 
the need to create a coherent Indian identity in a land with a multiplicity of identities 
based on ethnicity, caste, class, region, religion and language. The newly independent 
state sought, therefore, to maintain an overarching Indian identity while allowing space 
for ethnic aspirations so as to avoid further territorial division from the experience of 
the creation of Pakistan (Mukarji & Arora 1992; Jalal 1995). 
The reorganization of states on the basis of language in 1956, while meant to cater to 
the regional aspirations of the people, led to similar demands in other parts of India 
which had been left out of the process. In Punjab and the north east region, such 
demands evolved into conflicts for a variety of reasons-either their demands were 
neglected, received delayed response from the centre or policies were such that 
included some in the division process but excluded others, thus creating further pockets 
of dissent (Singh 1997).  
One of the first conflicts after independence erupted in the southern part of the country. 
Protesting against a new language policy aimed at making Hindi the official language 
of the country with a subsequent requirement of including it as a compulsory language 
of study in the curricula of schools across the country, the non-Hindi speaking southern 
states threatened to secede if the policies were implemented (Barnett Ross 1976). The 
Centre’s resolution of the language conflict through accommodation and repeal of the 
contentious policies ultimately created space for the linguistic rights of its citizens and 
gave autonomy to the state on matters such as education. Moreover, timely state 
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intervention in the conflict ensured that it did not escalate into violence (Dasgupta 
1970; Kohli 2001).  
In the north eastern part of the country, numerous conflicts have marred the region. 
States like Nagaland sought separation from the Indian state terming the terms of 
accession after independence as contentious and invalid. States like Tripura, Assam and 
Manipur were embroiled in conflict to preserve their ethnic or tribal identity from 
‘outsiders’ who were either other ethnic or tribal groups or non-natives crossing into 
Indian territory from Bangladesh. Government apathy and a general political and 
economic neglect of the region have added to the intensity and intractability of the 
conflict (Nag 2002; Baruah 1997).  
In Punjab, the demand for Sikh separation, which had been voiced at the time of 
independence but was subsequently marginalised, led to a violent conflict by the 1980s. 
Combining economic, political, linguistic and religious demands, the Sikh agitation 
escalated into demands for secession and followed a period of intense violence (Brass 
1991; Singh 1997). The neglect of Sikh aspirations and suppression of regional politics 
by New Delhi during the 1970s were important triggers and the gravity and duration of 
the conflict ensured novel counter insurgency strategies, many of which were to be 
emulated in other conflict areas in the country. 
Around the time the conflict in Punjab was experiencing heightened militancy in the 
early 1990s, the situation in Kashmir began to deteriorate. The Kashmir conflict, which 
is considered to be one of the most intractable conflicts in the world, has attracted 
international attention due to the added factor of it being a source of conflict between 
two nuclear rivals-India and Pakistan, and over which the two states have fought three 
wars. Tracing its origin to 1947, the year of India’s independence and partition, this 
Muslim majority state which was then ruled by a Hindu king became a part of India 
after the ruler consented after much deliberation. Though the Indian constitution 
recognised Kashmir’s special status and gave it autonomy in all matters except defence, 
foreign affairs and communication, the provisions were watered down or violated by 
successive governments in New Delhi such that the stifling of political aspirations 
coupled with human rights violations led to a growing alienation of the Kashmiri 
people with hardliners demanding secession from India (Wirsing 1994; Jalal 1995; 
Ganguly 1999). Militant groups, many of which were sponsored by Pakistan, 
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proliferated and intensified violence (Behera 2000) and led to the stationing of a large 
number of armed personnel, making Kashmir one of the most heavily militarized 
regions in the world. 
The Naxalite or Maoist conflict traces its origins to a peasant rebellion in a village in 
the state of West Bengal against land distribution and taxation policies. The spread of 
the movement and its evolution into an armed conflict across several states in 
opposition to state development policies has in recent years become a greater challenge 
for the state as violence levels have increased (Mohanty 2006). 
Common to each of these conflicts is their framing primarily as threats to the security 
of the state. In so doing, the state is able to justify the use of certain strategies as 
necessary and in fact the only option available. The space for alternative articulations 
and consequently different policy actions is thus inhibited and has an important effect 
on the way conflict proceeds. This raises important questions—how important are state 
mechanisms in mitigating conflict? How successful and inclusive has the negotiation 
process been? Are root causes of the conflict identified and worked upon? What is 
considered to be the most important issue in approaching conflict? Does this change 
over time? 
Moreover, characterization of conflicts as, for example, secessionist or extremist, draws 
attention away from the political and historical grievances which trigger these conflicts. 
To explore this concept of framing conflict situations, critical security studies have 
generated novel ways of understanding security.4 Making a departure from realist 
theories on security, which takes states as the prime referents of security and views 
threats to security as exogenously given and objectively identified, the securitization 
debate views security as essentially inter subjective. For the purpose of conflict studies, 
critical security studies have opened up a plethora of issues that have been neglected in 
traditional security studies. The former has generated rich literature on previously 
unexplored issues affecting state behaviour and the implications thereof. How security 
is defined by states affects their policy actions and the two are inter-related so that 
policy action constrains the way states behave. Inter-state relations have been an 
                                                             
4 See for example, (Krause & Williams 1997); (Booth 1997) 
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important theme in critical security studies.5 These studies have shown how foreign 
policy considerations are determined by a complex set of factors that include 
conceptualizations of identity and interests and how they change with the broader 
historical and political context.  The following section elucidates the theory further and 
discusses important contributions to the subject of study.  
 
The securitization debate  
Policies require representations of the issues they seek to address and these 
representations come from the wider context in which policy makers find themselves 
(Hansen 2006). The purpose of this study then is to explore the process of production 
and reproduction in discourses and continuity and transformation in policy practice. It 
is this interplay of security, identity and context, in understanding how and why 
policies are formed, that forms the purpose of this study. This also elucidates how some 
conflicts come to be solved while others remain intractable.  
The concept of security is central to this thesis since it is a dominant theme in conflict 
and conflict resolution practices. Security and interests are closely intertwined; indeed 
it is the protection of interests that forms the basis of security. But neither security, nor 
interests, are objectively given and fixed. Identities and interests are not exogenously 
given, but are constituted through interaction. This leads to another central assumption 
in critical studies that agents and structures are mutually constituted.6 The significance 
of this ontological premise is that it is futile to study which influences which, for each 
is simultaneously influenced by the other. Thus, security is better understood as a 
construction of threats and insecurity, a construction that can be discerned in the 
framing of issues in political discourses.  
The concept of security has occupied a dominant place in the field of international 
relations. Critical security studies challenged the realist notion of security as an 
objectively given state-centric concept.7 From the realist perspective, states were the 
                                                             
5 See for example, (Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006)  
6 For more on the agent structure debate, see, for example, (Wendt 1987; Klotz 2006)  
7 See for example, (Booth 1997), (Krause 1998) 
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referents of security and insecurity arose from some exogenous disturbances that were 
directed at the state. Constructivist theories have sought to explore security as a 
construct; the role of ideas played a dominant role in explaining the concept of security 
as being constructed for some purpose. Thus constructivism focuses on the processes 
that construct the world as we know it.  
Buzan and Waever’s theory of securitization, which deems security to be a speech act, 
narrows the construction of the security problem to the agency of political actors, 
especially the elite in determining the moment of construction. The Copenhagen 
School, as this school of thought has come to be characterised, places on actors the 
potential of intentional and strategic action through the production of discourses of 
insecurity. Waever characterizes security discourse as ‘dramatizing an issue as having 
absolute priority’ and the act of labelling something a security issue enables an actor to 
deal with it in extraordinary measures, including ‘breaking the normal political rules of 
the game’ (Waever 1996) p.106).  
 
The concept has been popular in critical security studies that studied the phenomena 
across a range of issues; the securitization of  immigration, of crime and of sexuality 
are only some of the uses of the theory that seek to explain how these issues are 
constructed as threats to the security of the state. A large part of some of the recent 
literature on discourse and policy has at its focus the study of discourses on terrorism 
and American policy post 9/11 which tends to locate securitization primarily in the 
speeches of the political elite and in the policy texts that articulate official positions. 
Jackson (Jackson 2005) studies the language used in the war on terror and argues that it 
made certain forms of action seem rational and logical and others seem entirely absurd. 
As it translated into action, attacking states suspected of harbouring terrorists became 
an acceptable and logical policy, while any form of dialogue with the individuals and 
organizations labelled terrorist was unthinkable. Jackson pays close attention to 
language in speeches and texts of the political elite and shows how linking the events of 
September 11, 2001 with Pearl Harbour and World War II framed the incident in a 
historical narrative that suggested that the United States was being attacked for its 
virtues rather than its failings or foreign policy conduct.  
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Even though the contribution of the Copenhagen School to critical security studies has 
been important in drawing attention to language, the insufficient attention to context 
suggests rather erroneously that political actors are free to pronounce any situation a 
security problem by declaring it to be so. In later elaborations, (Buzan et al. 1998) 
Waever adds the role of audience and facilitating conditions to refine the securitization 
theory, but fails to make explicit the mechanism that links the audience with the actors 
and speech act. The omission of wider social processes suggests ironically that power 
and identity, two central concepts in the securitization theory, are momentarily 
produced and results in a somewhat static model of the application of meaning to 
events rather than to show how meanings are dynamically located in a process 
(McSweeney 1996; Stritzel 2007).  
Weldes points out that conflicts and crises are not only situations that threaten states 
and their security, but at the same time, they are beneficial for states for they present an 
opportunity to enhance control of the population and to “refine and elaborate the 
relations of power within the state itself” (Weldes et al. 1999, p. 58).  Power can be 
enacted directly, as in the form of directive speech acts or texts on legal or regulatory 
matters or indirectly, in the form of description or legitimization of powerful actors or 
their actions and ideologies’ (Van Dijk 2008). 
There is a growing body of literature on the interaction of identity, security and policy 
that provides the conceptual and methodological guidance of this thesis. In arguing that 
policy is a political practice that encompasses the constitution, production and 
maintenance of identity, Campbell (1992) deconstructs conventional political discourse 
of the United States during the Cold War. The constant revision of the national purpose 
and security objectives, encompassing cultural, political and geostrategic aspects, 
shows security to be articulated not just in terms of the Othering of the Soviet Union 
and its threat to the United States, but also in terms of the need to maintain order even 
in the absence of a Soviet threat and hence the justification of policies that served these 
objectives. The construction of threat and danger is thereby maintained and reproduced 
one way or the other. As Campbell argues, in this way, it did not really matter if one 
threat ended; the ending of the Cold War may have caused that particular representation 
to collapse, but if we understand it to be a struggle within and between identities, then 
threats are not just the result of a particular state or ideology; it is an on-going process. 
The mutual constitution of identities and policies brought out in the official texts is 
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evident in the way these inscribe policy with statements on moral codes, the protection 
of cultural and spiritual values and thereby scripted a particular American identity. 
The temporary fixity of meaning, by aligning identity, interests and policy, is therefore 
open to challenge by competing discourses that destabilize and displace the dominant 
articulation. The replacement by a new dominant discourse once again takes place by 
the silencing or marginalizing of alternative discourses. The Israel-Palestine conflict 
presents an example of the process of silencing and delegitimization of Palestinian 
concerns in American official discourses during the Truman administration, a period 
that marked the beginning of the conflict. In focusing on Jewish claims to statehood, 
their victimization and rights find consistent mention, even as Palestinian rights and 
humanitarian issues affecting them from Jewish immigration are sought to be de-
emphasized. Where the denial of a Jewish state does find mention in some sections of 
the official administration, the concern is centred on American strategic interests rather 
than on the concerns of Palestinians (Shinko 2004). Any debate on issues that 
Palestinians raised was not entertained by the American political leadership. The 
recognition by the Truman government of Israel, and the policy of partitioning the 
Palestinian land, framed as ‘fair and equitable’ despite the disproportional population-
territorial area ratio, served ultimately to deny the Palestinians the authenticity to speak 
on behalf of their community. In other words, the rights of the Palestinians were 
delegitimised,  
What the above discussion on security demonstrates is that states encompass a 
perception of themselves and the situation around them, and this can be discerned in the 
way they seek to define their security. This ties in with their interests and restricts the 
way these interests can be protected. As Campbell’s (1992) and Shinko’s (2004) studies 
show, states view other states through the prism of identity; the perceived identity of 
the latter affects the level of animosity or friendship between the two, and the resulting 
policy options before them. Campbell’s crucial observation of the inherent need for 
states to maintain an illusion of threat underlies the framing process in situations of 
conflict. Even as conflicts change course, the concept of security and threats to it 
acquires different meaning. Moreover, this process is inherently unstable as meanings 
are ever changing and exist only temporarily in a given context. These meanings of 
security legitimise or delegitimise policy options facing the state,  
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In domestic conflict situations particularly, this process is even more challenging as 
democratic states attempt to define and respond to situations within their boundaries 
and to actors usually their own citizens. Security is no longer envisioned in terms of 
states and their external enemies; for millions of people across the world it is their own 
government and their policies that is the biggest security threat (Booth 1991). The 
careful delineation of ‘us’ or Self and ‘them’ or Other takes on added sensitivity and, 
more importantly, the range of options the state can use legitimately become that much 
more complicated. Many states lack a well-defined domestic security strategy and 
instead focus on each situation anew, though often using a set of legislations available 
to them. As the case of India shows below, the constant adaptation and revision of 
policies in line with their legitimacy points to a wider process of locating identity in 
changing contexts and the resulting implications for conflict trajectories.  
 
India’s Internal Security Strategies  
The recurring theme in the literature on securitization suggests that legitimacy is the 
key factor that provides coherence to the mutually constitutive relationship between 
discourses on security, identity and policy practice. The interlinkages of dominant 
conflict representations with policy action as applicable in India’s conflict settings are 
the focus of study of this thesis. India’s own sense of security is reflected in the way it 
handles domestic strife. Influencing its understandings are not only historical 
experiences but also the contemporary context in which it finds itself-shaped by both 
domestic and international events.   
Much of the literature on India’s security policy deals with its foreign policy. Within 
this literature, important contributions have been made to understanding India’s identity 
and interests and their links with policy outcome. Kumar argues that India’s foreign 
policy considerations have shifted from state sovereignty to a more normative foreign 
policy in recent years as the country begins to identify itself as a rising power (Kumar 
2008), p.26). Indian strategic thought is sometimes traced back to Kautilya and Ashoka, 
both historical figures in India’s long history of political reign.8 The former espoused 
realist thought, the latter, idealist ones and both have been cited as sources of India’s 
                                                             
8 See for example (Tanham 1992), (Hilali 2001). 
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foreign policy strategy. However, as Mehta argues, “these invocations are a caricature 
of historical realities” (Mehta 2009) p.210). He argues that Indian foreign policy has 
been influenced, to a large extent, by the partition in 1947 and that India, and all of 
South Asia, has relied on a fear of the other to secure its identity. However, India’s 
security concerns are not just confined to its immediate neighbours as the political elite 
seeks major power status and not merely a regional power (Hilali 2001). Hilali (2001) 
also argues that India’s defensive strategic culture is responsible for its preference for 
bilateral over multilateral engagement. Yet others argue that India’s nuclear capability 
has strengthened the confidence of the Indian leadership to pursue an active 
international diplomatic strategy (Perkovich 2003). India’s foreign and security policy 
considerations are at a time and place where changes are necessary, as India’s profile 
and stature have risen in the international system, but because foreign policy does not 
sway votes, political parties have not engaged with it seriously, resulting in ad hoc 
responses to various international crises (Pant 2008).  
As it translates into domestic security policy, here too, decisions have been ad hoc, with 
lack of institutionalisation contributing to the lack of a cohesive security strategy. At 
the core of these responses is India’s sense of identity and its relationship with others. 
To highlight the role of identity in securitization and policy formulation, Muppidi’s 
study (Muppidi 1999) of India’s foreign policy during the Cold War is a useful 
example. Muppidi argues that security in India is conceptualised in postcolonial terms 
and continues to dominate political discourse of the State. Through a constructivist 
methodology, she shows how Indo-US relations during the Cold War can be viewed 
through the lens of post colonialism whereby India’s postcolonial identity was 
constantly expressed in the assertion of independence in the international system. The 
analysis shows how the self-understandings of the Indian state’s relations with the 
United States differed from its relations with the Soviet Union, and how the concept of 
security functioned simultaneously as a field of meanings and as social power. As a 
field of meanings, security was understood as an ‘organised set of interpretations for 
making sense of a complex international system’ while as social power, the security 
imaginary worked to ‘produce social relations of power through the production of 
distinctive social identities’ (Muppidi 1999, pp. 123-24).  The United States, then, in 
spite of sharing democracy, plurality and free market values with India, was looked 
upon as a ‘colonizer’ that failed to respect India’s independence and nonalignment in 
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international affairs. The Soviet Union on the other hand by stressing a shared past of 
oppression and struggle sought to ‘establish a relationship of identity through the 
postcolonial self-understanding of the Indian state’ and thus presented a less hostile 
image to India.  
Identity, then, can be said to mediate between the framing of conflict situations and 
locating the appropriate strategy; and changes over time are reflective of and are 
reflected in changes in the way security is conceptualised. Applying this in a domestic 
framework, internal conflicts in India have preoccupied the Indian state since its 
independence and long-standing conflicts such as Kashmir and Manipur continue to be 
major security challenges even if the concept itself has undergone changes over the 
years. Literature on India’s internal security strategy is largely case-specific.9 
Moreover, much of the analysis has been carried out with an underlying focus on 
federalism and India’s status as a federal polity and scholars of conflict resolution in 
India have often highlighted reorganization and federalism as exemplary models of 
resolving ethnic conflict (Bhattacharya 2005) (Chadda 2002).  
Chadda’s (2002) analysis of India’s efforts at internal reorganization elucidates this 
further. She argues that the various phases of federal reorganization that India has 
witnessed have been part of the Indian State’s strategy to accommodate ethnic 
aspirations. In the early years after independence, the main task for the leadership was 
to ensure a strong central government for the preservation of India’s unity. The 
linguistic reorganization of states in 1956 was meant to simultaneously reiterate the 
Centre’s importance but acknowledge the importance of diverse cultures and allow a 
degree of regional autonomy (Chadda 2002, p.50). The reorganization of the north 
eastern region in the 1970s was less successful, she argues, due to the centralizing 
tendencies of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Twin considerations of ethnic 
accommodation and security concerns led to the reorganization of this border region, 
but the era was marked by increasing populism of, and greater demands for autonomy 
                                                             
9 A number of studies exist on the conflicts in Punjab, Kashmir, the north-east conflicts, Naxalism. 
Fewer studies deal with an overall internal security strategy drawing comparative research. Exceptions 
include, Telford, H. 2001. Counter Insurgency in India: Observations from Punjab and Kashmir, The 
Journal of Conflict Studies, 21 (1); Tharu, S. 2007. Insurgency and the State in India: the Naxalite and 
Khalistan movements, South Asian Survey, 14 (83); Chenoy, A. and Kamal Mitra Chenoy. 2010. Maoist 
and other Armed Conflicts, Penguin, Delhi; Conflict Resolution: Learning lessons from dialogue 
processes in India. 2011. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva. 
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by the various caste and ethnic political parties that ruled the states across the country. 
The arbitrary use of emergency constitutional provisions by Gandhi to quell political 
dissent translated into an erosion of the democratic character of the Indian state. The 
late 1980s and early 1990s marked the end of Congress dominance and emergence of 
coalition politics in India. Chadda describes the conflicts in this period, barring 
Kashmir, as evidence of a new relation between the Centre and states wherein demands 
now began to be couched not in terms of autonomy from the centre but for exercising 
power over the centre. This analysis stems from the fact that coalition partners now had 
a stake in the functioning of the government. The creation of three new states in the 
1990s is further testament to the devolution of power away from the Centre, she argues. 
Rather than analyse the effects of the policies in terms of simple dichotomises like 
centralization and decentralization, Chadda defends India’s federal arrangement as 
successful even if centralization and state oppression during the 1970s and 1980s 
deserve to be criticized. Chadda argues that without a strong state there can be no 
democracy, and hence centralization has to precede decentralization.    
Amongst the range of options that the state has, accommodation through reorganization 
of boundaries has perhaps been the most favoured strategy. The Centre is empowered 
to alter state boundaries by the Indian constitution. Reorganization of borders within 
the state, so as to create a separate area of relative autonomy based on the principle of 
federalism has been a dominant approach to resolving conflict. In ethnic conflicts, this 
strategy works to ensure that the group remains committed to the existing political 
process while at the same time carving out a niche for it to govern itself on matters 
particular to them.  
Amongst the constitutional measures that the Indian state has before it, the Centre in 
New Delhi is disproportionately empowered over the state governments in situations of 
emergency. Three categories of what are known as situations of ‘emergency’—war or 
external aggression or internal disturbance; failure of constitutional machinery in the 
country or in a state; and a threat to the financial security to the nation allow for a 
suspension of all fundamental rights (except the right to life and personal liberty) and 
the dissolution of federal principles. Invoking one of these, then, gives the state the 
authority to control democratic functioning. Moreover, the President can suspend a 
state government on the recommendation of the New Delhi appointed governor to the 
state, if the latter reports the inability of a state government to maintain law and order. 
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Direct rule from the Centre can be instituted for a period of six months, which can be 
extended based on approval from the parliament. At the very least, even without a state 
of emergency or President’s Rule, the state can curb the right to assemble in public 
spaces and has used preventive detention in the name of ‘maintenance of law and 
order’.  
For Singh (1996), India functions as an ethnic democracy, by which he means that 
Indian nationalism is a disguise for Hindu revivalism, and points to policies in Punjab, 
and the denial of Sikh statehood as evidence of majoritarianism and ‘hegemonic 
control’ (Singh 1996). The use of anti-terrorist strategies in Punjab led to the 
establishment of what he terms a ‘security state’ that depended heavily on strong arm 
tactics. Further, he argues, in spite of the “success” of Punjab, core demands that were 
behind much of the crisis remained unresolved (Singh 1996, p.420). He notes a 
deliberate attempt to legitimize the apparent order in Punjab through the electoral 
process.  
In a similar vein, Ganguly argues that the strategy of the state has some discernible 
trends and these follow from the “success” of Punjab (Ganguly et al. 2007) p.62). As a 
first step, he contends, force is used to tackle violence using both state police forces and 
specially trained paramilitary troops. The introduction of various laws to strengthen the 
powers of the security forces and the capacity of the judicial and political 
administration has often met with criticisms as these sought to curtail civil and political 
rights. A third dimension of the state’s strategy has been to adopt peace agreements 
with chosen insurgents. These accords contain measures to address grievances and 
protect political, cultural or economic rights but, as Ganguly argues, these have failed 
to tackle root causes or have faced implementation issues (Ganguly 2007, p.63).    
Writing on India’s security policy in the north-east, Baruah (2005) argues that the 
counter insurgency methods employed by the state have led to the establishment of an 
authoritarian military regime due to the powers of the armed forces. In treating the 
region as a frontier region, the security thinking in New Delhi is dominated by the need 
to protect the borders so as to maintain territorial sovereignty and control infiltration 
from the east. He also argues that there is a lack of concerted effort at ending conflict, 
suggesting that the Indian state has managed disorder at a level that it can live with and 
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lacks political will to end the violence. The policy of creating exclusive homelands for 
particular ethnic groups has, moreover, led to exclusionary politics (Baruah 2003).    
Both Baruah and Singh highlight the role of the state in accentuating the conflict—by 
extending support to certain factions, or by co-opting leadership. In Punjab, the tacit 
support of the central leadership to a Sikh extremist preacher in countering the 
popularity of the Sikh political party at the forefront of the movement led to a split in 
the movement and strengthened extremist forces. In the north east, the Assam Accord 
for instance co-opted the leaders of the movement for separation of Assam from India 
into a power sharing agreement, and left out extremist groups that continued to engage 
in a violent conflict against the state. Cohen considers this ‘pressure and co-option’ 
strategy to be successful owing to the sheer size and resources available to the state as 
well as to the fragmentation in dissident groups (Cohen 2001), p.113).   
Navlakha (2004) argues that a militaristic approach dominates India’s internal security 
strategy. He assesses that the state perceives its internal conflicts as imminent threats to 
itself and therefore the best way of fighting them is through force. This, he argues, is 
most evident in the way the Naxalite conflict has come to be perceived. This armed 
movement of the tribals and landless labourers now occupies the status of the most 
serious internal security threat to the state.10 Financial allocations and military 
deployments suggest that though state leaders have identified the roots of the problem 
to be socio-economic, the thrust of its policy continues to be through counter-terrorism 
tactics that include the creation of new paramilitary forces, training of police and 
modernization of weapons. Efforts to establish the movement’s foreign links with 
Nepal were also attempted which Navlakha argues is a deliberate strategy of the state to 
elevate a conflict to the status of a serious threat (Navlakha 2004), p.4239). The 
association of domestic problems with external actors stems from the continuation of 
its troubles with its neighbours in the region and has been an almost spontaneous 
tendency by the state to divert attention away from domestic roots. Winning external 
patrons has been an important strategy in India’s internal conflict strategy (Sahadevan 
2000). With its complicity in conflicts in Punjab, Kashmir and the north-east, the 
                                                             
10 This was stated by then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in April 2006 at a meeting of the standing 
committee on Naxalism, www.pib.nic.in. Accessed on October 25, 2014.. 
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Indian government has made consistent attempts at bilateral and international 
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.  
KPS Gill, who served as the police chief in Punjab during the crises and was later 
appointed to other conflict areas such as Kashmir and Maoist areas as well, considers 
the use of coercive force as the sole reason for the defeat of terrorism in Punjab and 
argues that force is a fundamental obligation of the state.11 Gill asserts that dialogue 
with militants and political solutions in such situations have been failed strategies and 
are futile policies in violent conflicts. This strategic thinking, which dominates a 
section of the ruling elite, has been a consistent feature of domestic security policy, 
though it has often been supplemented with political and economic policies as well.  
When does the state use force? For a democracy in particular this question weighs 
heavily. Democracies are assumed to be more resistant in using force to suppress 
dissent given that the ruling state elite is interested in maintaining power and that the 
use of violence against its own citizens is likely to be unpopular. Democracies are also 
assumed to have legal and constitutional constraints that prevent them from resorting to 
force. Paradoxically, evidence in India suggests otherwise. Across the conflicts in 
Punjab, Kashmir and the north eastern parts of the country, widespread use of the army, 
paramilitary and police forces has been a fairly acceptable way of dealing with 
domestic armed conflict, with limited resistance outside the impacted areas..  
That the Indian State views autonomy and security as ‘bipolar and zero-sum’(Miklian 
2011) is lent some credence by this view and the response to internal conflicts and 
demands for greater autonomy is therefore spontaneously met with suppression. 
However, the concept of security is itself not addressed in these studies. A question that 
requires further research is whether security articulations and definitions display 
changes. This question is important in capturing domestic and international contexts as 
influencing the Indian state’s notion of its security. As an example, the events of 
September 11, 2001 and its repercussions had a huge influence on domestic security 
situations of states across the world. A tendency of the Indian state to bring Kashmir 
under the ambit of the global war on terror was aimed at gaining international attention 
and pressuring Pakistan.  
                                                             
11 KPS Gill, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpstext.htm 
Accessed on July 13, 2012. 
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Security perceptions-both in its foreign and domestic dimensions is shaped primarily by 
a small section of the political elite in India. Koithara argues that centralization of 
power has generally found support (Koithara 1999) p.37) and that in times of crises, as 
in Punjab, the state has been able to garner the support of the upper strata to use 
illiberal measures. He also contends that the discourse on internal security is state-
centric, with a general unwillingness to engage in dialogue with disaffected sections of 
society (Koithara 1999, p.37). After the political resolution of the Tamil crisis by the 
late 1960s, there has not been a replication of such mechanisms to other internal crises. 
An expansion in the capability of state repression-by strengthening paramilitary and 
police forces and using the army for internal operations has meant that the state has 
evolved a militarised approach to internal security (Koithara 1999, p.104). He also 
asserts that the strategy has little to do with addressing root causes and can be deemed 
to be more as ‘crisis invoked’ and ‘damage limiting’. Cohen (2001) argues that the 
roots of most of the political domestic conflicts in India can be traced to the state’s 
neglect of democratic politics at an early stage of the crises.      
Likewise, according to Ganguly (Ganguly & Fidler 2009) the counter insurgency 
strategy of the Indian state follows a pattern bereft of historical contexts and past 
experiences and hence shifts attention away from core issues. Using the same heavy 
handed responses in Kashmir as was followed in Punjab and the north east meant heavy 
human costs and resulted in the alienation of the population. Had the experiences of 
Punjab been taken into account, this would have demonstrated the failure of such 
policies. The state viewed the Kashmiri demand for greater state autonomy as a threat 
to national integrity, thereby providing legitimacy for the imposition of central rule 
(Ganguly & Bajpai 1994).   
Hardgrave has identified increasing centralization by the Indian state as a source of 
conflict and notes that “in its attempts to quell endemic unrest and the challenge of 
terrorism, India has enacted a plethora of laws that have become instruments of 
repression; police and paramilitary abuses seem to get worse while all sorts of other 
violations of human rights are reported with numbing frequency” (Hardgrave 1993), 
p.68). In recent years, this centralisation has been checked to some extent by the active 
interventions by the Supreme Court on matters related to judicial reform, corruption 
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and human rights, but in situations of conflict, the law remains largely unchanged.12 
Moreover, these interventions have not always resulted in greater human rights 
protection. For instance, despite the Supreme Court’s repeal of the draconian 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2004, the provisions of this Act have remained 
in other legislations (Kalhan et al 2007).  
Considering the above discussion on India’s security strategies, two opposing sets of 
views emerge. On the one hand, India is referred to as a success, measured in terms of 
its model of federalism and the resulting political flexibility, while on the other, India 
appears as a security state. The former views public expenditure and economic 
packages towards conflict areas as an effort at promoting development for the common 
man, while the latter considers the thrust of military approaches and the neglect of 
political negotiations evidence of the state’s failure to resolve the conflict even if it uses 
public expenditure as a superficial attempt at managing conflict.  
This contradiction highlights the opposing views on India’s internal security strategies. 
The challenge then arises from this division and throws open space for research on a 
comprehensive analysis of the Indian state’s conflict policies. The existence of these 
two schools of thought suggests a complicated picture that co-opts both federalism as 
well as militaristic strategies. What needs further analysis is how these options are 
weighted and how this relates with conflict evaluation and representation.  
Adding to the complexity is the issue of studying conflicts from an ethnic-nationalist 
understanding versus conflicts over different issues, such as land rights and 
development. Literature on internal conflict in India has largely been written from the 
standpoint of conflict as ethnic conflict or ethno-nationalist conflict. Kashmir, Punjab 
and the conflicts in the north-east are subsumed under these categories. These conflicts 
also share the commonality of being border regions where the security imperative takes 
on added importance militarily. However, from the point of view of conflict resolution, 
it becomes pertinent to consider whether the approach to “ethnic” conflicts is different 
from other conflicts such as the Maoist or Naxalite conflict. Also this raises questions 
                                                             






on whether conflicts in border areas are more likely to attract force as the predominant 
counterinsurgency strategy?  
Miklian’s (Miklian 2011) analysis of the Naxalite conflict and state responses to it is 
based on its categorization as a revolutionary conflict. He argues that the Indian state 
finds itself at a loss in responding to the Maoist conflict as contemporary conflict 
resolution mechanisms such as carving out autonomous regions for the insurgents are 
rendered inappropriate. Without an explicit demand for territorial autonomy or the 
creation of a state of its own, the state has limited ways of evolving an appropriate 
strategy for resolution of the conflict. At best, a strategy of management or containment 
through force seems to have gained the upper hand.  An emphasis on development as 
security in recent years has emerged as a favoured response, as the Centre pumps 
money into these ‘backward regions’ for development projects which may be difficult 
or even impossible to implement (Miklian 2011, p. 47).  
A national response, however, took years to formulate, as the Centre considered the 
problem to be primarily a law and order problem to be entrusted to the concerned state. 
With each state unit implementing its own policies to deal with the Maoists within their 
jurisdiction, the conflict lacked a pan-Indian strategy. Its classification in recent years 
as a national security threat, and hence under the ambit of the Centre, has meant a 
renewed attempt at conflict management strategies. In some cases, centre and state 
policies have conflicted with each other, leading to strains in centre-state relations. 
Hoenig (2009) considers the Maoist conflict to be primarily an ideological one. Hoenig 
argues that such conflicts have in recent times become greater security threats in the 
eyes of the state than ethno-nationalist demands by border communities (Hoenig 2009) 
p.8).  
For conflict analysis and conflict resolution studies, then, the Naxalite conflict appears 
in a distinct category. This raises an important and hitherto unexplored question—does 
the categorization of conflicts impact approaches to conflict resolution? How does the 
state perceive the Naxalite conflict? Does the lack of ethnicity or territorial 
concentration impact security policy? As a law and order problem, did the approaches 
to the Naxalite conflict differ from articulations of the problem as a socio-economic 
problem? What were the reasons behind this change in frames? Is federalism a 
fundamental principle of conflict resolution/management mechanisms in India?  
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According to Sahadevan, there is a preference in South Asia for unconventional pre-
negotiations strategies to end conflict without seeking a negotiated settlement 
(Sahadevan 2000). In his study of internal ethnic conflicts and policy responses in 
South Asia, he argues that governments in this part of the world have demonstrated a 
tendency to use unconventional strategies unilaterally until they prove to be ineffective 
or until they reach a level that demands serious negotiations. He includes processes 
such as ‘war for peace meaning military might to end the conflict; winning patrons; 
winning the hearts and minds of people and divide and rule’ under ‘unconventional 
tactics’ (Sahadevan 2000, p.38). In South Asia, war for peace, i.e., military victory is 
preferred especially in the initial phases of conflict. In Punjab for instance, the Indian 
government justified its war efforts against the extremists as the only possible solution 
as the extremists’ insistence on secession had foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated 
political settlement. Likewise, in Mizoram and in Nagaland in the north-east, the 
government’s initial reaction was to quell the conflict militarily even though the leader 
of the Mizo movement had offered to talk with the government.  
Amongst the successes in India’s security strategies, Mizoram, a state in the north 
eastern region, is considered as a model. The movement began in 1966 and spiralled 
into violence demanding separation from the Indian Union. The conflict ended in 1986 
with the creation of a separate state of Mizoram within the state of India. Goswami 
(Goswami 2009) analyses the strategies of the Indian state and argues that a 
combination of soft and hard approaches such as negotiation, reconciliation and 
coercion went towards the successful resolution of the conflict. Sahadevan (2000) 
argues that the Mizo conflict ended in a positive sum game as the government was able 
to use a war strategy to weaken the insurgents and reach a political settlement, while 
the Mizo insurgents voluntarily opted for a negotiated settlement without abjuring 
violence in order to gain political concessions such as full statehood and constitutional 
safeguards.   
Dialogue and negotiation as part of state strategy at managing or resolving conflict 
have not always resulted in positive outcomes for ending conflict. Limited and 
conditional talks, or their use alongside force, have hampered efforts at ending 
violence. In Kashmir, for instance, the thrust of India’s strategy in the early 1990s was 
to use force and engage in a war of attrition so that the insurgents were weakened and 
the ground prepared for political bargaining (Ganguly & Bajpai 1994; Koithara 1999). 
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Further, the tendency of dividing the moderates and extremists so as to politically 
isolate the latter has had mixed effects. In limiting the agenda for talks, and restricting 
the inclusiveness of dialogue processes, rarely has dialogue resulted in durable peace 
(Buchanan 2011). The Indian state’s insistence on finding a solution “within the 
constitution” has been a stumbling block for avenues of conflict resolution, suggesting 
that the identity of the state continues to be reiterated through the lens of traditional 
sovereignty concepts. Accommodation forms a crucial part of India’s strategy so long 
as the insurgents or extremists acknowledge the sovereignty and authority of the state 
(Cohen 2001).  
An overview of the literature as shown above demonstrates critical gaps in conflict and 
conflict resolution studies on India undertaken thus far. While each conflict has in itself 
produced extensive literature, an emphasis on causes of these conflicts overshadows 
studies on conflict resolution policies. Where studies on state policies have taken place, 
there is greater attention to federalism as the lens for analysis. There is a lack of focus 
on how the state legitimizes its policies and the strategic thinking behind domestic 
security imperatives.  What the above discussion on India’s conflict resolution 
approaches also suggests is that the process of securitization and conflict framing 
underlies state strategy. Moreover, inherent in this framing process is a self-perception 
of the Indian state as it identifies itself in changing contexts. For instance, in recent 
years there seems to be a centrality on development as a core part of the identity of the 
state, which is reflected in the policies of the state in conflict areas (Samaddar 2010). 
The framing of anti-development movements such as the Naxalite movement as anti-
national appears to be part of the process. Indeed, in Kashmir and in the Naxalite areas, 
the emphasis on youth employment and economic development packages gives 
credence to the argument.  
This gap in the literature has arisen partially due to a tendency to analyse security 
policy through the lens of pre-coded conflicts. What this implies is that studies on 
ethnic conflicts have been dealt with as a separate category. A focus on India’s 
domestic security strategy through the lens of conflict framing and policy responses 
lacks critical engagement.  A dearth of comparative studies on different forms of 
violent conflict challenging the state opens up immense research potential. Of the many 
possible issues in domestic security strategizing, this study attempts to partially fill the 
gap by undertaking a comparative study of security policies in India in the 
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contemporary period. This study, by bringing in three varied conflicts-Kashmir, Punjab 
and the Naxalite conflict, attempts to undertake a comparative analysis of conflict 
resolution policies so as to elucidate the process of decision making and legitimacy. 
What determines the legitimacy of actors in conflict? Are some types of rebels less 
likely to be negotiated with? Is this consistent across cases? This study investigates 
whether conflict typologies determine the appropriateness of policies.  
Considered thus, we may conceptualise a spectrum of typologies to characterize 
conflict, which may be based on demands and actors. An analysis of these 
characterizations and their appropriate responses can contribute to literature on conflict 
resolution by focusing on strategies of legitimization. Based on existing literature on 
typologies of conflict we may consider three key frames: secessionist conflicts, 
political conflicts, economic or development conflicts. These frames are not mutually 
exclusive; indeed there is significant overlap, but the purpose of these frames is to show 
the combination of frames and responses over time. What also makes the analyses 
interesting is the change in framing over time. Changes in characterization are 
reflective of conflict dynamics as well as of changes in the way the Indian state 
perceives its own sense of threat and security.   
Significance of the Study 
This thesis adds to the literature on conflict and peace studies by offering a novel way 
of analysing policy legitimization. By keeping its focus on state discourses, this study 
answers how conflicts are represented by the political elite and how these have 
repercussions for policy making. In considering the case of India, this study assumes 
greater significance as India provides a canvas for comparative study owing to the 
multiplicity and distinctiveness of internal conflicts. This enables us to understand the 
differences and similarities of the Indian state’s internal security strategy across a wide 
range of conflicts-Punjab, Kashmir and the Naxal conflict.  
Research Questions  
To understand India’s internal security policy and the process of legitimisation and 
delegitimization, the following research questions guide this thesis: 
x How are internal conflicts represented by the Indian state in its formulation of 
an adequate response? 
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x What are the patterns of security and conflict resolution policies displayed 
across conflicts and across time?  
x What are the forms of identities conferred upon various actors in domestic 
conflicts?  
x Do the above change during conflict? Is there a deradicalisation of identities in 
conflict management and conflict resolution policies? 
x How are formerly unthinkable solutions legitimized at later stages of the 
conflict? 
It is in this context that the theme of understanding security and conflict resolution in 
India fits in. With legitimization as the crucial factor underlying the politics of 
representation, this study attempts to explore the mechanisms by which legitimacy is 
sought, contested and undermined in conflicts.  
In this thesis, though, the concern is not so much as to why these conflicts are described 
one way or the other, but how they are made sense of. The relationship between 
discourse and policy is constitutive and relational rather than causal, the implication of 
which is that dominant representations inform policy making and vice versa. By 
exploring the discourses of the state and the rebel groups at key moments of the 
conflict, we can understand competing and converging claims to nationalism, security, 
conflict resolution and violence. What is included in the dominant discourses and what 
is excluded are important parts of this discovery.  
In Chapter 2, I lay out the methodological framework of this thesis and the 
appropriateness of the chosen methodology in answering the research questions laid out 
above. In Chapter 3, a detailed discourse analysis of the Punjab conflict shows how the 
Indian state dealt with one of the earliest insurgencies affecting independent India. 
Chapter 4 looks at the political discourses in New Delhi on Kashmir and follows the 
trajectory until 2010. The Naxalite conflict is analysed in Chapter 5 with a focus on the 
contemporary period from 2000 to 2010. This thesis concludes with comparative 
analyses of the three conflicts and the broader implications for India’s internal security 





Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
How conflicts are represented, and how policies are legitimised are crucial for conflict 
resolution. As was discussed in the introductory chapter, there is an inherent process of 
constructing a heightened sense of insecurity in times of conflict so as to garner support 
for suppression and military tactics. In the case of internal conflicts, such a need may 
be greater or lesser, depending on how the state would like its domestic and 
international audience to react. The possibilities are, of course, bound by context, 
making a temporal study apt to discern changing processes.  
If legitimacy and the processes accompanying policy making in conflict situations are 
determined largely by the state, one of the possible ways to analyse policy making is 
through a study of the state’s discourses. These discourses, reflected in official texts, 
speeches, debates and actions, contain within them perceptions of the causes of the 
conflicts, the identities of actors involved and the best way to address these conflicts.    
This chapter contains the methodological framework guiding this thesis. Drawing upon 
previous discussions of securitization, contextual framing and discourse analysis, this 
chapter outlines hegemony and legitimization as two central concepts emergent in 
policy making particularly in crises. From a post-structuralist ontology, an analysis 
through the lens of discourse theoretical analysis offers the best possible way of 
identifying these processes.  
Beginning with the larger puzzle of democratic governments, dissent and violence, this 
chapter then moves on to the question of legitimacy as the key guiding factor in policy 
making. The process of legitimization, it is then argued, is a discursive contest where 
discourses compete for hegemony. The study of discourses is enabled through Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory, which is further blended with practical applications of 
the methodology as it appears in other studies on conflict and policy. These studies are 
elucidated and the appropriate methodology for this thesis is then illustrated with 






Violence, Sovereignty and the State 
The relationship between violence and the state can be analysed through different 
lenses and theories. The puzzle in this thesis, of how and when states use violence 
against its own citizens has concerned many political theorists. In situations of internal 
conflict, dissent has the potential to turn into violence and if left unresolved, may lead 
to protracted violent conflicts. Closely linked to this concept of violence and the state is 
the idea of sovereignty.  In much of the discourses in IR, sovereignty is “taken to be a 
political or legal fact within an already given and demarcated territory simultaneously 
signifying sovereignty over the same territory and everything that happens to be inside 
this portion of space” (Bartelson 1995).  
The realist or traditional conception of the modern state in international political theory 
can be traced to the events surrounding the Treaty of Westphalia in Western Europe in 
1648. It is widely believed in international relations that this treaty separated the 
powers of the state from the Church and thereby established the state as the legitimate 
authority within a particular territorially defined political unit. With this authority came 
the notion of indivisible sovereignty that essentially meant states had complete control 
internally and the internal sphere of sovereignty was distinct from the external (Walker 
1993). Each sovereign state had monopoly and legitimacy over the use of violence 
within its boundaries, manifest in the institution of the police. However, recent research 
suggests that modern sovereignty was not the result of the Peace of Westphalia and it is 
nineteenth and twentieth century historiography, with its anachronistic account of the 
modern nation-state, which created the myth of Westphalia (Osiander 2001). 
Osiander’s research indicates that there is no mention of sovereignty or division or 
balance of power in the peace treaties (Osiander 2001, p. 266). The estates within the 
empire had always had the right to conduct relations with foreign actors and were free 
to even leave it if they had so desired (Osiander 2001, p. 279) without the fear of threat. 
The widely believed account in International Relations of the birth of the sovereign 
state after the Peace of Westphalia has been therefore a misrepresentation and 
distortion of the history of seventeenth century Western Europe. In his historical 
account of the thirty years war, Osiander argues that the war itself was not the result of 
36 
 
the Habsburg Empire to increase its power, but because other actors wanted to reduce it 
(Osiander 2001, p. 260).  
If it is indeed questionable that the modern nation-state began its tryst with sovereignty 
after 1648, it also problematizes the sole authority over the means of violence that the 
state exercises. The monopoly over the means of violence is an important resource 
through which states sustain their power (Giddens 1985) . It is this limitation of the use 
of violence to states, and the territorially defined entity of the state that are two of the 
most crucial characteristics associated with modern states.  
It is this definition that is used almost uncontested in traditional political and 
international studies. There are additional factors that help states achieve internal 
pacification—these are legal sanctions, the police and transport and communications 
(Giddens 1985, p. 276) and restriction on the use of the military. In spite of these 
restrictions, the use of force by states in the face of dissent has not been uncommon. 
Internal conflicts-manifest across the world in the form of ethnic and political violence, 
have seen the use of police, paramilitary and even military force.    
Critical theory has opened up the space for a critique of the various uncontested 
concepts used in political theory including state violence in ways that were traditionally 
not available before. Since then there has been a reconceptualization of the concepts of 
security, sovereignty and violence.13 The emergence of international human rights and 
implementation through human rights watchdogs in international and local civil society 
has greatly aided the effort to minimize state sanctioned violence. At the very least, this 
has achieved rigorous academic study of political violence. Questioning the 
essentialization of sovereignty, Bartelson (1995) traces the genealogy of the term to 
argue that “sovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produce each 
other historically” (Bartelson 1995, p.3). One way of considering this argument is to 
look at historiography as implicated in the production of the past as Osiander’s study 
indicates. The givenness of sovereignty assumes an unchanging constancy in its scope 
(Bartelson 1995, p.29), however, the concept is contingent and unstable (Bartelson 
1995, p.2). In other words, there is inconsistency in arguing for the logical connection 
between state sovereignty and violence. As Hannah Arendt puts it, “power is indeed the 
                                                             
13 See for instance (Walker 1990) 
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essence of all government but violence is not” (Arendt 1970)  She implies that violence 
is instrumental, requiring constant justification and guidance; it is a means to an end.  
In analysing violence, used both by the state as a policy response, as well as rebel 
groups against the state, this needs to be borne in mind and hence any study focussing 
on conflict policies and responses necessarily requires how justification is carried out.  
Writing about the relationship between state, identity and violence, Behera (Behera 
2000) argues that “the modern state’s strong and determinate sense of self inevitably 
leads to intolerance of those outside its boundaries” and that a “dominant identity 
seeking subjugation, assimilation or submergence of other identities, and self-assertion 
of a non-dominant identity seeking a share in state power controlled by the former, is 
inherently imbued with the risk of violence” (Behera 2000, pp. 24-25).  
For the purpose of conflict studies, particularly intra-state conflicts, the notion of 
identity, and the use of violence are fluid concepts, the meanings of which and the 
justification for which require contextual adjustments. In this thesis, state use of 
violence is analysed in terms of policy discourse; the policy practices of the political 
elite are legitimised through a construction of security in ways that marginalise 
alternative policy options. Below, the concept of legitimacy is explored in detail.  
The concept of legitimacy and legitimization 
The concept of legitimacy has been explored in political studies primarily in the 
functioning of the state (see for, example (Lipset 1959; Connolly 1984; Habermas 
1988). The acceptance of something as valid, logical or natural lies at the core of the 
legitimacy concept. Legitimization is the process of constructing something as 
legitimate. The latter is grounded in a more constructivist theoretical basis and in the 
case of political studies is used to understand the construction of political legitimacy 
such as for example the legitimacy of policies. Political legitimacy may also be defined 
as “the quality of oughtness” that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political 
regime. That government is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for a society” 
(Merelman 1966). Two points are noteworthy-one that it applies to the state and its 
political system, and two, its reception by an audience or public is important to 
complete the concept. In other words, there must be a notion of justice associated for it 
to be considered legitimate.  In conflict studies, this concept has been used in the case 
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of failed/collapsed states and foreign intervention in the post-conflict stage that 
considers the establishment and restoration of political legitimacy to be a challenge.  
My concern in this thesis is with the former articulation of political legitimacy as a 
process of legitimization, but situated in the context of internal conflicts in relatively 
stable democracies. In particular, it is the peculiar legitimacy of force in democracies 
that deserves greater scholarly attention.  
Habermas was amongst the first to take a critical theory approach towards legitimacy. 
He argued that advanced capitalist societies eventually face legitimacy difficulties 
owing to the class structure in these societies and that “the rising level of demand is 
proportional to the growing need for legitimation” (Habermas 1988) p.73). He says that 
a “legitimation crisis can be predicted only if expectations that cannot be fulfilled either 
with the available quantity of value or generally with rewards conforming to the system 
are systematically produced. A legitimation crisis then must be based on a motivation 
crisis—that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the 
educational system and the occupational system on the one hand and the motivation 
supplied by the socio-cultural system on the other” (Habermas 1988, pp. 74-75). What 
this implies is that there is a sense of dissatisfaction when the state and its institutions 
are unable to fulfil the expectations and motivations of the citizens or subjects. 
However, this leaves open the question of what such a discrepancy can imply.  
Tying in the concept of democracy and moral justification, Buchanan provides a lucid 
definition of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy as defined by Buchanan (2002), 
could be said to exist when an entity is “morally justified in wielding political power 
where to wield political power is to attempt to exercise a monopoly, within a 
jurisdiction, in the making, application, and enforcement of laws” (Buchanan 2002), 
pp. 689-690). This moral justification stems from a democratically authorized political 
power, which means that people or subjects have authorized or allowed certain 
(elected) persons to wield political power by their consent and without discrimination 
(Buchanan 2002, p.698). Thus, political authority, which includes the right to be 
obeyed, entails political legitimacy but not vice versa (Buchanan 2002, p.695). There is 
a distinction between political authority and authoritativeness, easily understood by 
three vital differences-whereas the former is restricted to the political domain, the latter 
is not; authoritativeness does not imply that one is morally justified in imposing rules 
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on anyone; and, lastly, there is no obligation on the part of the subjects to obey an 
authoritative entity whereas a political authority has an obligation to be obeyed.  
Merelman (Merelman 1966) examines legitimacy through the framework of 
psychological learning theory in which political legitimacy is understood as a largely 
top down process as it rests on the capacity or ability of political leaders/government to 
communicate new policies effectively to the population. The linking of these policies 
with payoffs, that is, governments attach sanctions or reinforcements with policies and 
the whole process is rationalised into an overall logic of legitimacy (Merelman 1966, 
p.549). While the association of symbols with legitimacy is useful, such explanations of 
policy making can be said to be more strategic/rational and driven entirely by the 
political elite; whereas this thesis takes the opinion of decisions as rooted in a context 
such that there is a more constitutive rather than causal relationship between power, 
policy decisions and legitimacy.  Power and legitimacy are intertwined such that it is 
not a case of causality, but rather that “power and legitimacy are one and the same”, 
say Laclau and Zac, and “to call a power illegitimate would presuppose another social 
order whose content would be the basis to judge the existing power. But if outside 
power were the chaos of the state of nature, then that basis would not exist. The only 
way in which power could become illegitimate would be if it were incapable of 
guaranteeing the life and security of the subjects.” (Laclau 1994) p.20) 
Essentially, the argument made by scholars of political legitimacy is that democracies 
in particular need legitimacy and effectiveness of their political systems in order to 
remain stable (Lipset, p.88 in (Connolly 1984). This notion of legitimacy he says is 
evaluative: “Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to 
the way in which its values fit with theirs” (p.88).  It was Lipset in fact who argued that 
economic development and political legitimacy were the two crucial requisites for a 
democracy (Lipset 1959). He considers the question of legitimacy to be the “degree to 
which institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper” (Lipset 
1959, p.71).  Considered such, Lipset argues that it is a matter of belief or opinion that 
when existing institutions are believed to be appropriate or morally superior that 
renders institutions as legitimate (Connolly 1984) p.108). Maintaining that the modern 
state is currently embroiled in a crisis of legitimacy, he argues that this has been a 
function of modernity itself; as people challenge “the processes and powers which 
control their lives and who fear that their institutions and leaders have no answers” 
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(Connolly 1984, p.127). This detailed definition of legitimacy provides some insight 
into domestic conflicts targeted at the state, where groups seek to question the 
legitimacy of policies. If we look at Connolly’s understanding of the concept, this 
becomes clearer.  
Connolly (Connolly 1984) relocates the question of legitimacy in terms of its 
instability. Citing four possible reasons for destabilizing legitimacy, he argues that 
firstly, future generations may become disillusioned with the current order if they 
“misconstrue the range of possibilities inherent in the order”. Second, if there emerges 
a disconnect between the commitment to constitutional principle of the political order 
and the role imperatives governing everyday life, then it may impair the state’s ability 
to play its legitimate role. Third, the ends and purposes fostered by an order can 
themselves become objects of disaffection. Such a contradictory tendency embodies a 
historical dimension whereby abstract goals inspire a populace at one moment but 
decline in their ability to secure reflective allegiance once their actual content becomes 
clear through cumulative experience. And fourth, the identities of participants are 
bound up with the institutions in which they are implicated. The modern individual, 
possessing the capacity for self-consciousness, is never exhausted by any particular set 
of roles. But one’s sense of dignity and self-identity is intimately linked to one’s ability 
to endorse the way of life one actually lives (Connolly 1984, pp. 224-225). This 
disillusionment adversely affects the ability of the institutions to promote these ends by 
non-coercive means (Connolly 1984, p.227).     
And herein lies the essential problem of force in democracies—in order to maintain 
power and legitimacy, states may eventually resort to force if the citizens feel 
disillusioned. However, studies on legitimacy, owing to the predominance of political 
legitimacy, have failed to examine the process of legitimization within the context of 
domestic conflicts. While there is always an inherent need for legitimization of 
policies, in the case of internal conflict situations this need is magnified as the state 
must face the test of legitimacy against its own people. How states delegitimize actors 
(rebels), their demands and whether this changes during the course of conflict and 
during negotiations requires greater scholarly attention. This thesis explores the process 
of legitimization occurring in conflicts by identifying the demands, identities and 
means of rebels from the perspective of the state and determines which of these at what 
points in time are legitimized or delegitimized. Since the topic resonates across 
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domestic and international conflicts, beyond the focus of India that this thesis is limited 
to, it is of wider interest to scholars interested in security, conflict and peace studies.   
A look at some of the analyses of legitimacy and conflict policies shows how 
legitimizing practices inscribe identities and insecurities as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  In analysing the discourses of American presidents justifying war, Oddo 
(Oddo 2011) studies the strategies of legitimation and concludes that these have a 
recurrent theme of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ resonating in the texts. “War is certainly one 
social practice that begs the question – why? Indeed – as a dangerous, deadly activity – 
war must be assigned legitimacy before it is undertaken. And this takes serious 
rhetorical work – work that is most often carried out by political leaders” (Oddo, 2011, 
p.289). The primacy of politics in the project of legitimization lies at the foundation of 
these studies. 
In her study on the apparent indivisibility of territorial conflicts such as in Northern 
Ireland and Jerusalem, (Goddard 2009) argues that it is legitimation strategies that 
render territories and identities as indivisible. Her analysis is based on the analysis of 
legitimization strategies and their effects on Anglo-Irish politics between 1880 and 
1921 when the civil war eventually broke out. She argues that the nineteenth century 
was a period of compromise as the Constitutional Nationalists engaged various parties 
including Republicans, Liberals and British Conservatives by strategically altering their 
legitimation of Home Rule according to each so that it appeared that the conflict was 
divisible and Home Rule was a viable solution (Goddard 2009, p 80).  It was only in 
the twentieth century that this began to change. In other words, no concept or idea 
enjoys a privileged position of unchanging legitimacy, an idea particularly important 
for conflict resolution. Many once unthinkable solutions have been found to later gain 
acceptance, or legitimacy, in the course of conflict resolution.  
Legitimization thus is a key concept in the study of policy making and for the purpose 
of this thesis, is used as an important conceptual framework in analysing policy 
discourses. How this process takes place is elucidated further in the section below.  
Poststructuralist Discourse Theory 
There are several approaches to studying policy discourses; notably content analysis, 
critical discourse analysis and poststructuralist discourse theory are used most 
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commonly in political research. The difference between these three approaches is in 
their definition of discourse and in the importance they assign to context.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, the problem of official responses to internal conflicts in India is 
proposed to be examined through a study of discourses using post structuralist 
discourse theory. Poststructuralism stems from the belief that there can be no positivist 
or objective categories with which to analyse the social world; interpretation is 
necessary and inevitable in understanding it. Poststructuralist theorists argue that 
knowledge and power are intimately related, and it is this nexus between the two that 
produces dominant narratives to the exclusion of multiple others. The plurality of 
possible perspectives and the implication that no event or object lies outside of 
discourse or narrative are the bulwarks of poststructuralism. Moreover, many issues in 
politics and international relations are not just ontological and epistemological ones, 
but are issues of power politics and authority (Devetak 2013)  
The development of post structuralist discourse theory can be attributed in large part to 
Laclau and Mouffe, who developed their theory by drawing upon the structuralist 
linguistics of  Saussure (1974), deconstruction of Derrida (1978) and the idea of 
hegemony of Gramsci (1971). Their theory has also been informed by Foucault’s 
theory of discourse (1972), and psychoanalytic theory of Lacan (1977). These theories 
are deconstructed in Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis in order to reveal their inner 
contradictions and to propose a poststructuralist theory of discourse. A methodology of 
discourse analysis informed by poststructuralism has at its centre critical investigation 
into the way facts are produced, understood and used in discourses (political, media, 
academic etc). This does not mean that poststructuralism denies the existence of facts; 
however these are made sense of only in discourses. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed is terms of 
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist 
externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute 
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themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. (Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001) p.108 
 
With its emphasis on the structures of discourse, discourse theory blurs the distinction 
between language or text and context; there is no separation of the discursive and non-
discursive. It considers all social phenomena to be discourse. In other words, material 
and ideational factors as well as text constitute ‘discourse’ (Hansen 2006). Another way 
of defining discourse is to ‘refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the 
identities of subjects and objects’ ((Stavrakakis et al. 2000) p.3) This implies that any 
research on social phenomena, such as conflict and conflict resolution practices, must 
be carried out by treating these practices as discourses-or constructions that have 
become embedded and have foreclosed meaning, albeit temporarily. The most 
distinguishing feature of discourse theory is in its concept of the discursive, and in the 
fluidity of meaning. It is this definition of discourse that is used in this thesis. 
Considered such, its applicability in this thesis implies that the conflicts facing the state 
are not objective realities ‘out there’ but are represented and imbued with meaning by 
the dominant political elite based on certain perceptions of the causes of the conflict 
and/or on the actors or rebels driving the conflict.  
Discourse theoretical research contains no single methodology for guidance. Instead of 
applying a given theory to a set of empirical objects, discourse theorists ‘articulate their 
concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000, p. 5). They use a range and a combination of approaches including but not 
limited to Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical 
approach of discourse analysis and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to critically 
investigate social reality. Discourse theory takes a relationalist, contextual and 
historicist view of identity formation to argue that identity is shaped within and through 
its relation to other meanings (Torfing 2005, p.14). Theoretically and ontologically, 
poststructuralism assumes that representations and policy are mutually constitutive and 
discursively linked (Hansen 2006, p.28). This implies that policies often articulate 
identities to achieve legitimacy or enable action, but identities are also produced and 
reproduced through policy discourses and are hence both the foundation and product of 
discourse (Hansen 2006, p.21).  Identities, moreover, are not merely self-other binaries, 
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but involve degrees of otherness, as Hansen (2006) argues. Ontologically, identity or 
representations and policy are inseparable, though analysis may and often does 
distinguish between the two. This separation facilitates analysis of how policy 
discourses create (partial) stability (Hansen 2006, p.29).  
Meanings inscribed through discourse are unstable; they exhibit temporary stability but 
meanings can change in competing discourses or with temporal and contextual 
changes. This implies that if there is an inconsistency in the constructed relationship 
between policy and identity there will be a process of adjustment whereby either the 
policy or the identity discourse is altered so as to achieve stability once again. All 
political activity is essentially concerned with the construction of links between identity 
and policy to make the two appear consistent with each other (Hansen 2006, p. 28). For 
example, American foreign policy that calls for military action against Iraq cannot be 
consistent if the identity of Iraq is constructed in terms of stability or sovereignty; there 
must instead be a construction of Iraq as a possible threat to world peace or as an evil 
dictatorship oppressing innocent civilians that requires outside help.    
Competing discourses, which in a study of governmental policies, may include 
oppositional discourses, media discourses and critical discourses of civil society, are 
the ever present factors that constantly challenge dominant official discourses. It is also 
not as if a certain construction of identity will always lead to the same policy outcome 
nor vice versa (Hansen 2006 pp.30-31). However at a given moment in time, taking 
into account contextual constraints, this is made possible, or appears ‘logical’ due to a 
continuation of intertextual and interdiscursive links; i.e. due to a continuation or 
refinement of the same concepts used in similar ways in older texts. Therefore, one set 
of policy responses appear “common sense” while others are marginalised. 
What this thesis aims to do is to apply discourse theory in situations of internal conflict 
and compare the way the Indian government handles different domestic issues. There is 
at present a gap in the literature on internal conflicts that use discourse analysis to study 
policy making. This study partially fills this gap by analysing domestic policy making 
with respect to internal conflicts and the policies for management/resolution in a 
comparative framework. By drawing in three different conflicts across different and 
overlapping time periods, the purpose is to locate discursive process within and 
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between cases. It therefore contributes to policy analysis and conflict and peace 
literature, as well as to the application of discourse theory. 
Being fundamentally interpretive in nature, critics point to the lack of validity and 
reliability in such research. However, being interpretive does not imply an ‘anything 
goes’ approach nor does it imply lack of methodological rigour (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000, p.7; Hansen 2006). Analyses of discourses require precision in 
methodology and reading so as to establish the linkages between signs and how these 
signs link policy and identity constructions. If analysis fails to include important signs 
or misinterprets the stability of discourses or fails to identify the connections between 
policy and identity then it points to weak analysis (Hansen 2006, p.45). Having said 
that, discourse theoretical research does not claim to provide the ‘correct’ analysis of 
events since it is founded on the philosophy that there is no final or absolute truth 
waiting to be discovered, there is no singular reading that can exhaust all others. The 
same discourses can be subject to multiple research questions and multiple and 
complimentary readings (Hansen 2006, p. 45).    
Application of Discourse Theory in existing literature 
The use of discourse theory in the analysis of politics is a relatively recent approach to 
the study of politics but there are a few good examples of the study of discourses of 
conflict and conflict resolution in the international context (see for example (Hansen 
2006) (Hayward & O’Donnell 2011) (Campbell 1992). These studies have challenged 
dominant narratives and have thrown light on new ways of understanding policy 
changes and policy considerations by governments. A number of studies in recent years 
on policy analysis have emerged and demonstrated the importance of discourse 
analysis.14  
Campbell (1992) can be said to be amongst the pioneers in developing a post 
structuralist methodology suited to the study of foreign policy and security. His concern 
with representations as a form of delineating security from danger and how these 
representations lie at the heart of foreign policy decisions laid the groundwork for 
                                                             




future studies of policy making. In Writing Security, he provides a historical 
interpretative analysis of American foreign policy using an interpretative methodology 
concerned with the ‘manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of 
representation over another’ (Campbell 1992) p.4. Foreign policy, he argues, is a 
practice of establishing identities of states through the production of boundaries; 
practices that are exclusionary in nature and which create the notion of a secure identity 
on the “inside” and linked with a discourse of danger and threat on the “outside” 
(Campbell 1992, p. 68). The inside/outside demarcation of space is made possible by 
and simultaneously produces a moral superior/inferior dichotomy (Campbell 1992, p. 
73).   
In Discourse Theory in European Politics (Howarth and Torfing eds., 2003) the 
contributors examine various aspects of modern European politics, such as new 
nationalism, European security and environmental challenges through the framework of 
discourse theory. Discourse Theory and Political Analysis (Howarth, Norval and 
Stavrakakis eds., 2000) similarly uses discourse theory to understand social and 
political changes across contexts through the study of identity and hegemony. Nur 
Betul Celik’s chapter on the Kemalist ideology in this volume for instance analyses the 
ideas articulated by Kemalist leaders in Turkey from the 1960s and 1990s. Using 
genealogy to trace the transformation of key political ideas, Celik’s discourse 
theoretical methodology studies the speeches and documents of government and 
political leaders during the period-both Kemalist and others, to understand the 
interlinkages between modernism, secularism, democracy, Islam and Turkish politics 
and the changing meanings these ideas exhibit to unsettle hegemonic ideologies.  
In conflict literature, discourse analysis has been deployed to study continuity and 
change in these situations, primarily from an analysis of official and media discourses. 
Transformation of policy practices in conflict settings reflects discursive changes that 
capture the inherent instability and transience of meanings. Israel’s foreign policy 
change during the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s can be understood by this 
amalgamation of identity, interests and policy in the discourses of key leaders. 
Barnett’s (Barnett 1999) study on the Oslo peace process locates the foreign policy 
change in the way it was linked with Israeli identity and interests by Yitzhak Rabin. 
The puzzle of why and how Israel was able to represent the issue of withdrawal from 
territories as legitimate and desirable is the key question of his study. This radical shift 
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in policy is made legitimate in the process of weaving identity, framing and narratives. 
Context is crucial to this framing, for, as Barnett elaborates, political actors ‘strategize 
in an institutional setting’ (Barnett 1999) p.6). So, for Israel, religion, nationalism, 
liberalism and the Holocaust are dominant themes that recur in identity and narrative 
construction and reproduction. At the same time, the appropriation of these concepts 
and the meanings assigned to them, are located in the key institutions in Israel- 
electoral, coalition and party politics. The articulations of the two key contenders in the 
prime ministerial elections in 1992 show the two opposing ways in which these 
ideational and institutional practices were represented and the eventual success of 
Rabin in altering the discourse on Israeli identity and interests. This would lay the 
foundation for the foreign policy change brought about during the Oslo process. 
Whereas his opponent Shamir emphasised the territories as being crucial to the identity 
of Israel, Rabin framed the issue to represent the territories as a drain on Israel’s 
resources and peace prospects. Withdrawal, therefore, became linked with the identity 
of Israel as a liberal state that placed at its centre the security and prosperity of its 
citizens (Barnett 1999, pp.19-21). Shamir’s predominantly ideological orientation was 
marginalized and the electoral success of Rabin paved the way for a sustained discourse 
on withdrawal as being in the interests of Israel. In opening direct negotiations with the 
PLO, broader contextual factors such as the Intifada and the end of the Cold War and 
Gulf War were pivotal as Rabin had previously been opposed to such a prospect.   
Barnett’s study is useful to understand how dominant discourses eventually lose 
meaning and develop into new discourses that enable previously impossible strategies 
and conceptualisations. Dominant articulations can and do give way to alternative 
discourses that are then able to assert hegemony and this process simultaneously 
changes policy directions.   
The study of discourses in conflict and conflict resolution has been succinctly captured 
by Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell (2011), whose edited volume Political 
Discourse and Conflict Resolution: Debating Peace in Northern Ireland analyses the 
discourses of various political actors in the Northern Ireland conflict, from historical 
origins to the 1998 peace agreement. While most of the contributors in this book focus 
on language, there is an unambiguous agreement on the importance of context in 
analysing discourses. At the heart of these studies is the acknowledgment of 
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legitimization as the key objective of discourses. They also show how discursive 
change may lead to socio-political change (Hayward & O’Donnell 2011).  
The strength of discourse theoretical analysis lies in its ability to factor in context as 
part of the discursive process. The “internal stability of a policy-identity construction”, 
argues Hansen (2006, p.29), “cannot be determined in isolation to the broader social 
and political context within which it is situated.” For McDonald (McDonald 2008), 
security is constructed over time; an incremental process that encapsulates not just 
representation through speech, but also through the broader context that makes it 
possible for some actors to speak for security and marginalizes or delegitimizes 
alternative articulations of security. In this conceptualization of security, the historical 
and social contexts, which shape ideas and practices, need to be analysed 
simultaneously to understand intersubjectively constituted social factors such as 
identity. Even as the political elite do constitute dominant policy makers, obfuscating 
the context in which they construct security ignores the issue of why certain 
representations resonate with relevant constituencies (McDonald 2008). McDonald’s 
insight is particularly useful as it insists on a process-based understanding of discourse 
with a constant reminder of the importance of context.   
Context becomes even more significant in a temporal analysis that seeks to identify 
change in identity and policy constructions. Since discourse includes social practice, 
events and written and spoken text, the meanings of these discourses should be 
examined in a contextual framework. Representations can be explained as part of the 
wider discursive project that attempts to define reality in a certain way. If Campbell 
used historical and foreign policy texts to identify and analyze these representations on 
American identity vis-à-vis others, a study of political decision making may analyse 
similar discursive techniques in any sub-discipline and focus of study.  
The research goal in this thesis is how meanings are established in the context of 
domestic conflicts and what patterns of change they display over time. Discourse 
theory offers a methodology that can be adapted for this purpose. In order to practically 
implement this methodology, there is a need to identify the dominant discourses in 
conflict situations and locate the nodal points around which these flourish. The next 
section lays out the research methodology used by Lene Hansen in her seminal work on 
the Bosnian conflict. This methodology has been adapted for use in this thesis.  
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Hansen’s use of discourse theory in identity constructions and policy responses 
An important contribution to the application of discourse theory has been made by 
Lene Hansen in her study of the Bosnian conflict. Hansen (2006) reads the foreign 
policy considerations of Western powers in the Bosnian war against a discourse 
theoretical framework to show how their representations of the conflict focused on 
identity issues and had implications for policy action. Her understanding of identities as 
discursive and relational leads to two simultaneous processes occurring through 
discourse-the process of linking and the process of differentiating. The former entails a 
network of attributes used positively in relation to a particular construct, while the latter 
is more a negative connotation in relation to a superior, more positive one. This creates 
a difference between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ exemplified by gender as a social construct. To 
think of ‘woman’ as caring, nurturing and emotional is to simultaneously position it 
vis-à-vis ‘man’ as rational and practical. However, there is not a singular Self-Other 
dichotomy, but a series of juxtapositions that is situated in a spatial (geographically 
different), temporal (vis-à-vis its own past) and ethical (superior/inferior) context 
(Hansen 2006, p.37). The Self can therefore take on any number of Others to define 
itself relationally.  
In her research design, the western debate on the Bosnian war is studied between 1992 
and 1995 by dividing the time period into 7 phases. Though there is a clear self cast in 
terms of the ‘west’, this itself contained a number of ‘selves’ and Hansen chooses to 
focus on American and British official discourses. Official and oppositional discourses 
within American and British policymakers, as well as media and academic discourses 
(including key texts from journalism, travel writing and memoir) form the body from 
which discourses are selected for her study. The multiplicity of sources allows the 
identification of intertextuality and highlights the importance of media for foreign 
policy debate.  
Texts are selected based on certain criteria; for political official discourses, these would 
be primary texts of political actors with a clear articulation of identities and policies, 
widely read and attended to, and have the authority to define a political position (p.85). 
When conducting analyses over a period of time, the texts are chosen after compiling a 
timeline of main events/periods of heightened political and media activity (p.87).    
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Hansen relies on what she calls ‘basic discourses’ to identify identity constructions of 
Self and Other. The basic discourses are identified after a reading of a large number of 
texts so as to identify two or three basic discourses that contain explicit articulations of 
identity representations.  These basic discourses are important analytically since they 
provide a lens through which varied representations and policies are systematically 
connected and point to the relationships between discourses in terms of contestation 
and convergence (Hansen 2006, p. 52).  Identifying these and reading subsequent texts 
in light of these discourses can point to how discourses evolve over time and how they 
develop in response to facts and contradictions. Discourses are deconstructed to locate 
identity and degrees of differentiation, as well as to identify the patterns of linking and 
differentiation.  
In analysing political, media and popular culture representations of the conflict, she 
locates two basic discourses that were crucial to understanding how the foreign policy 
decisions were made—the Balkan discourse and the Genocide discourse. The earlier 
‘Balkan discourse’, for instance, centred on representations of the Balkans as violent, 
backward, uncivilized; a case of the Other formed through the dialectical relationship 
with the Western Self. In light of this, therefore, there was little that the West could do, 
since it was a dangerous area, and the conflict had ancient roots that rendered futile any 
intervention by the West to civilize and bring stability to the region. The situation was 
therefore considered to be beyond repair and Western inaction legitimized. Much of 
these ideas shaping the Balkan discourse show continuity with earlier depictions, 
particularly with the period coinciding with the Balkan wars and breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire. However, as the conflict and violence escalated, the existing 
discourse interacted with growing concerns over ethnic cleansing. The transformation 
of the Western debate over time through the lens of a ‘genocide discourse’ shows an 
increasing focus on the ethicality of intervention as the policy debate took on 
considerations of the West’s ‘strategic interests’. The change in policy, signified in 
terms of responsibility, merged with this strategic interests consideration as Western 
intervention would prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states. This shift was 
also evident in the reconstruction of identity from one of the homogenous, barbaric 
Balkans, to one where Bosnia and Serbia were separated discursively so as to represent 
the former with common values of multiculturalism and tolerance shared with the 
West, and the latter as the perpetrator of genocide.  
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The contribution of Hansen’s study is in locating changes in discourse on the Bosnian 
conflict and the interlinked changes in the policy responses that emanated in the West. 
These discourses, displaying identity constructions of Self and Other and containing 
ways of responding to the crisis, essentially can provide clues as to how policy 
decisions were formulated, continued and changed and how these different stages were 
justified.  
Towards a novel approach of discourse methodology 
The methodology in this thesis is adapted from the works of, one, Lene Hansen (2006), 
two, Barnett (1999), and three, McDonald (2008) discussed above. In particular, this 
thesis makes use of the application of discourse analysis as appears in the works of 
Hansen and McDonald who study identity and policy in contextually bound 
frameworks to establish a comprehensive analysis of meaning making. With conflict 
and security as the underlying themes of this thesis, the above discussion on hegemony 
and discourse highlights the broader framework for analysis. Hegemony, defined by 
Laclau and Mouffe as the (temporary) stabilization of systems of meaning around 
certain nodal points, is a political project implicitly underlying all political practices. 
Hegemony is understood as the production and reproduction of power relations through 
dominant discourses through the (temporary) settlement of meaning that privileges 
certain ideas and concepts above others. Discourses as analysed in this thesis refer to 
the forms of text, talk and practice in situations of conflict and conflict management. 
While text and talk are reflected in the speeches, debates and policy papers of officials 
and in speeches and texts of rebel groups, practice is a non-textual form of discourse, 
which, combined with text, together make up the meanings ascribed to identity and 
security. In conflict situations, for example, security, nationalism and sovereignty can 
be considered to be some of the nodal points that establish state supremacy in ensuring 
security and towards whom all nationalist feelings may be drawn. Such a system of 
meaning, common to the idea of nation states, marginalises alternative ideas of 
nationalism and challenges to territorial sovereignty.  
Just as Hansen locates discursive changes with policy changes, this thesis identifies the 
changes in the way the Sikh, Kashmiri and Naxalite conflicts have been portrayed in 
official discourses and how government policies addressed these conflicts at different 
stages. What commonalities and differences are played up by the self of the Indian state 
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vis-à-vis the Sikh, Kashmiri or Naxalite other. What are the hegemonic practices in 
conflict discourses and do competing articulations succeed in destabilizing prevalent 
discourses? How do conflicts go from being securitized and militarized to being 
negotiable? In other words, how are policy practices transformed? Given the number of 
years it took for the Indian government to ‘succeed’ in ending the Punjab conflict, and 
the durability of the Kashmiri and Naxalite conflicts, a study of the process of 
transformation becomes pertinent.  
The studies on discourse and policy by Hansen and Barnett show two of many possible 
ways of studying discursive changes in policy. What is common to both is the location 
of discourses within their contexts and the mutually constitutive relationship between 
the two. In the former, political, cultural and social discourses come together in an 
analysis of American foreign policy changes towards the Balkan crisis while in the 
latter, political manifestos and speeches of the two Israeli political leaders are analysed 
so as to identify the different frames through which identity and policy are interlinked. 
McDonald binds the discussion by arguing that essentially all security discourses are 
contextual and evolve as processes. This implies a study of security policy over time, 
and analysed in relation with the changes and continuities taking place in them. Since 
discourse is an all-encompassing concept, the analyses of this thesis take into 
consideration discourse in the form of text and talk as well as the policy practices in the 
three conflicts under study. Crucial to this analysis is for the researcher to include 
contextual change as a simultaneous variable within discourse. In other words, 
discourses evolve in a context; a relationship formed not causally but constitutively by 
which is meant that while analysing discourses in conflict (through official policies, 
text and speeches and legal, economic, political and military policy practices), there 
must be a simultaneous analyses of local, national and international contexts.      
With a focus on power and the production and reproduction of hegemonic power 
relations, discourse theory provides a rich theoretical and methodological toolkit with 
which to analyse state discourses and counter discourses on conflict and peace in 
domestic conflicts in contemporary India. A comparative perspective allows for 
observing similarities and differences and feeds into the broader assertion of this thesis 
that policy analyses is greatly enriched when studied over time and across contexts so 
as to locate the dominant and recurring practices of the state.  
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This study is further enhanced through analytic narratives, a form of storytelling by 
piecing together various events in order to trace the process or evolution of concepts, 
policies and the trajectories of such phenomena. Analytical narratives can open up the 
so-called black box of social and political phenomena as it pays “close attention to 
stories, accounts and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of 
reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation” (Bates 1998). This 
methodology is problem-driven, and focuses on cases rather than on theories. In this 
thesis, analytic narratives will be employed within selected key events of each of the 
three conflicts.                                             
Domestic conflict and security policy in India: A discourse theoretical and 
analytical approach  
Though much of the literature on discourse and security has so far concentrated on 
international politics and the realm of international security and foreign relations, the 
concept of security remains the same in an internal framework as well. In fact, the Self-
Other dichotomy becomes an even more confounding issue as the Other necessarily 
exhibits characteristics of the Self, owing to a commonality of an overarching national 
identity or citizenship.  
Faced with a number of internal challenges, India makes for an apt case study for 
comparative analyses. The importance of such a study lays in its consideration of a 
single Self and its relations vis-à-vis several Others with a broad objective of 
identifying the construction of a domestic security policy. Since this study has both in-
depth case analyses (single Indian state) and comparative analyses (more than one 
domestic conflict) it makes an important contribution to the study of conflict and 
security. It also adds to the current methodological literature. By bringing in the 
concept of hegemony to discourse theoretical research, and by supplementing this with 
analytic narrative, it contributes to the field of discourse theory methodology and its 
application.    
As laid out in Chapter one, three domestic conflicts have been selected for study. 
India’s advantage in hosting a plurality of internal conflicts and the strength of 
comparative analysis from three cases-Punjab, Kashmir and the Naxalite conflict are 
the main study of analysis. The purpose of three conflicts is to widen the type of 
conflicts that the Indian state has faced. While Punjab is considered resolved, the 
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Kashmiri conflict has an added international dimension with Pakistan, and the Naxalite 
conflict, sometimes branded a revolution, receives attention due to the severity and 
intensity in the last decade. A large volume of scholarly work exists on each conflict; 
what lacks is an analytical study of domestic security policy through comparison of 
these conflicts.   
The focus of this thesis is on the hegemonic discourses of the state in responding to 
these conflicts, the changes exhibited in official discourse over time, and the range of 
actions and policies legitimized as the two discourses-official and rebel, interact. The 
purpose of this approach is to throw light on India’s domestic security policy, the 
discussion of which is severely limited in existing conflict and security literature.  It is 
to a brief overview of these policies and state actions that we now turn our attention. A 
detailed historical background of the conflicts will be provided in subsequent chapters 
dealing with each conflict area separately.  
In Punjab, the Centre’s initial response was to quell any dissent by dismissing elected 
state governments and replacing them with direct rule from New Delhi. The imposition 
of Presidents Rule and the closing of all political outlets created space for hardliners 
and the movement escalated into violence. Towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Punjab crisis began to bifurcate into moderates and extremists. The latter began to 
voice demands for secession in the garb of protecting the rights and aspirations of 
Sikhs. Voices in New Delhi articulated the role of Pakistan in funding the Sikh 
extremists. Army action against the extremists led to a wave of anger against the central 
government. The undermining of democracy under the then Prime Minister, Indira 
Gandhi, through heavy government repression and centralization further exacerbated 
the situation (Singh 1996; Singh 1997). It was not until the signing of the Punjab 
Accord in 1985 under a new central leadership that the political impasse was brought to 
an end even though intermittent negotiations between New Delhi and movement 
leaders had marked previous years as well. The Accord, which encompassed political, 
cultural and economic aspects, was, however, unable to end the violence and non-
implementation of a number of clauses became a source of political discontent. 
Considering the text of the Punjab Accord, the use of language appears to be 
deliberately ambiguous and its content side-lined the core political demands while 
conceding cultural demands (Kohli 1990). Heavy handed police action in the early 
1990s ultimately led to the end of violence and political discontent arising from non-
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implementation was gradually replaced with compliance and co-option into the 
political system.  
Punjab provides a reference point for other conflicts and is crucial to this study since it 
is considered by New Delhi as a model of successful resolution and had important 
ramifications for the way subsequent violent situations were responded to. Punjab 
presented for the Indian State a challenge cast varyingly and not always exclusively in 
undemocratic, secessionist, and religious extremist and terrorist terms. The ‘successful’ 
counter-insurgency strategy developed in the early 1990s for the problem in Punjab 
was thereafter adopted in Kashmir, but with less success (Telford 2001)  
In Kashmir, the militant turn of the simmering conflict in the early 1990s was met with 
a brutal crackdown as the dominant government narrative focused on the abetment and 
direct sponsorship of the violence by Pakistan. Pakistan became the lens through which 
the situation in Kashmir was analysed, and an acknowledgement of possible Indian 
government policy failures in Kashmir as driving Kashmiri discontent has only been 
made in the twenty first century. 
Though the roots of the conflict can be traced to 1947 when the partition of India took 
place, the conflict had not yet turned violent. Even as the special status of Kashmir, as 
guaranteed by the Indian constitution, was gradually but steadily diluted by the central 
leadership in New Delhi, it was not until the late 1980s that the movement took a 
violent turn. The government strategy of using suppression, its role in rigging state 
elections and the infringement of civil and political liberties, led to further alienation of 
the people and militarization of the conflict (Kohli 1997). The eruption of armed 
conflict in the 1990s ushered in an era of militancy, much of which was believed to be 
‘Pakistan sponsored’. Policy practice included expansion of the army in Kashmir, arrest 
and/or killing of militant leaders, crackdowns, raids and torture of civilians and 
suspects (Bose 2007). The testing of nuclear weapons by India in 1998 and the Kargil 
war of 1999 further escalated the conflict as relations with Pakistan soured. Meanwhile, 
the central government maintained a policy of refusing to negotiate with ‘terrorists’ 
until 2000 following US President Bill Clinton’s visit. The decade of the 2000s 
provides a rich landscape of changing discourses and policies by the Centre as it has 
sought to enlarge the agenda for talks.  Over the last couple of years there has also been 
an increasing attention to Kashmiri youth in the form of economic packages and 
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employment expansion schemes as part of an official discourse suggesting that the 
conflict and the alienation of the people is primarily an economic issue.  
 The strategy against the Naxalites has been two-fold, and in recent years a 
characterization of the conflict as the gravest internal security threat has been 
accompanied by an increasing use of force.15 While it has remained largely a state issue 
since its origins in the 1960s (under the purview of respective state governments), it is 
only in the last decade or so that the attention has commanded a heightened sense of 
urgency at the Centre. Navlakha (Navlakha 2006) argues that the policies of the Centre, 
including increasing paramilitary and special forces in these regions and increasing 
financial allocations for police training and ‘modernization’ reflect war as the dominant 
mode of responding to the Naxalite problem. 
Whereas Sikh-dominated Punjab and Muslim majority Kashmir could be clubbed as the 
Other of the Hindu Self and dismissed for their secessionist claims, neither of the two 
arguments could be made against the Maoists. Attempts to highlight links with China 
and with the Maoists in Nepal have been in existence but not captured the dominant 
theme in state discourses. This brings us to the understanding that agents are not free to 
construct reality as they please, but they are bound by their social and historical 
contexts. However, in spite of the apparent unacceptability of the Indian political elite 
of the use of armed force against the Maoists, the purpose of using a constructivist 
approach is to see how then the State continues to place heavy reliance on the use of 
force and the steady increase in the numbers of security forces acceptable (Navlakha 
2004). One way of considering the changing identities of actors and changing meanings 
is to deconstruct the term security as it has been used by the Indian state. Fierke (Fierke 
2007) points out that there is a political aspect of defining security in militaristic terms. 
Viewed in this light, then, the notion of security as applied to the Maoists can be 
interpreted as security necessary for sustained development of the nation and to remove 
all obstacles to its progress.   
 
                                                             
15 This was stated by then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in April 2006 at a meeting of the standing 




From the above discussion we can discern a range of possible strategies that have been 
used in domestic conflicts with similarities in spite of differing challenges. Comparing 
the strategies of the state in Punjab and Naxalite areas, (Tharu 2007) p.96 enlists the 
following similarities—the rejection of force by insurgent groups by the state, 
accompanied usually by branding them as extremists or terrorists; the undermining of 
the character and social location of the insurgents so as to silence genuine grievances; 
an encouragement of groups with similar aims so as to factionalise and undermine the 
conflict; arming civilians to create local vigilante groups; and a deliberate attempt at 
exposing links with a ‘foreign hand’ to represent the conflicts as external security 
threats.  
Tharu (2007, p.98) claims that there is no significant difference between the 
securitising discourses of the Indian states across contexts/conflicts and that existential 
threats do not form part of the discourse. All threats-insurgencies, revolutions, seditions 
are responded to in a similar fashion of constructing non-military threats as military 
ones. His article refutes Waever’s conception of securitisation to argue that in liberal 
democracies, such as India which is his case study, emergency legislation is woven into 
everyday normal legal precedent and that there is no need for constructing an 
existential threat so as to exercise emergency laws (Tharu 2007, p.86-87). What 
Tharu’s analysis shows is that various repressive legislation has been enacted in India 
even before the breakout of insurgency movements in the country. The period 
immediately after independence maintained some of the colonial laws dealing with 
national security and defence and subsequent decades saw the enactment of emergency 
provisions over issues such as Naxal violence (in 1970 in West Bengal) and during 
India-Pakistan hostilities (in 1971 country wide). The Punjab conflict triggered a host 
of new laws as was the case with Assam and these insurgencies paved the way for 
various national security legislations. The larger point of his study is to show that states 
do not need to justify their acts; there is no need for securitization since the state 
controls various institutions making any contention independent of the state difficult. 
He argues that the state has become ‘self-legitimating’ (Tharu 2007, p.98) and 
opposition to policies is no longer possible.  
While Tharu’s argument of the ready existence of emergency provisions may be 
credible, his contention that states need no longer legitimize and securitize, and face 
little or no credible opposition that would require these is problematic. One, if that be 
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the case, there would be an ahistorical, non-contextual use and authorization of the 
emergency provisions. This also wouldn’t be able to explain changes in government 
discourses. Secondly, there would be an indication of unopposed acceptance, which is 
not the case. As will be shown in this thesis, contextual changes and challenges to 
government discourses are part of the process, making a study of legitimization indeed 
important.  
Parliamentary debates, speeches of opposition members and discourses of civil society 
highlight voices of dissent; moreover, debates in the Indian Parliament are reflective of 
a range of oppositions. To take the Naxal conflict for example, the federal character of 
the Indian polity plays a vital role in creating dissent as state governments, under whose 
purview the issue is considered to be, challenge, contest or agree with New Delhi. In 
the case of Kashmir, too, the course of the conflict suggests that different identities and 
different concerns have emerged in state discourses.  
There is less focus in the existing literature on the processes of legitimization and 
delegitimization that arise within conflict settings. A dearth of critical analysis of the 
way policies are made and their implications for conflict resolution requires a study of 
how states articulate their security concerns-in political debates, speeches, public 
statements and policy documents. This thesis analyses national security imperatives and 
strategic thinking in a domestic context. Decision making in different aspects-political, 
economic, social and military, is a process in which the identity of the Indian state is 
constantly being negotiated as it emerges from a post-colonial state to one with an 
increasing role in the international context as it combines its regional significance with 
nuclear and economic power.  
In light of the above discussion, the following research questions may be considered to 
be the guiding questions for this thesis:  
How are internal conflicts represented by the Indian state in its formulation of an 
adequate response? 
What are the patterns of security and conflict resolution policies displayed across 
conflicts and across time?  
What are the forms of identities conferred upon various actors in domestic conflicts?  
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Do the above change during conflict? Is there a deradicalisation of identities in conflict 
management and conflict resolution policies? 
How are formerly unthinkable solutions legitimized at later stages of the conflict?  
 
Selection of texts 
Using secondary sources on each of the three conflicts, the key periods of escalation, 
conflict intensity, state response and de-escalation (where appropriate) were identified. 
Focusing on these shorter periods in an intensive way allows the analysis to explore 
periods where discourse is strengthened and challenged, where legitimacy is built or 
lost and where possible contradictions between text and speech and policy response can 
be explored.  
In each case, the analysis focuses on key official statements by the Indian government, 
parliamentarians and security actors. These discourses have been collected from 
parliamentary debates, government reports such as committee reports and annual home 
ministry reports, and statements and interviews of prominent government officials that 
appeared in the media. For the purpose of convenience, discourses in the media were 
identified in leading English dailies and news websites and one magazine.16 These have 
been read in the original language (Hindi or English). In a small number of cases, 
translations of documents in other languages have been used and this is clearly 
indicated in the footnotes.  
The discourses were categorized according to whether they referred to representations 
of the conflict’s issues/demands, representations of identity or policy discourses. This 
enabled a comprehensive analysis of the framing of security threats and its comparative 
significance. Considering demands or issues in conflicts, we may conceptualise a 
spectrum of typologies to characterize conflict, which may be based on demands and 
actors. An analysis of these characterizations and their appropriate responses can 
contribute to literature on conflict resolution by focusing on strategies of legitimization. 
Based on a preliminary reading of the discourses, three key frames appear in the 
                                                             
16 The main newspapers are The Hindustan Times, The Times of India, Indian Express and The Hindu. The 
magazine referred to is India Today.  
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framing of conflict: secessionist conflicts, political conflicts and economic or 
development conflicts. These frames are not mutually exclusive; indeed several of them 
overlap, but the purpose of these frames is to show the combination of frames and 
responses over time. Changes in characterization are reflective of conflict dynamics as 
well as of changes in the way the Indian state perceives its own sense of threat and 
security.  
Having accumulated the key documents reflecting official discourse, these were 
grouped/coded to identify dominant/hegemonic articulations under each of the nodes of 
discussion (secessionist/political/developmental) and any counter-hegemonic views 
also identified. The changes and continuities of official discourse in each node are thus 
traced through the key political and security events for each case.    
While Walker, Campbell and others have examined the issue of securitization through a 
‘radical Othering’ of the external enemy, Hansen considers the Other to be framed 
along a spectrum of otherness, what she calls degrees of differentiation. This thesis 
takes a combined approach by arguing that the Indian state categorises its internal 
enemies along a spectrum of radical others. Each of these others allows a construction 
of threat that makes force a necessary and appropriate policy option. There is no 
common internal enemy; at different points of time and with varying degrees of threat 
perception, Sikhs, Kashmiris and Maoists have assumed the role of the ‘Other’ to the 
national, Indian self. This Other has been varyingly represented as terrorist, anti-
national, extremist, misguided youth and exploited poor masses.  
The time period under review varies with each conflict, but together forms a period 
spanning more than thirty years. For Punjab, discourses were selected from 1980 to 
1993, the year that terrorism was declared by the then police chief to have been 
defeated; the conflict in Kashmir is traced from 1989, widely accepted in the literature 
as the beginning of the insurgency, to 2010, a summer of discontent in contemporary 
Kashmir. Analysis of the Naxal conflict is focused on the contemporary period from 
2000 to 2010. In terms of studying discourses, this study looks at the central 
governments perspective and hence the discourses in New Delhi. In all, 37 debates 
were read on Punjab, 30 on Kashmir and 21 on the Naxal conflict. Discourses that have 
been quoted in this thesis pertain to important speeches within these debates that were 
either made by prominent parliamentarians, or which made important references to the 
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issues of causes, identities and policies.  Analytical attention to words and meanings 
embedded in power relations that make certain actions, certain ways of thinking 
‘common sense’ or ‘logical’ and the antagonisms from competing discourses that 
ultimately make way for alternative articulations.  
The next chapter focuses on the conflict in Punjab, and uses the techniques elucidated 
above to understand the Indian state’s framing of the conflict and its security policy to 




Chapter 3: A discourse theoretical analyses of the Punjab 
conflict 
 
Amongst the conflicts that have confronted the Indian government, the Punjab conflict 
was not only the first to have erupted at the level of violence that it did, but it is also 
considered to be one of the few conflicts to have been resolved by the Indian 
government.  
An analysis of state discourses during the period from 1980 to 1993, the most 
significant period of conflict in Punjab, suggests that the conflict was framed primarily 
as a secessionist, fundamentalist conflict. Moreover, the identities of key actors in the 
conflict was continually changing and points to the flexibility of the state in dealing 
with its enemies. Literature on the Punjab conflict elucidates the use of brute force and 
the human rights violations by the State in Punjab.17 There is also ample evidence in the 
literature bringing out the role of the Congress government in interfering in Punjab and 
the particular role of then PM Indira Gandhi in exacerbating and perhaps even 
triggering the violent conflict.18 The contribution of this chapter to the existing body of 
literature is an understanding of how the identities and demands of the conflict changed 
over time and the policies that were instituted that ultimately led to a “resolution” of the 
conflict. The dearth of discourse analysis is a glaring gap in understanding the concerns 
of the Indian government at the time. Crucially, this chapter will identify the positions 
of the government on the key demands, actors and the policies required. Going back to 
the key questions that this thesis seeks to address: 
How was the Punjab conflict represented by the Indian state and did this change over 
time?  
How were the identities of the actors/rebels framed? 
Were there alternative representations and policy suggestions?  
                                                             
17 See for example. (Singh 1996), (Singh 1997), (Kumar 2003) 




What was the security strategy of the Indian State in Punjab and how was this 
legitimised? 
Immediate background of conflict  
The state of Punjab was formed in 1966 by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The 
1956 reorganisation of states on the basis of language had left out the then province of 
Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). All through the 1950s, the Akali Dal 
had been agitating for a Punjabi-speaking state for the Sikhs but then Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru thought that such a demand was communal as it would lead to a Sikh 
majority state of Punjab.19 The decision to reorganise the state and create Punjab was a 
symbolic gesture by Indira Gandhi to thank the Akalis for their support during the 
Indo-Pak war in 1965 during which the Akalis suspended their agitation. The Punjab 
Reorganisation Act of 1966 created the states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal 
Pradesh and made Chandigarh the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana. The river waters 
of Punjab were put in the control of the Centre to distribute amongst the three states. It 
is important to note that the period coincided with rising powers of regional parties all 
over India and the growing strength of the Akali party which in March 1967 came to 
power in the Punjab Assembly elections in a coalition with the Jan Sangha (later known 
as the Bhartiya Janta Party or BJP) and Communist parties. This was the first time that 
the Congress was defeated in the Punjab elections and the threat of rising regional 
powers across India led to Congress-backed manoeuvres against non-Congress state 
governments. In November 1967, the eight-month old Akali Dal led United Front 
government was ousted by Congress-supported defections in the Akali Dal. In elections 
in 1969, the Akali party once again formed the government with the Jan Sangha. In the 
same year, there was a demand for Chandigarh and other Punjabi-speaking areas to be 
transferred to Punjab; Darshan Singh Pheruman a prominent Sikh political leader who 
had been active in the Punjabi Suba agitation, had gone on a hunger strike and died 
during it. Increased interdependence after 1971 of central and state politics and the 
necessity for the Congress to control most of the states in the Indian Union, especially 
                                                             
19 Nehru, in a statement to the Lok Sabha in August 1961, justified his opposition to the creation of a 
Punjabi state as follows: “The demand for a Punjabi Suba, this can only be considered as a ‘communal 
demand’, even though it is given a linguistic base. It seemed to us that the acceptance of the proposal, 




in north India, meant a shift in the centre-state relations. At the same time, Indira 
Gandhi had developed a highly personalized and centralized type of control system 
over Indian politics through increasing interference in provincial matters.  
The Akali government was brought down through Congress manoeuvres and 
President’s Rule was imposed on June 15, 1971. It was in October 1973 when the 
Shiromani Akali Dal brought out the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.20 The Resolution 
demanded an autonomous region as an integral part of the Union of India for the Sikhs 
where “Sikh interests are constitutionally recognized as the fundamental State policy” 
and be “entitled to frame its own internal constitutions on the basis of having all powers 
to and for itself except foreign relations, defence, currency and general communications 
which will remain subjects within the jurisdiction of the Federal Indian Government.” 
It included demands for provincial autonomy, the transfer of Chandigarh, land reforms, 
removal of illiteracy and casteism, protection of Sikh interests.  The central government 
termed the ASR ‘secessionist’. 
In 1975, Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency Rule in the country, the first and only time 
that democracy was suspended in India. The move was aimed at silencing the 
Opposition and curbing the mounting unrest in the country from inflation and other 
unstable economic conditions. In Punjab, Akali leaders were jailed. The Emergency 
lasted until 1977 when a Janata government came to power at the Centre. In March 
1977, an Akali-Janata Party government came to power with Prakash Singh Badal as 
the Chief Minister of the state. It was at this time that the Congress decided to prop up a 
Sikh religious leader to challenge and embarrass the Akali government and 
Bhindranwale21 was chosen for his religious preaching and austerity.22 By 1978, the 
rivalry between Bhindranwale’s followers and the Nirankari Sikhs had reached a point 
of violence and retaliatory killings as both groups vied for power and as Bhindranwale 
grew increasingly violent. Many educated, unemployed youth were drawn to 
                                                             
20 Full text of the document can be found in (Nayar, Singh 1984) Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, 
1984, Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar and After, Vision Books, Delhi   
21 Bhindranwale was a Sikh preacher who led a religious organisation called Damdami Taksal in Punjab 
and preached the return of the Sikh youth to a “pure” Sikhism that shunned alcohol consumption and 
drugs. He was also a vocal advocate of the distinction of Sikhism from Hinduism.  
22 Sanjay Gandhi is said to have suggested to ousted CM Zail Singh that some “sant” Sikh leader be put 
up against the Akalis, Kuldip Nayyar and Khushwant Singh, 1984, Tragedy of Punjab, p. 31.  
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Bhindranwale and his anti-landlord rhetoric also won him support from the subordinate 
non-agricultural castes. Meanwhile, in 1978, the Akalis launched an agitation to fulfil 
the demands of the ASR and added new demands such as the redistribution of river 
waters in favour of Punjab, an international airport at Amritsar and a broadcasting 
station at the Golden Temple.  
By 1980, the socio-economic scene in Punjab was such that the prosperous Sikh 
families who had been able to send their children to college had returned with the 
desire for non-agricultural professional jobs and grew frustrated at the lack of 
opportunity. The Sikh intelligentsia was culturally strongly linked to traditional religion 
and became easily attracted to the religious revival which had been going on in the 
various centres of Sikh learning in the Punjab countryside. These centres had started 
receiving large donations from the prosperous farmers and could intensify the revival 
of religious identity which rapid modernization seemed to threaten.23 It was also in 
1980 that Indira Gandhi returned to power at the Centre and it is from this time that the 
analysis begins. The year marks the beginning of a long simmering conflict as one that 
became openly hostile and violent.  
Towards a Discourse Analysis of the management of the Punjab crisis 
The above background shows how there had been a history of grievances that were 
simmering in Punjab since Independence. The broader context of the wavering strength 
of the Congress party and the rise of regional parties across India had led to a climate of 
repressive control by Indira Gandhi, and when she returned to power in 1980, one of 
the first acts was to dismiss the elected state government and hence also foreclose their 
petition to the Supreme Court challenging previous legislation on issues pertaining to 
Punjab.  
An analysis of the discourse of the Indian State points to the dominant articulations on 
the causes of the conflict and the identities of actors involved. It also shows the 
marginalisation of alternative policy options. Considered over time, this analysis is 
useful for understanding India’s broader security policy. In the case of Punjab, this 
analysis is carried out at three phases of the conflict, each phase coinciding with certain 
key events of the conflict as identified by secondary literature on Punjab. These key 
                                                             
23 (Ahmed 1998), p. 127 
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events reflect changes in Punjab or at the Centre and are considered to be those that 
sparked off animated debate amongst the political elite. These events are in turn 
grouped into three broad phases for the purpose of analysis. In each phase, discourses 
have been organised around three themes-causes of the conflict, identities of the actors 
involved, and policy suggestions and decisions. The analysis is grouped under three 
phases of the conflict-1980-1985, 1985-1987 and 1987-1993. 
Phase 1: 1980-1985: Active agitations and New Delhi’s interferences 
Key events 
 
1980 Akali-led government dismissed by the 
Centre, and President’s Rule imposed, 
followed by a Congress-led state 
government under Darbara Singh 
September 1981 Negotiations between Centre and Akalis 
after latter presented their charter of 
grievances 
August 1982 Akali Dal and Bhindranwale joined hands 
and launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha; 
Akalis also launched a movement to stop 
work on the SYL canal which was 
diverting water from Punjab to Haryana 
October 1982 Talks between Akali Dal and Centre 
1983 Increasing violence, clashes between 
Sikh sects as well as targeting of Hindus 
October 1983 State government led by Congress’ 
Darbara Singh dismissed and President’s 
Rule imposed 
Feb 1984 Talks between Akalis, Government and 
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Opposition in New Delhi 
March 1984 Akali leader Longowal charged with 
sedition, and Punjab declared ‘deeply 
disturbed’ 
May 1984 PM appoints senior Congress leader 
Narasimha Rao to hold talks with the 
Sikhs 
June 1984 Operation Blue Star followed by 
Operation Wood Rose 
October 1984 Indira Gandhi assassinated by her Sikh 
bodyguards, widespread rioting against 




The dismissal of the state government in Punjab in 1980 led to an increasing 
confrontation between the Akalis and the Centre. Between 1981 and 1984 there were a 
series of negotiations between the Centre and the Akalis. Even as the ruling party 
sought to defend its role in negotiations, it blamed the Akalis for any failure. One 
Congress MP said that the religious demands of the Akalis had been accepted but the 
Akalis were taking advantage and adding to their demands. The hesitation of accepting 
some of these demands stemmed from a deep rooted fear of religious groups gaining 
power. RL Bhatia of the Congress told the Lok Sabha that the Akalis were asking for 
three hours of broadcast over the radio service rather than one, and said that this could 
have a snowball effect if the “Muslim League and Harijans and others too started 
asking for air time for their religions”.24 Bhatia also said that meetings had been held on 
the political issues as well but the Akalis were “indecisive and divided” and were not 
                                                             
24 Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India  
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able to come to an agreement. He said that the issues that remained were inter-state 
issues and hence the delay. 
During this stage, it came to be widely perceived by the ruling party that the Akalis 
were to blame for the mayhem in Punjab. There was a recognition that the demands of 
the Akalis were of two kinds-religious and political.25 But while the religious demands 
were considered to be largely fundamentalist, the political demands were couched in 
the category of secessionist or those arising from the “frustration” of the Akalis.26 For 
instance, Congress MP RL Bhatia was of the view that the Communist Party of India 
(CPI),  Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI (M)) and Janata Party had entered the 
political game in Punjab as they allied with the Akali party and this pushed people 
further away from the Akalis. This he said had led to frustration and isolation which in 
turn bred extremism. The Akali demands were considered to be “secessionist” and 
Opposition parties were blamed for “encouraging these separatist tendencies.”27 
Home Minister PC Sethi said that in a recent letter circulated by Akali leader 
Longowal, “He has raised a separate nation theory, a multi-nation theory for India.” 
Also, the home minister stated that: 
India may be multi-lingual, India may be multi-racial and India may be 
multicultural but India is one nation and the Indian people have sacrificed for 
keeping India as one nation and we shall continue to make all sacrifices to keep 
India as one nation.28 
These dominant discourses marginalised alternative explanations of the conflict. 
Opposition members asserted that the demands of the Akalis were justified and that: 
                                                             
25 R.L. Bhatia, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983., Monsoon Session, Government of India 
26 Ibid. 
27 Congress MP Chiranji Lal Sharma, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
28 Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
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The Punjab problem hinges around three or four basic issues-territorial issues, 
sharing of river waters, Centre-state relations and religious demands of the Sikh 
community…these issues contain democratic contents.29  
The Congress accused the Akali party of supporting and protecting Bhindranwale.30 
The home minister Buta Singh said that “there is a political revolution in Punjab led by 
the demands of the Akali party but they are taking their strength from Bhindranwale, 
they are supporting him.”31 The annual report of 1982-83 of the home ministry noted 
that the situation in Punjab “arising out of the agitation of the Shiromani Akali Dal and 
the activities of extremist elements has been causing serious concern.” 
In 1984, following the events of Operation Blue Star32, the government published a 
white paper on the situation in Punjab. This document laid bare the dominant 
interpretations of the causes of the conflict in Punjab at the time.  The Paper described 
the movement as “stridently communal and extremist” and one that “degenerated into 
open advocacy of violence”. It further elaborated that the movement sanctioned “the 
most heinous crimes against innocent and hapless citizens and against the State”. It also 
blamed the Akalis for the movement and highlighted that certain factors “combined to 
produce a complex web of violence and terror that threatened to undermine social, 
political and economic stability not only of Punjab but the whole country.” The White 
Paper also mentioned that “secessionist and anti-national activities with the declared 
objective of establishing an independent state for the Sikhs with external support” and 
“the involvement of criminals, smugglers, other anti-social elements and Naxalites who 
took advantage of the situation for their own ends” as being responsible for the 
situation in Punjab along with the Akalis and the communal elements.33 The absence of 
                                                             
29 Chitta Basu, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
30 See for example statement of home minister Buta Singh in the Lok Sabha on December 2, 1983. 
31 Lok Sabha, December 2, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India, Translated from Hindi.  
32 Operation Blue Star was the name given to an Army-led operation against Sikh militants who were 
lodged in the Golden Temple-the holiest shrine of the Sikhs in Amritsar in Punjab. The operation lasted 
from June 3-8 1984 and was approved by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to flush out the militants, 
including Bhindranwale. This infamous operation not only demolished the holiest shrine, but also led to 
the killing of innocent civilians who were in the premises at the time.   
33 White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, 1984, Government of India. 
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any acknowledgment of a political dimension is striking; the conflict was now elevated 
to the level of a secessionist conflict that had also harboured criminals and lumpen 
elements.  
Moreover, the conflict was now considered to be primarily “fundamentalist” in nature. 
Indrajit Gupta said “the main thing that is worrying everybody is that every day of 
delay communalism is gaining the upper hand in Punjab. The thing of which we were 
always the proudest in Punjab was the unity of Hindus and Sikhs.”34  Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi told the Lok Sabha “today, communalism has a new dimension and this 
is called fundamentalism”35 she also said,  
What is happening in Punjab was not simply a story of cruelty or merciless 
violence against innocent people. It was a concerted attempt by a combination 
of internal and external forces to encourage divisive forces and if possible, to 
divide the country. The Sikhs feel alienated for some reason. Other people feel 
alienated not because of religion but because of economies…there are all kinds 
of alienation…a movement for unity has to be created just as during the 
freedom struggle…36 
Hinting at foreign intervention, she said, “Can we ignore the remarkable coincidence of 
troubles in Punjab with the re-arming of our neighbour? Can we ignore the strong 
revival of secessionist forces in Jammu and Kashmir and those in Tripura and the 
north-east border?” she also said that the Akalis had brought up the water and territorial 
demands much later and had initially begun with only religious demands which she had 
agreed to.  There was thus contempt for the political demands which were viewed as a 
potent mix of religion and politics and which, Indira Gandhi felt, would threaten her 
power at the Centre and would lose her precious Hindi-speaking electorate. Moreover, 
the reluctance, indeed indifference of the grievances, which she attributes vaguely to 
“some reason”,37 suggests a general ineptitude at dealing with the issue.  
                                                             
34 Lok Sabha, July 25, 1984, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
35 Lok Sabha, July 25, 1984, Monsoon Session, Government of India.     




When Rajiv Gandhi came to power in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, he too 
considered the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) to be “secessionist” in some parts 
and also said that the problem in Punjab was largely “a law and order problem.”38 
Thus, during this phase, causes ranged from the political frustration of the Akali party 
to extremism and communalism and the demands of the Akalis were framed as being 
secessionist. There was a slight tension in the internal external dichotomy-there was an 
acknowledgment of external sources fuelling the conflict. The general indifference of 
the government to act stemmed from this failure to recognize genuine grievances of the 
Sikh community.  
Identity 
During this period, the government viewed the Akalis and other chief actors in Punjab 
as extremists who had destabilised the situation in Punjab. The Akalis were portrayed 
as anti-nationals who were colluding with the Sikh religious fundamentalists to 
pressure the government into accepting their demands. The annual report of the 
ministry of home affairs in 1980-81 pointed to a “series of violent incidents by Sikh 
extremists who also hijacked an IAC aircraft to Lahore on 29 September 1981.” There 
was also a mention of how “some extremist groups in Punjab” were “alleging 
discrimination against Sikhs by the Government” and they were responsible for these 
violent activities. Regarding the identities of those involved, the report of 1982-83 
stated that “two extremist organisations namely the Dal Khalsa and the National 
Council of Khalistan whose objective was the establishment of an autonomous Khalsa 
state” were indulging in “secessionist activities” and were therefore declared “unlawful 
associations” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.  
In 1983, in a debate on the situation in Punjab, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution came up 
for discussion and Akali leader Tohra was accused of a “wild and irresponsible” 
statement in which he said that Sikhs were a separate community.39 This move of the 
Akalis to recognise Sikhs as separate from Hindus drew condemnation in the 
Parliament and many members harked back to the days of close Hindu-Sikh relations 
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when religious identity did not matter in the context of the Sikhs. For instance, Charan 
Singh on July 26, 1983 drew attention to the fact that Punjab had been a Hindu majority 
state and most Sikhs had converted and were still known as Jat Sikhs. He said that 
Hindu families had had a tradition of making their eldest son a Sikh and that the two 
religions had always had close ties. BJP Opposition leader Vajpayee also asked the 
Akalis to reconsider whether they wanted to be defined separately from Hindus and 
have their own personal law as he said that it might break a family given the high 
degree of Hindu-Sikh relations through marriage or through making one son a Sikh.40  
The ruling party distanced itself from any role in mentoring Bhindranwale in previous 
years and called him a “fundamentalist” who was using religion as a tool.41 It was 
argued that the earlier rivalry of Bhindranwale and the Akalis had now turned into a 
bond between the two and the Akali party was termed as “communal” and aligned only 
with the big land owners in Punjab and represented only the Jats, not the poor harijans 
or the city dwellers of the state.42 
Simultaneously, the Opposition was quick to draw distinctions between the Akalis and 
extremists. Opposition leader Atal Behari Vajpayee for example said that the Akalis 
were separate from the handful of those supporting Khalistan.43 There was also a 
discussion over the use of the term ‘qaum’ by the Akalis which Vajpayee defended as a 
word for ‘community’ rather than ‘nation/nationality’ in English. PM Indira Gandhi 
said that India was one country and one nation and was not a land of many “nations” 
and insisted that the word communities be used instead. “Let me make this quite 
clear…the Akali leadership was using the word ‘qaum’ as nationality…I used the word 
qaum to mean community. There is no question of there being different nationalities in 
India. We are all one nation.”44 
                                                             
40 Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
41 RL Bhatia, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India.  
44 Lok Sabha, July 25, 1984, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
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Others such as Congress MP Sparrow cautioned that “foreign-controlled, foreign-aided 
agencies aid, and abet and exploit the money-hungry extremists”.45 The identification 
of extremist Sikhs abroad was a prominent discursive attempt by the ruling party to 
avert attention from domestic roots of extremism. Consider Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi’s question “where did this cry for separatism rise? It did not rise in India. It 
rose far from our shores from people who are affluent.”46 There was also an attempt to 
link Kashmir and Punjab and draw comparisons. Ram Vilas Paswan called the two 
states “our sensitive border states”.47 The fact that Punjab bordered with Pakistan was 
indeed a pressing issue and points to a well-established nodal point in statist discourses 
of the Pakistan link in India’s internal disturbances.  
The widespread arrest of Sikhs in Punjab was a concern for Opposition members. In 
response to a question on the arrested persons and whether they were terrorists or 
extremists, home minister PC Sethi replied that “most of them are anti-social elements 
and those who are engaging in smuggling. But they are responsible for many crimes 
and therefore it is very difficult to distinguish between the two.”48 This blurring of the 
categories of the ‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’ legitimized the use of force and allowed the 
government to get away with such policies in Punjab.  
Meanwhile, each party tried to argue that the problem was not with the Sikhs as such, 
but with certain extremist elements within them. For instance, Subramaniam Swamy, 
an MP of the Opposition, termed the Akali Dal led by Longowal to be a “moderate” 
group and said that “the Sikhs are an emotional people...they are prosperous by their 
hard work…they have this feeling ‘we are only 3% but we produce 75% of the 
procurement of wheat’…”49 On the other hand, ruling party MPs such as Sparrow 
blamed the Akalis for tarnishing the image of the Sikhs and said, “the Akali Dal and 
                                                             
45 Lok Sabha, November 15, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India. 
46 Lok Sabha, July 25, 1984, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
47 Lok Sabha, November 15, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India (Translated from Hindi). 
48 Lok Sabha, November 16, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India.  
49 Lok Sabha, December 5, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India.  
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their satellites have brought down the image of the Sikh…the Sikh is a wonderful man; 
everybody used to be proud about a Sikh…”50 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated in February 1985 that the Akalis were not 
representative of the people, “When the Akalis say that this is a Sikh problem, we must 
understand that they are talking about a group within Punjab which is not representative 
of Punjab. The Akalis are not even representative of the Sikhs; they represent some 
Sikhs in Punjab…”51 
The discourses on identity signal an overemphasis on the religious identity of the 
Akalis. Indeed, the idea of the Sikhs being separate from the Hindus did not go down 
well either with the ruling party or Opposition members. The identification moreover, 
of extremists and criminals and the blurring of their distinction was also an indication 
of the need for extraordinary measures to address the issue. Attempts were also made 
by the ruling elite to differentiate the Akalis from the rest of the Sikhs, thereby 
delegitimising their claims to be representatives of Sikhs. Essentially, the identity 
discourses reflect various levels of Otherness; as extremists they were on the extreme 
end of the spectrum, whereas the attempt to deny a separate Sikh identity was an 
attempt to co-opt the Sikh into the broader Hindu Self.   
Policy  
The above discussion on the prominent discourses of the state on matters related to the 
causes of the conflict and identities of the key players involved relate to the policies 
that were implemented by New Delhi in Punjab. While the causes were considered to 
be anti-national and largely unjustified, the State identified the Akalis as a group of 
disgruntled Sikhs who had joined hands with the extremists and who were responsible 
for the situation in Punjab.  
The dismissal of the Akali-led state government in February 1980 was followed by 
elections in which a Congress party led government under Darbara Singh came to 
power in Punjab in June 1980. In December 1980, the home minister Zail Singh 
introduced a Bill in Parliament to allow for preventive detention, called the National 
                                                             
50 Lok Sabha, February 28, 1984, Budget Session, Government of India. 
51 In an interview to India Today, February 15, 1985. 
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Security Bill. Even as the Opposition criticised the government, the Home minister 
defended it and said,  
This bill will open India to progress, it will protect the country’s freedom and 
will guarantee India’s unity…this bill is for India’s defence and protection of 
democracy… the state of India today is such that criminals and miscreants are 
breaking India’s efficiency and everywhere are trying to instigate tensions 
between caste and class.52 
By 1982-83, the coming together of Akali Dal and Bhindranwale, and the subsequent 
agitations that followed also ushered in a series of talks between the Centre and Akalis. 
The home ministry’s report of 1982-83 mentioned that: 
Several rounds of discussion were held during the year with the Akali Dal 
leaders. The political leaders of the States of Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab 
were also invited to the discussions. Some areas of agreement have been 
identified. Government has announced acceptance of certain demands which are 
religious in nature. It is hoped that an agreed solution can be found in respect of 
other matters as well. 
However, the failure of the talks to make any head way was made apparent in the 
state’s discourses:  
It is the government’s endeavour to find a peaceful solution to the problems in 
Punjab. Honourable members had also expressed the view that negotiations 
with the Shiromani Akali Dal leadership should be resumed in respect of the 
sharing of waters of Ravi-Beas and the territorial disputes between Punjab and 
Haryana. In pursuance of this, I invited the Akali leaders to resume discussions 
but unfortunately they have not responded favourably to my invitation…Despite 
the government’s clear offer to refer the two pending issues to tribunals, the 
SAD leaders have not reacted in a positive manner so far.53  
                                                             
52 Home minister Zail Singh, Lok Sabha, December 4, 1980, Winter Session, Government of India 
(translated from Hindi).  
53 MoS in the Ministry of Home Affairs, P. Venkatasubbaiah, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Budget Session, 
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That talks were becoming ineffective, due to the Akalis, was a way for the government 
to absolve itself from any responsibility. It also justified its policy of suspending rail 
transport in Punjab as a means to ensure the “safety and security of the passengers and 
public property from the large scale violence by Akali workers during the ‘rasta roko54’ 
agitation.” This agitation of the Akalis, in which they forcibly took to disrupting rail 
traffic as a means of protest was thus delegitimized and the discourse focused on the 
violence caused as a result of the protest to do so:  
Despite the fact that SAD leadership called off the rail roko agitation, agitators 
indulged in disruptive activities including squatting on railway tracks, cutting 
off signals telephone/telegraph wires, removal of fish plates…this caused loss 
of public property and inconvenience to the travelling public.55 
The government also said that it had taken up the issue of misuse of Sikh shrines by 
“criminals and anti-nationals” and that “It was suggested that a 5 member committee of 
Sikhs may be set up jointly by the state government and SAD to screen the persons 
now living in shrines. It is unfortunate that the SAD leadership is not prepared to 
discuss the question of misuse of holy shrines.”  The Akalis continued to be blamed for 
the violence in the state: 
Government has repeatedly appealed to the leadership of SAD to unequivocally 
condemn violent activities and not to say or do anything which may aggravate 
the situation. But unfortunately there have still been provocative and threatening 
speeches by some of the leaders. We have to be careful that continuing agitation 
does not spark off incidents of a communal nature.56 
Once again, the mention of communalism in state discourses shows how the 
preoccupation of the state’s conflict management policy was aimed at preventing 
communal clashes as being more serious and pressing than the political agitation of the 
Sikhs. 
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The government also wasted no opportunity to drive home the point that while it was 
serious about resolving the issue through talks, the Akalis had been time and again 
insincere in this endeavour. Home minister, PC Sethi, stated in the Lok Sabha that 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had invited them for talks to New Delhi and they were 
progressing well, “but before the talks could be finalised, the Akali Dal had made up 
their mind that they would boycott the talks and they would not disclose it to the 
press.”57 He said that despite this the PM was keen to keep the talks going but they 
were reluctant to come to Delhi so the government went to Chandigarh, their chosen 
venue, but the talks were “inconclusive”. They were invited to Delhi to resume the 
process of dialogue but the Akali Dal was “reluctant”. He also said that the Opposition 
members were made party to the talks and this tripartite dialogue continued. However, 
he said, the recent attitude of the Opposition had changed and they were not 
committing to any one stance. Both the Akalis and the Opposition were thus blamed for 
the failure of the dialogue process. This in turn became reason to doubt the efficacy of 
dialogue as a policy, “Charan Singh was right when he said that we should not be soft 
on the Akalis and we should deal with them firmly.”  
At this stage, the government also fielded questions as to whether it would consider 
going into the Golden Temple to arrest all those extremists taking shelter there. Most 
members agreed that such a step should not be taken and the government too seemed 
unanimous on this. 58 In response to entering the precincts of the gurudwara PM Indira 
Gandhi said in February 1984, “no place should be made a sanctuary for those who are 
wanted in any crime. But in taking any action we have to calculate the 
repercussions…that is why at every step we have to go slowly.”59 
Another important nodal point in the state’s discourses was the tendency to mention 
that since the political demands of the Akalis were related to territorial and water 
issues, it was something that affected other states as well and therefore the Centre was 
unable to act on it. For instance, a ruling party member said that the  “Prime Minister 
has conceded the religious demands of the Akali Dal…but the political demands cannot 
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be easily accepted because the rights of neighbouring states are involved.”60 Home 
Minister PC Sethi said that position of the government on talks was that: 
We made it clear that we cannot resolve this problem without consulting the 
people of Rajasthan and Haryana. Thereby we want that the ruling party of 
Rajasthan and Haryana and the Opposition leaders of Rajasthan and Haryana be 
consulted. The Akalis refused to sit with them.61 
The Centre dismissed the Congress led state government in Punjab in October 1983 and 
imposed President’s Rule. The home minister PC Sethi justified the imposition of 
President’s Rule in Punjab as the Chief Minister had tendered his resignation and had 
suggested to the Governor to keep Punjab under temporary Presidents Rule. He also 
said that it had had some positive results which he declared to be “4470 undesirable 
persons have been arrested and a total of 282 weapons, 1153 cartridges 1 hand grenade 
have been recovered”.62 He said that President’s Rule had become necessary He also 
said that talks had been initiated by the Centre at various times with the Akalis and 
while the PM had made announcements regarding their religious demands in November 
1982, the Centre-state issues had been referred to the Sarkaria Commission. He also 
said that in June he himself had made a public announcement that only two issues 
remained to be resolved—“the sharing of the Ravi Beas river waters and the territorial 
dispute between Punjab and Haryana”. He said that the Centre had offered to refer 
these issues to tribunals but “the Akalis have still not responded in a favourable 
manner.” Further he said,  
I may add that the Government has not complicated the issues at any time or 
prevented a peaceful solution from being arrived at. On the other hand, the 
Akali Dal have changed their demands from time to time. It has hampered the 
progress of a negotiated settlement. It is for the leadership of the Akali Dal to 
now come forward to help in the restoration of normalcies and to resume 
discussions.63  
                                                             
60 Soundarajan, Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India. 
61 Lok Sabha, July 26, 1983, Monsoon Session, Government of India.  
62 Lok Sabha, November 16, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India.  
63 Lok Sabha, November 16, 1983, Winter Session, Government of India.  
79 
 
He also said that training camps had been identified where “certain sectarian and 
secessionist views have been propagated” including in Jammu and Kashmir and that 
the Centre had told these states to “take appropriate action against those indulging in 
illegal activities.” This was the beginning of the Centre’s alluding to Pakistani 
involvement in the Punjab crisis, and one that would gain greater prominence in 
subsequent years.  
In November 1983, the home minister said that: 
As far as the territorial dispute is concerned, we are prepared to hand over 
Chandigarh…but then Abohar and Fazilka has to go to Haryana. Whatever 
decision we take has to be with the consent of all parties and the concerned 
states. We cannot take unilateral decisions in this matter.64 
This discourse would become more prominent after 1985, when the lack of 
implementation of the Accord would be blamed on this inter-state factor.  
On 15 November 1983, the government moved a Bill to give the armed forces special 
powers in Punjab and Chandigarh. Members such as George Fernandes65 opposed the 
law as it “opposed articles of fundamental rights of citizens and were a violation of 
human rights.” The reasons for this, as given by Home minister PC Sethi were that:  
The atmosphere of public order in Punjab has been vitiated on account of illegal 
activities of the extremist, terrorist and secessionist elements in the state. A 
number of violent incidents have been perpetrated with a view to creating scare 
amongst the peaceful people, and to vitiate the communal atmosphere in the 
state.66 
He also told the House that in a letter written by the Chief Minister of Punjab in 
October, he mentioned that “the situation called for the intervention of the Centre for a 
temporary period to meet the requirements of national security and integrity.” He then 
justified the Governor’s decision to call for President’s Rule in the state and the state 
legislature placed under suspended animation.  
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By 1984, there was increasing concern in Parliament over violence in Punjab and 
Haryana. The annual home ministry report for 1983-1984 noted the “intensification of 
the agitation” in Feb 1984 and emphasised that the “overall situation in Punjab was 
further aggravated by a series of acts of violence and killings by extremist elements.” 
The report of the home ministry also noted that the Akali Dal had left the tripartite talks 
mid-way in Feb 1984 and noted that “while on the one hand certain acts of extremist 
violence continued to take place, the leadership of the Akali Dal decided to burn and 
deface copies of the Constitution to demand an amendment to Article 25.71 This act of 
the Akali Dal has been condemned in all quarters.” It also emphasised that the 
government had “expressed its readiness for a settlement of the problem through 
negotiations.” 72 In the Lok Sabha, Atal Behari Vajpayee stated that “terrorists” were 
killing people and those who were being killed included Sikhs too.73 He also said that 
the PM resumed and called off talks with the Akalis at whim and this was going on for 
the last three years.   
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi refuted this and said that certain elements within the 
Akalis did not want a settlement.  She also said that over the previous two years the 
situation kept changing: 
Somebody asked who was against an agreement. Obviously it is those who are 
more extreme. These extremists have always been there. They may not be the 
same extremists who are now shooting people. But once the extremists asserted 
themselves, it was not possible for the moderates to come to an agreement. This 
was my assessment after talking with the Akalis that even though some were in 
favour of an agreement, there would be pressure on them…We told the Akali 
leadership that if they could get together with the Haryana people, with the 
Opposition parties there and with our party and sort out the matter, we would 
agree.74 
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However, by June 1984, the failure of the Centre to settle the conflict amicably reached 
its pinnacle in Operation Blue Star. The storming of the holiest shrine of the Sikhs by 
the Indian Army on the orders of Indira Gandhi was to become one of the most 
criticised policies of the Indian State and had huge ramifications for the resolution of 
the Punjab crises. It was succeeded by the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her own 
bodyguards in November and widespread rioting against Sikhs in the months to follow. 
In the aftermath of the Operation Blue Star, the government brought out a White Paper 
detailing reasons for the policy. In a debate on the White Paper in the Parliament, 
opposition members blamed the government for hiding and distorting facts and for 
delaying negotiations. The ruling party defended its decision to use the Army in the 
face of backlash in the Parliament by Opposition members. A Congress MP said that 
the Anandpur Sahib Resolution had been a “great danger signal” and “however difficult 
things were, the action taken by the Army has broken the back of terrorism in 
Punjab.”75 Atal Behari Vajpayee said that the Army was primarily constituted to deal 
with external enemies and that to use it against its own people should have been 
avoided. He also said that sending in the Army into the precincts of the Golden Temple 
should be a reminder to never follow such an example again.76  
That Operation Blue Star had gotten rid of extremists like Bhindranwale but had not in 
any way solved the Punjab issue was evident. The reason for this was pinned to the 
Akali party’s inflexibility. PM Indira Gandhi said that she was in favour of Chandigarh 
going to Punjab but only so long as Haryana got something too and that the Akalis 
“were not willing to talk to the Haryana people.”77 She also said that the Akalis were 
not willing to give up their stance on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and were “not 
willing to accept that there was terrorism from Golden Temple. They were not willing 
to accept that there were arms in the Golden Temple…it was only when we came to a 
dead end that Army action had to be taken.” Regarding army action, “I was deeply 
pained in taking this action… but I felt the step had to be taken for national interest.”78 
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Thus, ‘national interest’ had become a reason for storming the Golden Temple even as 
the government was nowhere closer to resolving the conflict.  
The report of 1984-85 mentioned that extremist violence had showed an upward trend 
during 1984. It also stated that the police was an important factor in countering the 
violence in Punjab and mentioned that: 
As a result of the action taken by security forces and various measures including 
strengthening and streamlining of the general administration and police and 
increased vigil on the border, the situation in the state has shown considerable 
improvement. A number of extremists have been arrested and several criminal 
cases involving these elements have been investigated. 
Moreover, the report mentioned that it had been necessary for the Parliament to amend 
Article 356 of the Constitution so as to continue President’s Rule in Punjab beyond the 
period of one year up to a maximum of two years if necessary.  
The above discourses on policy debates at the time suggest that while the government 
was not averse to talks, it had framed certain demands of the Akalis as essentially 
undemocratic and foreclosed any possibility for negotiation. The dismissal of state 
governments, imposition of President’s Rule and use of the armed forces all signal a 
policy aimed primarily at using force to control and manage the conflict and the 
justification of such measures as taken for “national interest”.  
The above discussion on causes, identity representations and policy debates indicates 
that during this phase of the conflict, the government was wary of the Akali Dal and 
considered it not only hand in glove with the extremists but also uninterested in 
resolving the conflict. The framing of the conflict at this stage ranged from being one 
driven by the frustration of the Akalis, to law and order problems, to extremist action. 
The identity of the Akali party was framed as anti-national and secessionist, and their 
demands for a separate Sikh identity termed communal. Despite this representation of 
their demands, the government held a series of talks with the Akalis but each time they 
failed, the Akalis were blamed. Punjab continued to be placed under President’s Rule 
during the period and key political demands of the Akalis were obfuscated and turned 
into inter-state issues that were therefore beyond the control of the State.  The 
identification of the Akalis as extremists, or anti-nationals was in part responsible for 
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the distrust between the ruling Congress party and the Akali Dal. There were moments 
when the Government seemed to be in favour of doing away with talks as it blamed the 
Akalis for their insincerity in the dialogue process. Indira Gandhi’s interpretation of the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution as essentially a secessionist document due to its position on 
the Sikhs constituting a separate nation was a major stumbling block in negotiations as 
she never failed to mention that the Akalis were continuing their pursuance of the 
Resolution. Crucially, Operation Blue Star as a policy of defeating terrorism not only 
failed to curb violence in the state, but also pushed common people further away from 
the government. This alienation would form cornerstone in the discourses of the state in 
the next phases.   
Phase 2: 1985-1987: Post accord period 
Key events 
March 1985 PM Rajiv Gandhi appoints Arjun Singh 
as governor of Punjab. He advised the 
Centre to release certain Akali leaders, 
such as Longowal, for talks.  
July 1985 Punjab Accord signed between the Centre 
and the Akalis led by Longowal. The 
Accord left out other sections of the 
Akalis as well as the Haryana 
government. 
August 1985 Longowal assassinated 
September 1985 State Assembly elections bringing 
moderate Akali leader Surjit Singh 
Barnala to power 
January 1986 Sikh extremists launch agitation for 
Khalistan 
March 1986 Appointment of J. Ribeiro as police chief 
in Punjab  
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May 1987 Dismissal of Akali government and 
imposition of Presidents Rule 
1988 Operation Black Thunder in May under 




If the earlier phase pinned the causes of the conflict to the agitations of the Akali Dal 
and its aligning with extremist forces under Bhindranwale, by 1985, there was a 
willingness by the government under the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi that there 
had to be a resolution of the crises affecting Assam and Punjab, both of which he 
inherited from his mother’s tenure.   
There was a change in the attitude of the government as it now began to consider the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution, once considered to be a secessionist document under 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. There was also a tendency to associate the demands of 
Punjab as indicative of a broader all-India issue rather than one restricted to Punjab, 
thereby making the situation “normal”. Home minister SB Chavan said that most of the 
issues were common to other states, “it is not peculiar to Punjab that they are asking for 
more autonomous powers. There are rest of the state governments who have been 
asking for the same…if there is the slightest doubt about secessionism I would be the 
first to oppose it…”79  
Janata Party member Jaipal Reddy said that  
I welcome the change in attitude of the Prime Minister towards the question of 
Punjab. At one time he was not prepared to touch the Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution with a barge pole but I was happy to know that he recently gave an 
indication that he did not find everything wrong with the Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution and only some parts were objectionable.80  
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The concern over Pakistan’s involvement was felt too as the proximity of Amritsar to 
Pakistan was a source of concern for the political elite. CPI leader Indrajit Gupta, for 
example, stated that  
We are talking everyday about the threat which is coming from across the 
border particularly because of the tremendous accumulation of offensive 
weapons in Pakistan in the hands of the military regime. Amritsar for example 
is situated 20 miles from the border of Pakistan. Can we afford to let a border 
state which has always been in the past the primary bulwark of our defence 
whenever there has been aggression or attack, can we allow a state like that to 
remain in this condition? This is not something that concerns just Punjab or the 
Sikhs. It is a matter of the security and defence of the entire country.81    
The moderation in the government’s position was followed by the Rajiv-Longowal 
Accord on July 24, 1985.82 The Accord came about in much secrecy and excluded two 
prominent Akali leaders, Tohra and Badal, from the negotiations; Longowal was 
chosen as the chief point of contact of the Akalis. The Accord recognised the political 
identity of the Sikhs and awarded Chandigarh to Punjab-two important demands of the 
Sikhs which had earlier been only half-heartedly acknowledged. The Accord also 
addressed issues of sharing of river waters, rehabilitation of Army deserters, 
compensation for those killed, enquiry into the riots of November 1984 amongst others. 
If these issues were considered to be the main causes of the conflict, it was also the 
case that the Accord was vague on matters of actual transfer of territory and sharing of 
river water, and failed to include the Haryana government-a key actor for enabling 
implementation of the Accord, in negotiations.  
However, even though the demands of the Akalis had finally been met, the conflict was 
far from over. In August 1985, Longowal was assassinated. Elections brought a new 
Akali-led government to power in Punjab. By 1986, violence in Punjab had once again 
reached high levels even as the new government in Punjab under chief minister Barnala 
struggled to keep things in control. The proclamation of Khalistan in 1986 led to a deep 
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condemnation in the Indian Parliament. Now, the causes of the conflict were described 
as a “foreign conspiracy”. According to Congress MP RS Sparrow,  
The enemy’s grand plan all along has been to destabilise the sensitively 
positioned border state of India-Punjab, and contiguous to it, also Jammu and 
Kashmir…the first phase of this that has been put into play is to aid, abet, bribe 
and train mostly the Sikh youth…after that, to make use of holy shrines for 
whipping up communal hatred…then the shrines have been used and still are 
being used for harbouring extremists and also for stockpiling weaponry and 
hatching plans of attack on innocent people…then comes the phase of civil 
strife which leads to revolt or revolution of a type…83  
Clearly, at this stage, the fear of secession as the prime mover of the conflict was far 
from over. There was also a decidedly religious extremist hue given to the causes for 
the conflict.  
The place from which the declaration has been made, the Golden Temple, is not 
only the highest seat of worship of the Sikh people but also a place which is 
revered by people of all communities. Secondly, one cannot ignore the 
background of the uncertainties in Punjab for the last five years…an appeal of 
this nature may appeal to the youth who tend to accept it in their adventurist 
spirit. We felt that this discussion should also be taken up because there is a 
possibility that international media may play it up…also because of the fact that 
these five persons are not isolated, there are countries which are prepared to 
help them.84 
Meanwhile, the ruling Congress party blamed the Barnala government for the situation, 
“Our youth, especially in Punjab, is prone to becoming tools in the hands of our 
enemies...it is basically the fault of the Akali Dal in Punjab…the basic question is that 
politics and religion should be separated and the present situation in Punjab which is 
conducive to creating terrorists should be eliminated. That is the responsibility of the 
Barnala government.”85 Likewise, the home minister Buta Singh said, “the fact is that 
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some of the elements in the Akali Party have been unfortunately managed by anti-India 
forces. They are willingly or unwillingly acting as agents of the enemies of the 
country.”86 The representation of the conflict as one that was being sponsored from 
outside went hand in hand with ascribing terrorism as the root of the problem. In this 
context, secularism also appeared as a nodal point. For instance, “I feel that this is not a 
secular government…this is a government which appeals to the terrorists and are trying 
to appease the terrorists all the time.”87  
On the other end, for the Opposition parties such as the Communist Party, the reasons 
for the conflict were to be found in the failure of the government to implement the 
Accord. Some blamed the Centre for the situation:  
As far as the Centre is concerned, on the question of implementation of the 
Accord, the Centre has bungled on the question of transfer of territory. Of 
course the Punjab and Haryana governments have played their own role in it, 
but these successive commissions have only complicated and confused the issue 
much more.88  
But the Accord, for the government, was not related to the conflict. As PM Rajiv 
Gandhi put it:  
Let me also add at this stage that our discussion at this moment which is really 
about violence and terrorism, I do not think is going to be effective at this stage 
by the accord being implemented or being slower or faster. Let us not mix the 
two things up.89  
The cause for violence was ultimately pinned on the failure of the Barnala government 
in Punjab to curb terrorism, and it was in 1987 when the government was dismissed by 
New Delhi and President’s Rule imposed.  
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The dominant discourse on causes of the conflict during this phase were articulated 
around the idea that the conflict was being fuelled from ‘outside’; it was represented as 
a foreign conspiracy to destabilise India and internally driven by ‘religious extremists’. 
Terrorism became a key nodal point around which the conflict was represented and was 
given as the reason for the dismissal of the state government.  
Identity 
The distinction between moderate Akalis and extremist Akalis by the Centre served to 
widen the gulf between political leaders in Punjab as the Centre thought it prudent to 
negotiate with the moderate elements including Longowal while keeping others such as 
Tohra and Badal away. That the talks were therefore not inclusive complicated the 
situation in Punjab as there was lack of unity on the Accord.  
On March 26, 1985, the situation in Punjab came up in a discussion on amending the 
National Security Act in Punjab so as to enable the extension of the Act beyond 3 
months. Speaking in favour of the amendment, a Congress MP stated that  
I think the situation merits that this should be extended not only for six months 
but even further until a sound philosophy of being a part of the Constitution and 
part of the Indian nationality dawns upon the minds of these Akali people…a 
few years ago they said that they were Hindus. But now they say that they are a 
separate race. They want a separate flag and they claim a separate nationality. 
How on earth can one tolerate such a situation?90  
This intolerance of the assertion of a separate religious identity of the Sikhs was one 
fraught with much consternation among the parliamentarians. Others tried to blur the 
religious identity while calling on the Akalis to declare their ‘Indianness’:  
Once upon a time we believed that if the religious demands were fulfilled, 
things would improve. The religious demands have been conceded but nothing 
has happened…the Sikhs must come forward with a commitment that they are 
Indians and Punjab is a part of India and no secessionist activity will be 
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tolerated…India is surrounded by countries which do not believe in 
secularism…91  
By this stage, the political discourse in Parliament also focused on the identification of 
Akalis as extremists. Further, there was a concern that most Sikhs had begun to 
sympathise with “extremists”: “It is regrettable that perhaps the majority of Sikhs, the 
psychology at least, has become not very different from that of the extremists.”92 Others 
lamented that the Akali Dal had crossed over, “earlier it used to be said that in the 
Akali Dal there are moderates such as Longowal and Prakash Singh Badal and there are 
extremists who are closer to Bhindranwale. Today it appears that there are no 
moderates and all have become extremists.”93  
For Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi: “Although the Akali leadership have been positive in 
certain aspects, they have also during the recent past said and done things which have 
encouraged extremists and terrorists…I would like our friends in the Opposition who 
know them well to talk to them and convince them that if we have to fight these 
terrorists and extremists, we must all fight them together.” 94 
The release of Longowal and other leaders of the Akali Dal in March, and the 
appointment of Arjun Singh as Punjab’s governor made the issue of negotiations more 
urgent and this section of Akalis was identified as being “moderate” enough to talk to. 
By July 1985, the representation of this section of Akalis was more favourable. As one 
member put it, “a political organisation representing a good section of Sikhs now has 
come to isolate themselves from the terrorism of extremists.”95  Moreover, the 
allegiance of these leaders to the Constitution was reiterated as proof of their 
worthiness: “…The Akali Dal has declared, particularly Mr Longowal, their adherence 
to non-violence, their opposition to Khalistan, their adherence to the Constitution…”96  
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In July, the Government signed the Punjab accord with Akali leader Longowal who 
was chosen as the moderate leader worth negotiating with even as others such as Badal 
and Tohra were left out. In the Lok Sabha, PM Rajiv Gandhi said, “I have signed a 
memorandum of settlement. This will bring to an end a very difficult period through 
which the country has passed. It will be the beginning of a new phase of working 
together to build the country, to build unity and integrity in our country.”97 
The assassination of Longowal in August 1985 was followed by state assembly 
elections in Punjab, bringing to power an elected government under the Chief 
Ministership of Surjit Singh Barnala. However, violence continued to rock the state and 
militant groups continued to flourish. The factionalism of the Akalis was stressed upon 
in political discourse, but at this stage there was a concerted attempt to distinguish 
those who were extremists and the others,  
The vast majority, except for this little sliver of a few extremists are against 
Khalistan…Akali Dal is split into various factions but the preponderant 
majority is against Khalistan…About the perpetrators, I have one word to say. 
They must stop the militant way of life at the behest of India’s foreign ill-
wishers. This is their own Mother India and one’s mother should not be 
hurt…how can we let her get vivisected?98  
Police chief J.F. Ribeiro, appointed by the Barnala government, unleashed a ‘bullet for 
bullet’ policy to wipe out terrorism. He viewed the extremists as “very confident that 
they will ultimately get Khalistan. People who have trained them in the camps in 
Pakistan have spent a great deal of time in their indoctrination.”99 The leaders of the 
movement were identified as “the committee of five men based inside the Golden 
Temple…the fresh batches of extremists trained in Pakistan often make the Golden 
Temple their first hideout…” 
By the end of December 1986, the focus of the government once again turned to the 
extremists and terrorists in Punjab, with references to countries like the US and 
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Pakistan in aiding them. RS Sparrow in December 1986, “We are at war in Punjab 
against militant cum fundamentalist anti-nationals, both internal and external. This is a 
new type of war with the use of modern sophisticated weapons, aided and abetted with 
funds, weapons, methods of training according to well-worked out plans.”100 Home 
Minister Buta Singh said that the state government had arrested certain political leaders 
including Prakash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra as it had realised that 
“terrorist activities derive sustenance from the opportunism of certain political 
elements”.101  
Hence, the framing of identities during this period began with the recognition of there 
being moderate elements within the Akali party with whom to negotiate with, but 
within a couple of months of the Accord being signed, this distinction was erased. The 
discourses were now organised around the nodal points of ‘fundamentalists’, ‘external 
agents’ and ‘terrorists’.  
Policy 
If 1985 started out with continuation of the policies from previous years, the 
appointment of a new Governor, Arjun Singh, in March, suggested a shift in policy as 
he worked to get the Centre to release certain Akali leaders from jail and begin 
negotiations. There was also an underlying theme of terrorism in Punjab being the most 
pressing issue; and some political leaders were of the opinion that, “We should not 
encourage terrorism for solving our problems, nor are we to hold talks with terrorists. 
Talks should continue with others…”102 On the other hand, the government made it 
clear that while it was taking all measures to control violence, it was open to 
negotiations: 
Various measures have been taken to contain terrorist activities. These include 
police protection to known targets of extremists, identification of sensitive 
areas, intensive police patrolling, recover of illicit arms and ammunition by 
organising special raids and combing operations, extensive checks in vulnerable 
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areas, strengthening of police machinery and streamlining of the intelligence set 
up. The situation in the state is under constant watch and is being regularly 
reviewed at the highest level…terrorist activities have no place in a democracy 
and issues must be resolved through discussions only…103 
In April, the government announced an inquiry into the November riots in Delhi, 
released some of the Sikh youth who had been lodged in jail and lifted the ban on the 
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF). 
Making his statement in the Lok Sabha on May 13, 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
said,  
What we really have to fight is not the political aspect. That is where we must 
adjust and accommodate always, within the constraints of a united and integral 
India; that is where we must be flexible. But at the same time we must be very 
rigid where there is any question of using violence towards those ends, where 
there is any question of using terrorism towards those ends, where there is any 
question of threat to the national unity and integrity and where there is a 
question of a fraction breaking away.  
The home minister, SB Chavan said,  
Terrorist activity or extremist activity in any form is going to be dealt with very 
seriously and for this, whatever organisational structure is necessary, either in 
intelligence or in police or in paramilitary force, we are going to create 
whatever structure is necessary for handling a situation of this nature.104  
While being publicly vocal in condemning violence and extremism, negotiations with 
Longowal continued under the stewardship of Governor Arjun Singh since April-May 
and on July 24, 1985, the Government of India signed a memorandum of settlement 
with the Akali Dal. The Punjab Accord of 1985 was hailed by the Centre as a resolution 
of the Punjab crisis. The Accord laid out compensation to innocent people killed in 
Punjab, rehabilitation of Army deserters, enquiry into November anti-Sikh riots, lifting 
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of most charges, all India Gurudwara Act, transfer of territories, Centre-state relations 
and sharing of river waters along with promotion of Punjabi language. The issues of 
territory transfer while relegating to Commissions, was set for January 26, 1986. The 
Centre-state relations issue was also relegated to a Commission and sharing of river 
waters issues transferred to a Tribunal. In essence, the Centre had now come to agree to 
many of the demands that had been part of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973.   
In August 1985, elections for Punjab were announced. Speaking in the Parliament, 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that: 
In the context of recent events in Punjab, the electoral process has acquired a 
new national significance…will we allow the exercise of free will of the people 
to be obstructed, frustrated and subverted by the forces of extremism and 
terrorism…what matters is that the lamp of democracy is not extinguished, what 
matters is that India wins…A democratic election is the people’s answer to the 
brute force employed by a small section to impose their will on the masses. We 
shall not allow divisive forces to prevail.105   
The secrecy in which the talks were held was apparently a deliberate attempt at 
ensuring its progress. According to Governor Arjun Singh, “That secrecy was the key 
to success. If we had failed there the accord would never have come about.”106 A 
number of Sikh organisations and offshoots of the Akali Dal denounced the Accord.  
For the BJP Opposition, the government had conceded to the Akalis:  
They have given them so much, what have they gained in return? They should 
have at least asked them to condemn extremism and declare that they will not 
allow their shrines to become arsenals and sanctuaries of extremists…The 
Government did not involve states like Haryana and Rajasthan whose interests 
were intimately connected with the accord.107 
The home ministry report of 1985-86 hailed the Punjab Accord as a “landmark” event 
“in the direction of finding satisfactory solution” to the situation. While it lay out that 
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most of the issues had been implemented, it mentioned that “the transfer of Chandigarh 
to Punjab will take place simultaneously with the transfer of areas in lieu of Chandigarh 
to Haryana.”  
For the Centre, even as it failed to meet the January deadline for transferring 
Chandigarh to Punjab, the violence in Punjab was now a matter for the state 
government to resolve. Rajiv Gandhi in July 1986 spoke in the aftermath of a spate of 
violence and killings in Delhi, “the challenge in Punjab is very squarely a challenge for 
the state government to rise up to.”108 He also said that: 
We are willing to talk to anyone. But, there are certain buts, that discussion can 
only be with those who are willing to operate within the framework of our 
Constitution…we will not categorically talk to anyone who is in our view acting 
against national interests, who is acting against India’s unity and integrity and 
who in our eyes is not behaving as an Indian should behave. The issue of a 
separatist state is not negotiable.  We will not allow it under any circumstances. 
  
Hence, the policy of the government was to conduct talks only if the Constitution 
allowed, making redundant any demands that challenged existing constitutional 
arrangements.  
The appointment of J.F. Ribeiro as Punjab’s police chief by the new Barnala 
government was an attempt to overhaul the police force and to motivate them. His 
‘bullet for bullet’ policy was meant to reignite the morale of the forces and give them 
sweeping powers to counter violence. He was also not against entering the Golden 
Temple albeit he said, “in certain situations it can be counterproductive as in the case of 
Operation Blue Star. At the same time, unless you act there will be no way of stopping 
the terrorists. We have to decide on that very carefully…”109 
By mid-1986, even as politically the government felt that the state government was in 
charge, the Centre was beefing up its security apparatus in the state. This included the 
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creation of an elite anti-terrorist unit called the National Security Guards (NSG). 
According to Ghulam Nabi Azad, minister of state in the Department of states,  
None of the paramilitary forces that we have is trained to deal with terrorists. 
We are making use of the CRPF at the moment in different parts of the country, 
particularly in Punjab, but the CRPF is not specially trained to combat terrorists. 
That is why it was felt necessary that we should have a specially trained force 
which can be used against terrorists…organised terrorism has been introduced 
in the border state of Punjab and this conspiracy has global ramifications. We 
also know that the forces of violence and destabilisation are not only abetted but 
also aided by alien forces who are hostile to India.110 
In December 1986, a debate took place on the situation in Punjab following a spate of 
killings in the state. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s statement in the face of accusations 
that the Centre was not taking any action,  
The Centre does not get direct powers to act on law and order situation in a 
State…the only time the Centre gets authority is when there is President’s 
Rule…therefore there is no way that the Centre can directly intervene. We can 
send forces, we can help. But we come under the authority of the local 
executive which is the State government…Every route is not open. The 
Constitution gives us certain paths under which we can act…111  
Amidst accusations that the Centre had failed to implement the Accord, PM Rajiv 
Gandhi on December 1, 1986 said,  
There has been no deviation on the accord on our part and we would like to 
complete the Accord now. We will complete it the first chance we get. At the 
moment you be aware we are stuck on the Chandigarh aspect because the 
Punjab government was not willing to do certain things that the Commission 
said should be done. We are stuck on the canal because the Punjab government 
is not constructing the canal.  
                                                             
110 Lok Sabha, August 20, 1986, Monsoon Session, Government of India.  
111 Lok Sabha, December 1, 1986, Winter Session, Government of India. 
96 
 
The government expressed alarm at the “continued terrorist activities” in Punjab in its 
report in 1986-87. The government reconstituted a National Integration Council in 
1986 and the report mentioned that in its first meeting it adopted a resolution “calling 
upon the people of Punjab, Haryana and the adjoining areas to dissociate from those 
who preached violence and secession.” The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) 
Special Powers Act 1983 continued in certain areas in the state  
To enable the armed forces to take effective action to check terrorist activities. 
Special anti-terrorist squads have been set up and raids are being conducted at 
the hideouts of extremists, their harbourers and supporters. During the year a 
number of terrorists have been arrested and some major terrorist gangs have 
been busted. Some terrorists have also been killed in encounters with the police. 
A substantial quantity of arms and ammunition has been recovered.112  
There was also now a widespread belief that the country was facing a secessionist 
conflict by a small group of fundamentalists. Regarding the territorial dispute and 
transfer of areas, the government had appointed another commission under Justice 
Venkataramiah in April 1986 and while it asked the state governments of Punjab and 
Haryana to mutually decide the matter, no agreement could be reached and the Centre 
referred the issue to Justice Desai with the consequence that the matter remained 
unresolved as an amendment was made that did away with the time limit for submitting 
his recommendations to the Government.  
The period 1985-1987 was in many ways a crucial period of the conflict. A change in 
policy of the government and the representation of a section of Akalis as “moderates” 
with whom to negotiate shifted the dynamics and resulted in an agreement called the 
Punjab Accord. With this Accord came an acknowledgment of the demands of the 
Akalis which had been presented to the Centre since 1973 when they came out with the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The same demands which had been termed “secessionist” 
by Indira Gandhi were now ceded. However, the manner in which the Centre conducted 
the negotiations in such secrecy, while marginalising those it considered to be 
“extremist” Akalis left an incomplete ‘resolution’ of the conflict. Crucially, 
negotiations on the Accord also failed to include representatives of the Haryana 
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government, a key actor for any successful resolution of the conflict. The conduct of 
state assembly elections in Punjab in September 1985 was considered by New Delhi to 
be a mandate of the people’s acceptance of the democratic process but the 
accompanying violence that continued and indeed intensified in the state, meant that 
the conflict was far from over. The Indian state also now sought to blame the mayhem 
in Punjab on the incompetence of the Akali government. Moreover, the lack of 
implementation of the Accord on key issues of transfer of territory and water sharing 
was beginning to be blamed on the unwillingness of the state governments of Punjab 
and Haryana to cooperate on the matter. By the end of 1986, the discourses of the state 
once again became dominated by references to the “terrorists” and “secessionists” who 
were driven by masterminds from outside the country. Security apparatus in the state 
was strengthened; police training was intensified and a new police chief appointed. 
Special paramilitary forces were sent in to help the state in flushing out extremists, and 
in 1987, faced with ever increasing numbers of killings, the state government headed 
by Barnala was dismissed.  
Phase 3: 1987-1993: Anti-terrorism thrust  
Key events 
1987 Barnala govt dismissed and Punjab 
placed under President’s Rule 
May 1988 Operation Black Thunder led by police 
chief KPS Gill against militants taking 
refuge in the Golden Temple 
1989 Demand for Khalistan raised by a group 
of militants in Punjab 
December 1989 New non-Congress government at the 
Centre led by Prime Minister VP Singh 
1990 Lok Sabha elections in Punjab, Talks 
between Centre and extremists 
November 1991 Army reinducted in Punjab 
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February 1992 Punjab Legislative Assembly elections, 
boycotted by all Akali factions 




In May 1987, the home minister discussed the situation in Punjab and elevated it to an 
“unprecedented” level, “the past two months has been an unprecedented period in the 
history of Punjab so far as the killings by terrorists is concerned.”113 Further, “what 
made matters worse was the deep involvement of some of the state ministers and their 
relations with the terrorists and the unwanted attempted interference with the 
functioning of the police by them some of the leaders of the ruling party.” 
The conflict was at this stage considered to be entirely secessionist and extremist in 
nature. For home minister Buta Singh, “it is not a law and order situation. We are trying 
to fight against those forces which are out to destroy the country, which are out to 
fragment the country.”114 The 1987-88 annual home ministry report mentioned how 
1987 “witnessed escalation in violent and secessionist activities and emergence of a 
fundamentalist movement” which led to the imposition of President’s Rule in May 
1987. 
The conflict was framed as Pakistan-sponsored:  
Operation Black Thunder gave a severe jolt to the nucleus of terrorist activities 
in Pakistan…While the role of Pakistan in aiding and abetting terrorism in 
Punjab is the most prominent one, it is part of a widespread international 
conspiracy to destabilise India, for example, pro-Khalistan elements 
                                                             
113 Buta Singh, Lok Sabha, May 12, 1987, Budget Session, Government of India.  
114 Lok Sabha, November 9, 1987, Winter Session, Government of India.  
99 
 
demonstrated in front of Indian missions abroad to register their protest against 
Operation Black Thunder…115 
By 1989, the perception of the causes suggests a shift from a secessionist one to one 
now driven by pure criminal activity. On May 8 1989, even as the government sought 
to extend President’s Rule in Punjab, the home minister said that the situation had 
changed and that: 
The governor has reported that while it is true that the number of killings is still 
large, it has to be noted that most of the killings are today not for achieving any 
separatist or fundamentalist ideology but for mainly anti-social and criminal 
reasons such as robbery, kidnapping, land grabbing, looting, extortion etc. In 
other words, a number of dangerous criminals armed with sophisticated 
weapons and arms are continuing their efforts to take advantage of the 
situation…Khalistani posters or slogans are not generally seen or heard these 
days…116 
The home minister said that earlier the reform movement of the Sikhs had taken on an 
extremist hue and pitted religious communities against each other but the situation had 
improved such that the issue now was “the continuing battle between groups of 
terrorists and law enforcing agency. It has to be met with very a heavy hand and with 
full determination.”117  
By July 1989, the government was also vehemently against any reorganisation of 
federal arrangements as per the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR). Further, the 
discourse at this time was dominated by references to external powers aiding the 
conflict. Speaking in the Parliament, Minister of State in the Home Affairs ministry P 
Chidambaram said,  
It is these two powerful factors-one internal, political, giving legitimacy to 
extremists and their movement, and the other external, perhaps international 
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which gives arms, money and support to the terrorists which has made for this 
combustible mixture in Punjab…the situation is a very difficult situation….118  
He also said that the Sarkaria Commission had given its report on the ASR and 
observed that the ASR demand to restrict the Union’s powers to defence, foreign 
affairs, currency and general communications only meant that “under such 
arrangements the country cannot survive as one integrated nation.” Further, he said,  
If this Resolution is accepted it will mean that the survival of India as an 
integrated country is in peril. Therefore we reject the Anandpur Sahib 
Resolution. It is the support to the ASR that has given legitimacy to extremists. 
It has given respect to the Khalistan demand…This is the problem of Punjab 
and unless you come to grips with this problem, unless you understand the 
game played by the factions of the Akali Dal, unless you understand the 
legitimacy and respect which the Akali Dal is giving to extremism, terrorists 
and militants-I am not saying you are extremists but you are giving legitimacy 
and respect to the terrorists and extremists in Punjab-you cannot deal with this. 
For a brief period between December 1989 and 1991, the National Front government at 
the Centre tried to make amends for previous Congress government failures in Punjab 
but lack of a cohesive policy and all round confusion prevailed. Prime Minister VP 
Singh visited the Golden Temple and spoke of the need of a “healing touch” for the 
people of Punjab. The new government however continued to espouse external factors 
as the main source of the causes of the conflict. Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Syed 
said, “Every time there has been a rise in terrorist activity, the source of guidance and 
motivation appears to have come from outside our borders.”119 
The government also sought to draw Pakistan into the discourse on causes and home 
minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed said, “it is obvious that they (Pakistan) are making 
every effort to communalise the situation in Punjab and Kashmir…”120 
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By November 1991, a new Congress government was at the Centre under the Prime 
Ministership of Narasimha Rao. In the same year, the Army was reinducted in Punjab 
and a new impetus given to the Centre’s counter-terrorism strategy. KPS Gill was 
transferred back to Punjab to lead the police force. The selection of KPS Gill as police 
chief was also symbolic, for as a Sikh officer known for his hard-line views on using 
force against militants, the government hoped to achieve some measure of legitimacy in 
Punjab.   
In August 1992, a minister in the home ministry gave a report saying that violent 
incidents had decreased and said, “with the killings of some of the top terrorists and 
faced with depletion of their ranks, the Pakistan backed terrorist outfits have become 
panicky…the security forces have taken note of the challenge and have initiated 
various operational steps so as to combat terrorists threat and ensure protection to the 
families of the policemen.”121 The report of 1990-91 put Punjab and Kashmir together 
and mentioned “terrorist and subversive activities continued unabated” with aid and 
abetment from across the border.  
The state assembly elections in February 1992 installed a new Congress government 
under the Chief Ministership of Beant Singh, the onus of counter terrorism fell to the 
state government. The causes of the conflict were no longer thought to be any real 
political grievance, but reduced entirely to criminality, terrorism and fundamentalism 
till such time that each of the extremist outfits were not driven underground or obsolete.  
Identity  
The identification of “terrorists” and “secessionists” during this phase went hand in 
hand with their representation as foreign-aided extremist’s intent on dividing the 
country. Home minister Buta Singh said, “Today the Sikhs are being converted into 
fundamentalists and terrorists…Sikhs are being converted into neo-Sikhism. Hence it is 
essential to understand the Sikh psyche in Punjab today.”122 He also said that most of 
these people were not Indians but nationals of western countries. Further, “whatever 
resolutions they have passed till date, they have supported the division of the country. 
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They do not want to hold talks with the Central government short of Khalistan..”123 He 
also said that these extremists, including the Panthic Committee124, was behind killings 
and anti-national activities and had not abjured violence. “Who brought this Panthic 
Committee inside the Golden Temple? Was it not Mr Tohra? Was he not responsible 
for handing over the whole complex?” There was a clear reference to Akali leaders as 
being hand in glove with the extremists.  
In the aftermath of Operation Black Thunder in May 1988, the government stated in 
Parliament that  
The disclosures of the material recovered from the Golden Temple complex 
after Operation Black Thunder show the close connection between Pakistan and 
the terrorist groups…after Operation Black Thunder a number of Sikh terrorist 
leaders based in Pakistan took stock of the situation. The Panthic Committee 
and the Babbar Khalsa sent out instructions to their members in India to step up 
violence…125  
In May 1988, the home minister said that the Governor of Punjab had submitted his 
report to the President and in it he had mentioned that  
Increase in the killings of civilians by terrorist activities are mainly due to a new 
factor being added to the Punjab problem by the illegal intrusion of trained 
terrorists and smugglers with sophisticated arms and ammunition into Punjab 
from Pakistan with the avowed object of disintegrating and destabilising the 
State…the Governor is of the view that Pakistan is behind the encounters which 
have taken place near our border areas. He has further mentioned that a number 
of centres have been set up by Pakistan in their territory for the purpose of 
training infiltrators into India. 
He also said that he had recommended extension of President’s Rule in light of the 
“firmness required” and to maintain the morale of the security forces. There was also a 
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reference made to the links of Sikh extremists with the Mujahideen groups in 
Afghanistan. The minister of state in the Home Ministry, P Chidambaram said,  
We are aware that there have been some contracts between the extremists who 
are operating in Punjab, not the terrorists themselves but their mentors abroad, 
and the Afghan Mujahideen. Government has information that in 1985 some 
Sikh extremists came into contact with Afghan Mujahideen in the United 
Kingdom…obviously there is some contact between the two groups in the 
matter of purchase of arms.126  
On the other hand, there was a parallel discourse of the need to address ordinary Sikhs 
including the youth, for which there was a call for development and employment 
oriented policies. In a discussion on the budget for Punjab in September 1990, the 
government defended its policies in the state and said,  
What is needed is not merely irrigation projects, what is needed is not merely 
the employment problem, they are necessary to remove the discontent of 
Punjab, but the whole psyche of Sikhs is also to be looked after….let us try to 
see that the disturbed psyche of friends, brothers and sisters is healed.127  
He also said that various financial programmes had been started in Punjab with regards 
to development works. He said, “I fully agree with members that we have to tackle this 
problem in a federal spirit”. When asked about avenues for employment for youth and 
lack of industries. He said, “if youth remain unemployed and they do not get 
opportunities, terrorists utilise them…they play as stooges in the hands of the corrupt. 
They play in the hands of the Pakistanis...”  
On October 5, 1990, PM VP Singh once again reiterated that though they were in 
favour of elections, the atmosphere was not conducive. He said that the threat from 
across the border continued to be present, “Pakistan is also busy in its activities across 
the border and there is no abatement.” Also, “the present government and supporting 
parties had created an atmosphere that every Sikh is not looked at with suspicion…We 
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do not suspect Sikh brethren, we trust them. They have sacrificed themselves for this 
country. They have contributed in the making and upliftment of this country.” By 1992-
93, the discourses on identity of the actors had succeeded in demarcating extremists 
from ordinary Sikhs. The boycott by the Akalis of the state legislative elections in 1992 
resulting from the dictates issued by extremist groups was termed unfortunate.  
Policy  
With the identification of causes and identities being dominated by references to the 
extremist nature of the conflict, the policy during this phase was largely one of counter-
terrorism led by police and paramilitary action. Any references to human rights 
violations were acknowledged but considered peripheral to the task at hand. In the 
Parliament, Home minister Buta Singh defended the actions of the Police chief Ribeiro, 
known for his bullet for bullet policy, as follows, “the whole country knows at what 
personal risks the Director General of Police in Punjab has been discharging his 
duties…wild allegations including that of fostering communalism were falsely made 
against him…”128 He also said that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that 
made it impossible for the state government to control despite the best intentions of 
Chief Minister Barnala. Therefore he said, the state assembly was placed under 
suspended animation and President’s Rule imposed in May 1987. Buta Singh said that 
elections had been held in the hope that a democratic government would be able to 
solve the situation but,  
In these 21 months our hopes remain unfulfilled and the democratically elected 
government was not able to tackle the situation fully…the political people who 
were expected to tackle the complicated problems were busy in seeking 
positions and those who were not given any position deserted the party….the 
state government did not cooperate in implementing Article 249129 and the 
people had to undergo enormous hardship for 21 months.130   
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He also said that Chandigarh had to be transferred only simultaneously with the transfer 
of territories to Haryana as it was a condition stipulated in the Accord.  
In November 1987, in a discussion on extending President’s Rule in Punjab, home 
minister Buta Singh said that  
The Governor of Punjab’s assessment is that when President’s Rule was 
promulgated in Punjab the state administration had to deal with two dangerous 
trends-fundamentalist terrorism in all its destructive and anti-national 
manifestation and ordinary terrorism that was both dangerous and anti-national 
in character...the Governor is of the view that if a popular government is 
installed now the present firmness will go and the people thrown into a state of 
nervousness and disarray. Moreover there is no party that can lead any 
government effectively in the present condition of the state with any firmness or 
determination. ”131  
Hence, elections were at this stage delegitimised due to the fear that the structures of 
force required to deal with terrorism would collapse. Extraordinary measures and their 
amendments were made legitimate owing to the securitised framing of the situation in 
Punjab. That these policies were proving to be successful counter-terrorism measures 
was highlighted in official discourses:   
The paramilitary forces have been deployed in greater strength and given legal 
powers to so as to enable them to deal with any terrorist effectively…over a 
dozen notorious terrorists have been killed in encounters or apprehended. Their 
leaders who had links not only inside the country but also outside have been 
eliminated. The Dal Khalsa and National Council of Khalistan have been 
banned; patrolling of police and paramilitary forces has been intensified… 
Through President’s Rule we will endeavour to root out extremism and 
separatism from Punjab at the earliest possible.”132 
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The 1987-88 report of the home ministry noted that “anti-terrorist” measures had been 
intensified and “a large number of suspected terrorists” been killed or apprehended. In 
November 1987, President’s Rule was extended for another six months. 
If, on the one hand, these security-centric policies were being instituted and carried on 
from previous phases, now, there was also a parallel policy targeting societal cohesion 
which suggests that the government was moving towards a normalisation in Punjab by 
co-opting and directing civil society organisations. These token peace committees 
coexisted with armed village defence committees. The rationale behind these groups 
was to instil in the state “lok shakti”, or people’s power:  
The Governor of Punjab has formed more than 2000 peace and development 
committees which are represented by all parties…their job is to solve the local 
problems of every village and to check the growing influence of terrorism 
through persuasion and mass contact. There are cases where villagers armed 
with lathis have killed terrorists armed with stenguns. Such confidence has been 
created… It is being considered that a village force should be organised so that 
they may be supplied arms to combat terrorism…these committees are proving 
quite successful and a lot of information is being received through them. We 
should channelize our efforts to mobilise ‘Lok Shakti’ i.e. the power of the 
people so that Punjab may come out of the mire of terrorism and may regain its 
high position of being a progressive state.”133  
With Operation Black Thunder in 1988, a number of extremists sheltering in the 
Golden Temple were flushed out in a joint police-army operation led by KPS Gill. 
Unlike the infamous Operation Blue Star, this time the operation was conducted with 
minimal damage and targeted only the militants. In May 1989, the home minister 
justified the government’s policies of force and highlighted their success as proof of 
continuing President’s Rule: 
The entrenchment of the Khalistani terrorists in the sacred precincts of the 
Golden Temple has been dismantled…Punjab has progressed considerably in 
the economic sphere. The Governor is of the view that we must not waver or 
falter or dilute in any way our determination to fight the forces of anti-national 
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terrorism…for this a strong and committed administration which can in present 
circumstances be only under President’s Rule with the Central and State 
governments working in total cohesion, cooperation and coordination under a 
determined and unified control… the Governor has assessed that any elections 
held for the Assembly in the present disturbed and uncertain situation are likely 
to result in further confusion and chaos.134  
Moreover, the ruling party continued to insist that talks were still part of the policy of 
the government but the Akalis had not reciprocated. RL Bhatia of the Congress said, 
There was an allegation that the Congress Party is not talking to the political 
parties and consulting them…Our position is very clear. We want to talk to 
everyone…Even now our door is open. The Akali party has not come forward 
to cooperate in this negotiation and they have put certain conditions…if you are 
really sincere about solving the Punjab tangle then there should be no 
condition…the responsibility of the present Punjab situation lies on the Akali 
Party, not on the Congress Party which is prepared to talk.135 
By 1989, implementation of the Punjab Accord had also fallen into disarray and the 
government continued to distance itself from it. According to the home minister Buta 
Singh, 
The very nature of the Accord is such that the government of India can do 
nothing on its own. We can only assist the state governments namely the 
governments of Punjab and Haryana. The issues are bilateral and they have to 
be implemented together. Unfortunately it has not taken off…in the process, 
Haryana got a new government…136  
The relationship of the centre with the Akali factions too continued to be hostile. A 
number of Akali leaders were detained in 1989 for protesting against fake encounters 
and police brutalities. For the government, these protests were undemocratic:  
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Now is that the way to bring normalcy to Punjab? They are contributing to the 
situation which is already very tense. Therefore my submission is that nobody is 
pleased to keep the representatives of the people behind bars but with a heavy 
heart, in the interests of the nation, one has to take that step. It was in this 
context that the step was taken and they were again taken into custody.137  
Moreover, it was reiterated that “We were always prepared to hold talks with any 
person provided he is willing to do so within the framework of the Constitution and 
take a pledge to abjure violence and preserve the unity and integrity of the country.”138 
The government continued to delegitimise elections and democracy in Punjab. MoS 
Chidambaram said, “As long as the Akali party is so fragmented and fractured and is 
unwilling to take a resolute position against terrorism, it is very difficult to hold 
elections and usher in a democratic government…not one Sikh leader of eminence in 
their parties has condemned terrorism…”139 
 A change in leadership at the Centre in December 1989 could have resulted in a 
departure from Congress policies but the short tenure coupled with the inability to 
break with old policies meant that little changed. The new National Front 
government140 tried to centre its policies on a ‘healing touch’. Home Minister Mufti 
Mohammed Syed said that the National Front government was interested in giving a 
“healing touch” to the “wounded sentiments” of the people of Punjab.  141 However, lack 
of a cohesive policy and reliance on previous policies of force continued as the main 
thrust in Punjab. Talks were held between the Centre and Akalis but the government 
continued to make violence and terrorism the main issue to be tackled. Home minister 
Mufti Mohammed Syed said,  
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The PM has talked to Punjab MPs and the leaders of the Akali Dal,  the issue of 
holding elections has been discussed in great detail…the people of Punjab are 
prepared to take part in elections. The foremost priority is to curb and contain 
terrorism then conduct elections in Punjab. It is not advisable to hold elections 
in Punjab without bringing violence under control.142  
The same was reiterated by Prime Minister VP Singh: “If elections are announced there 
will be terror and exodus of Hindu brethren and there will be reaction in the entire 
country. Then the people will participate in elections on gunpoint and there may be a 
proposal to secede from the country, after that this problem will be 
internationalised.”143 By this time, there was also a growing focus on the need for 
development packages for the state so that the youth could “choose a right path instead 
of treading on a wrong one… the problem of Punjab can be solved only by tackling the 
problems of the youth of Punjab and by taking them into confidence.”  
This shift in discourse on policy by focusing on the youth and development measures 
also meant that political grievances of the past were being gradually de-emphasised. By 
1989-90, security forces were still the dominant state apparatus in Punjab and 
“continued to mount pressure on the terrorists” and raids were being conducted on their 
hideouts for apprehending them. In 1990, the home minister stated that the “our 
common objective is to mobilise public opinion and to educate people of Punjab 
against terrorism and secessionism.”144 He also said that with regards to talks, they 
would be held only “within the constitutional framework.”  
The Congress party came back in power at the Centre in 1991. In the same year, the 
Army was reinducted in Punjab and a massive anti-terrorism mandate given to police 
and armed forces to crush terrorists. The years 1991, 1992 saw a massive operation 
against militants and gross human rights violations took place by both militant groups 
and security forces. Much of these militant attacks were termed acts of terrorism and 
the terror discourse made justifiable the brutal force used by security forces.  By 1992-
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93, events in Kashmir and terror attacks in Bombay had created a wider discourse of 
terrorism affecting the country.  
Elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly were held in February 1992 amidst a 
voter turnout of about 25% in which terrorists call to boycott the elections ensured the 
Akalis stayed out of contesting the elections. The state Congress government under 
Chief Minister Beant Singh gave KPS Gill as the police chief widespread powers to 
arrest and detain militants and the result of this crackdown was a huge decrease in 
civilian casualties by 1993, when KPS declared that terrorism had been defeated.  
The policies in Punjab between 1987-1993 reflect an emphasis on the counter-terror 
approach that relied on police and paramilitary forces to eliminate the ‘terrorists’. The 
continuation of President’s Rule and its justification by the state in terms of counter-
insurgency effectiveness dashed any real democratic policy response in Punjab. The 
arrest of Akali members for their protest against human rights violations also feeds into 
this discourse. Simultaneous with this security-centric approach, peace and 
development committees were instituted to address the needs of civil society and 
youth-centred policies relating to development measures also signal a move towards 
establishing democracy. Elections to the state assembly were held only 1992 and 
despite the low voter turnout and Akali boycott, the government viewed this, and the 
crushing of terrorism by force, as signs of the end of the conflict in Punjab.  
Between 1987 and 1993, Punjab witnessed ever increasing levels of violence as a 
number of extremist militant groups wreaked havoc in the state. Successive police and 
paramilitary operations ensured that the period saw high rates of militant and police 
casualties. Discourses of the state on matters related to causes, identities and policies 
suggest an exclusive focus on counter-terrorism as the best way of curbing violence. 
The dismissal of the state government in 1987 was followed by five years of direct rule 
from New Delhi. The governments in New Delhi during this period were unanimous in 
the continuance of President’s Rule so as to check terrorism, thereby delegitimizing 
elections. There was a concerted attempt in the public discourses to link extremism in 
Punjab with terror groups operating from outside the border. This was especially so 
from 1989 onwards when events in Kashmir and Afghanistan began to gain national 
and international attention. The government continued to view the Akalis as being 
subservient to the extremist groups with the effect that in 1992 when elections were 
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held, the Akalis, in deference to the call for boycott form these groups, did indeed stay 
away from the electoral process. When a state government was elected in 1992, headed 
by the Congress, the conflict in Punjab was thrust entirely on it to resolve. The Chief 
Minister appointed KPS Gill as police chief and under him, an aggressive counter-
terrorism strategy was enforced which ultimately saw violence to have reduced to an 
all-time low in 1993. It was now believed, that with low levels of violence, and with an 
elected state government in place, that the conflict in Punjab was finally over. 
Unimplemented issues of the Punjab Accord, such as transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, 
were relegated to the backburner as the Centre chose to distance itself from it, blaming 
governments in Punjab and Haryana for any lack of coordination on these issues. 
Moreover, the attention of the Centre had by now shifted to Kashmir, which was 
becoming yet another tinderbox ready to erupt.  
Conclusion  
As one of the first and most deadly conflicts to have challenged the Indian state after its 
independence in 1947, Punjab left a legacy that has since ensured that any violent 
conflict needs to be approached from a counter-terror perspective of using brute force 
to defeat terrorism and violence. That Punjab was a “success” gives further credibility 
to this policy. While literature on the Punjab conflict is exhaustive and detailed, this 
chapter provided a unique analysis of the discourses at the time that reflect broader 
security strategies of the State and the legitimization of these policies in a way that 
previous research has failed to do.  
The causes of the conflict ranged from Akali political frustration, to extremism and 
fundamentalism, to foreign or Pakistani influence. Towards the end, terrorism became 
the most dominant discourse on causes of the conflict. Political grievances were 
acknowledged until 1985 when the Punjab Accord was signed, but subsequent failures 
at implementation, and ever increasing levels of violence signalled to the government 
the futility of political negotiations. Moreover, the insistence of holding talks “within 
the framework of the constitution” often proved a stumbling block for fruitful 
negotiations. PM Indira Gandhi’s assessment in the early stages that the Sikhs felt 
alienated “for some reason” shows the indifference and indeed callousness in 
approaching the conflict with seriousness at this early stage of the conflict. By 1985, 
even as a new state government came to power under the Akalis, causes for the crisis 
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were blamed on this state government for failing to protect law and order. By the end of 
the 1980s, the conflict in Punjab was largely represented as a terrorist issue, with 
backing from foreign sources and Pakistan.  
The Akalis were held responsible for the chaos in Punjab and their identification as 
anti-nationals and hand in glove with extremists and foreign forces only widened the 
distrust between the two. Discourses on identity also made frequent references to the 
valour of the Sikhs during India’s independence and the close relations between Sikhs 
and Hindus as a way of negating the Akali’s demands for recognition of a Sikh identity 
as distinct from the Hindus. The idea of any religious community calling itself a 
‘nation’ was problematic for the Indian State and served to delegitimise their demands 
as being secessionist, for, in the words of the Indira Gandhi, “we are all one nation.”  
The framing of the prime movers of the conflict as Pakistan-sponsored or originating 
outside India also denied local agency and attempted to fix the causes and identities as 
foreign or disconnected with the internal situation in Punjab. Moreover, by highlighting 
the religious identity, the government’s discourses tended to focus on secularism and 
communalism as the main concern for the government.    
In terms of policy responses, one of the earliest actions of the government was to 
dismiss the Akali government in Punjab in 1980 and install President’s Rule. The 
government also introduced a National Security Bill in 1980 to provide for 
extraordinary measures of arrest and detention and used these measures in Punjab. The 
discourses on the causes of the conflict had already pinned much of the blame on the 
Akalis and their identification as anti-nationals only made more justifiable the denial of 
political voice to them. Despite the negative framing of the Akalis and their demands, 
the government held talks with them but these talks made little progress. The coming 
together of the Akali party and Bhindranwale alarmed the Indian government and in 
1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved Operation Blue Star to eliminate all 
‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple. This army-led 
operation was legitimised as necessary for ‘national interest’ as the plan of the 
extremists was framed as ‘secession’ and violence. Indeed, the discourses of the 
government in the aftermath of the operation highlighted the success of the policy 
based on the killings of some of the extremist leaders such as Bhindranwale.     
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In terms of policies, there was a change in emphasis once Rajiv Gandhi became Prime 
Minister after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. The anti-Sikh riots of 1984 also changed 
the representation of demands of the Akalis as justice and rehabilitation of victims were 
added to the list. Under Rajiv Gandhi, an initiative was taken to negotiate with chosen 
‘moderate’ Akali leaders and an agreement was signed between the government and 
Akali leader Longowal in July 1985. If this agreement acknowledged various demands 
of the Akalis that had hitherto been termed secessionist, the failure to include key 
stakeholders-such as the Haryana government, and the division of the Akali party 
ensured that the Accord was not going to be easy to implement. While the government 
tried to install some measure of democracy in Punjab by holding state elections, the 
new government under Akali leader Barnala struggled to cope with increasing violence 
and lack of commitment by the Centre. Moreover, the Centre’s discourses now ascribed 
all blame for the situation in Punjab to the fledgling state government. On matters of 
implementation of the Accord, there was now a tendency by the Centre to wash its 
hands off the matter by laying the blame on the Akali party for failing to negotiate with 
the Haryana government. These discourses then made possible the dismissal of the state 
government in 1987 and the reinstatement of President’s Rule.  
By the end of the 1980s, the government represented the situation in Punjab as a purely 
terrorist and criminal conflict and police and paramilitary operations were stepped up to 
deal with the violence. Acknowledgement of political causes and lack of 
implementation on the Accord were barely mentioned and the focus was entirely on 
‘terrorism’ in the state. Policies towards the 1990s were oriented to manage violence in 
the state through strengthening of the police and paramilitary forces. By this time, 
opposition discourses pressuring the Centre to establish democracy in Punjab through 
elections were side-lined as the government insisted that the ‘time was not right’ as it 
would interfere with the anti-terrorism operations being conducted in the state. It was 
only in 1993 that state assembly elections were finally held in Punjab and despite an 
Akali boycott and abysmal voter turnout, a new Congress-led government won power 
in Punjab after six years of President’s Rule. It was also in 1993 that police chief KPS 
Gill declared that ‘terrorism’ had been ‘defeated’ in Punjab. The end of large scale 
violence was, for the Indian government, a sign of the end of the conflict in Punjab.  
The pattern of security policy in Punjab then suggests that the Indian state’s reluctance 
to take the situation seriously in its early stages was in part responsible for the 
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downward spiral thereon. By framing the conflict in terms of ‘secessionist’, ‘extremist’ 
or ‘foreign’ discourses, the government ignored key political grievances and considered 
the Akali party as ‘anti-nationals’ who were acting out of frustration. At the same time, 
even though it chose to hold talks with the Akalis, these discourses served to widen the 
distrust between the two, and the insistence on negotiating only within the framework 
of the Constitution precluded any fruitful outcome. That the discourses chose to ignore 
the reforms it had promised shows how in the end, the policy discourses transformed 
the original demands. The discursive representation of the causes and identities of the 
actors worked to uphold a securitised notion of the threat in Punjab. This is also 
maintained the power structures within the Indian state where the Centre is more 
powerful than the state. In essence, the policies were legitimised through the 
hegemonic discourses of locating the conflict as primarily a terrorist conflict that 




Chapter 4: A discourse theoretical analysis of the Kashmir 
conflict 
 
Kashmir, with its international fame, has been India’s most protracted internal conflict. 
Its intractability allows us to analyse those key moments at which the Indian state came 
closer to resolution or where there were opportunities lost. An analysis of discourses 
elucidates the ways in which the main issues in the conflict were discussed and debated 
which in itself throws light on the types of policies which were legitimised or made 
more likely by this discourse.  
Using this methodology, this chapter sets out the main discourses of the Indian state on 
Kashmir as was being debated by policymakers in India. Conceptually, the analysis 
links representation of the conflict with the issues of causes, identity and practice which 
form the nodal points around which meanings are constituted and discourses are 
organised. The conflict in Kashmir can be considered along two 
intersecting/interlinking dimensions—the bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan 
on the one hand, and the conflict between India and Kashmir on the other hand. The 
peculiar status of Kashmir lends itself to these dichotomies.  In this thesis, the focus 
will be on this latter relationship since it is concerned with domestic security policy 
strategies of the Indian state.  
Drawing on the conceptual questions that this thesis seeks to explore, three broad 
categories are analysed in detail-cause of the conflict, identity of the actors, and policy 
suggestions. These answer the crucial question in conflict situations and the central 
question in this thesis: 
How is the conflict in Kashmir understood by the Indian state and does this change 
over time? How are policy options evaluated and legitimized and were there 
alternative discourses?   
Background of the conflict 
Before 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in the colonial empire of a 
united India. The last viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, gave the princely states two 
options at the time of independence and lapse of British rule—they could join either 
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India or Pakistan but independence was not a choice. Even as the subcontinent was 
partitioned into India and Pakistan, the maharaja of Kashmir sought to remain 
independent for over two months after August 15, 1947. The deteriorating law and 
order situation in Kashmir led to a tiff between the maharaja and the government of 
Pakistan. India, on the other hand, made promises to the maharaja of material support 
in the hope that he would accede. It was the invasion of armed tribesmen from the 
North West Frontier of Pakistan that made Hari Singh finally beseech India for military 
help and give up any hope for independence.145 
Much controversy surrounds the details of events between October 24, 1947 and 
October 27 when Indian troops arrived in Kashmir. India maintained that the 
instrument of accession was signed on October 26 making Kashmir a part of Indian 
territory. Pakistan however protested; it maintained that the situation in Kashmir was 
the result of a popular uprising of the Kashmiris against the maharaja and in favour of 
joining Pakistan. Pakistan believed the accession of the maharaja was based on fraud 
and violence and considers it illegal.  
Prolonged fighting between Indian troops and Pakistani troops continued well into 
1948. Deadlocked talks between the leaders of the two states led to the involvement of 
the United Nations. A UN mediated ceasefire in 1949 followed resolutions urging both 
India and Pakistan to resolve the matter impartially and both urged to reduce and 
withdraw armed forces. India was called upon to hold a plebiscite as soon as conditions 
were made favourable. The ceasefire line divided the state of J&K into two—Kashmir 
Valley, Ladakh and bulk of the Jammu region remained in India, while Mirpur-
Muzaffarabad belt in Jammu became known as Azad Pakistan and along with the areas 
of Gilgit and Baltistan (renamed Northern Areas), came under Pakistan control. The 
UN resolutions could not be implemented and its involvement had by the late 1950s 
ceased to be viable. India and Pakistan could not come to common terms in matters 
regarding implementation of the resolutions.  
The terms of Kashmir’s accession guaranteed it a special status in India not given to 
any other state. Legally, India’s jurisdiction was limited to foreign affairs, defence and 
communications. In the years to come, however, India sought to integrate more 
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comprehensively the state of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian framework. In 1952, 
under the Delhi Agreement, the special status of Kashmir was included under Article 
370 of the Indian Constitution.  
By 1953, relations between Abdullah, leader of the main Kashmiri nationalist party and 
Prime Minister Nehru soured; for the former, India’s secularism was increasingly 
showing communal tendencies, for the latter, Abdullah’s commitment to India was 
under suspicion. In August 1953, Abdullah was dismissed as prime minister of 
Kashmir and put under house arrest. The following year, the Constituent Assembly 
formally ratified the accession of J&K and effectively ended discussions of a plebiscite. 
In 1965, a new order was passed that enabled the President of India to govern the state 
of J&K. The Shimla Agreement signed between India and Pakistan after Bangladesh’s 
war for independence in 1971 stipulated that the ceasefire line would be converted into 
a Line of Control and neither side would try to alter it unilaterally. Further India 
insisted that a solution to the Kashmir issue in future would be settled bilaterally and 
not involve any international party including the UN. Elections in J&K in 1972 were 
held virtually without opposition since the Indian government had banned the Plebiscite 
Front (an umbrella forum for a number of parties in favour of a plebiscite) and externed 
Abdullah. The ban was soon lifted though and once again Abdullah began speaking 
about the right of Kashmiris to participate in talks which had been going on between 
India and Pakistan. Noteworthy is his changed discourse during this period. Rather than 
talking about the promised plebiscite, he now began pressing for greater autonomy 
within the Indian Union. Indira Gandhi took advantage of his changed stance and it was 
in 1975 that the two signed an accord after a year of negotiations. The six-point accord 
reaffirmed Kashmir’s special status but added that Kashmir was ‘a constituent unit of 
the Union of India’. The Indian government would be allowed to make laws on matters 
disturbing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The titles used for the 
top two ministers of Kashmir, sadar-i-riyasat and prime minister, were to be 
discontinued and were to become governor and chief minister as in the rest of the states 
of India. There was to be no return to the pre-1953 status which Abdullah had been 
demanding. The accord was looked upon by many in Kashmir and Pakistan as a sell-
out (Schofield 2010). 
The death of Abdullah in 1982 was followed by a period of renewed religious assertion. 
His son Farooq Abdullah, who became the leader of the National Conference (NC), 
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refused an alliance with the Congress in the 1983 elections, causing friction between 
him and Indira Gandhi who had returned to power in 1980. He chose instead to ally 
with a religious leader Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, and won the elections. The elections 
were marked by religious mobilization by all political parties who sought electoral 
majorities (Behera 2000). Abdullah immediately set upon busying himself not only 
within Kashmir, but also at the national level when he hosted a conclave of state 
leaders from different regional parties from across the country.  
Thirteen members of legislative assembly withdrew support from Abdullah’s 
government and New Delhi, taking advantage and blamed by Abdullah for hatching the 
plan, ousted him from power. Farooq’s dismissal unleashed a wave of protests as it 
confirmed New Delhi’s intention of denying Kashmir its special status and ruling by 
puppet governments. Ordinary Kashmiris lost faith in the electoral process and further 
alienated them from New Delhi.  
Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 and succession by son Rajiv Gandhi saw a 
renewed alliance between the Congress and NC which brought Farooq Abdullah back 
to power in November 1986 through direct appointment. By the end of 1987, the 
situation in Kashmir had changed. As the narrative above demonstrates, though 
political discontent had been a constant feature of Kashmir’s history, now, the struggle 
assumed a violent turn. Hitherto unpopular groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front  or  JKLF (a pro-independence organisation started by Kashmiri exiles 
in Azad Kashmir in 1965 which proclaimed armed struggle for the liberation of 
Kashmir) and Harkat ul Mujahideen, with pro-Pakistan leanings, became attractive 
alternatives for frustrated Kashmiris. These organisations sent recruits to Pakistan for 
training and weaponry who returned to wage a protracted armed struggle against the 
Indian state (Ganguly & Bajpai 1994). Another change during the period was the 
gradual decline of the Congress as the single most influential national party. The rise of 
the BJP and other regional parties meant that India entered a new era of coalition 
politics in the early 1990s.  
The victory of the NC-Congress alliance in the state elections of 1987 came amidst 
widespread allegations of rigging. The closure of political avenues and the breakdown 
of the democratic electoral process are considered to be an important factor in turning 
Kashmiri youth towards the path of violence. By 1988, anti-India feelings had 
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developed to such an extent that the anniversary of India’s airlift into Kashmir in 1947 
marking the state’s accession was termed a day of Indian occupation and 1989 marked 
the real beginning of insurgency in Kashmir (Schofield 2010). 
Towards a discourse analysis of the management of the Kashmir conflict 
Discourses of the political elite in New Delhi were collected around critical junctures of 
the conflict in Kashmir and these key events were selected after an analysis of the 
secondary literature on the conflict. These events are not necessarily single events but 
may also refer to phases in the conflict and therefore may be a grouping of years. The 
analysis of discourses around these events suggests a pattern of legitimizing the policy 
practices that accompanied these events in a way that delegitimizes all other options 
even if they were suggested.  
Based on the literature on the Kashmir conflict , five phases were identified; these are 
1989-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2007, and 2008-2010.  The first phase 
coincides with the eruption of violence and the beginning of the conflict as the violence 
escalated, by 1993, the Indian government had gained the upper hand in quashing 
violence while at the same time the issue was garnering widespread international 
attention. The 1996-1999 period reflects a period when an elected state government 
ended direct rule from New Delhi while 2000-2007 was a period that saw a 
transformation of the relation between Kashmir and the Centre as the latter sought to 
‘normalise’ relations. The last phase saw an eruption of violent protests against the 
Centre’s policies.   
Each phase reflects a certain pattern and commonality in the framing of Kashmir at the 
time. Discursive consistency forms the basis of this grouping of phases and inter-phase 
discursive distinction can be observed in the analysis.  
1989-1992: Confusion prevails 
Key Events 
December 1989 Daughter of home minister Mufti 
Mohammed Sayeed kidnapped by JKLF 
December 1989 Coalition government headed by VP 
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Singh of Janata Dal party replaced 
Congress government in New Delhi 
January 1990 Government appoints Jagmohan as 
governor to Kashmir 
1991 Return of Congress government at the 




As violence erupted on an unprecedented scale in the Valley, there was in New Delhi a 
sense of confusion as parties grappled with the best approach to tackle the situation. 
Debates in December 1989, in the aftermath of the kidnapping of the home minister’s 
daughter in Kashmir, reflect an inter-party blame game to pin the causes of the crisis on 
mismanagement on each other. The Congress blamed the newly appointed VP Singh 
government for the lack of any policy coherence. For the BJP, the Congress 
government had been responsible for the crisis while the newly appointed Janata Dal 
government in power at the time blamed previous administrative failures. Where the 
parties were unanimous was at the assigning of Pakistan as the most important cause 
for the outbreak of the conflict and this discourse dominated subsequent discussions on 
Kashmir.  In his speech on January 11, 1991 in the Lok Sabha, external affairs minister 
IK Gujral cautioned against blaming one another and urged instead that the focus 
should be on Pakistan’s foreign policies in Kashmir and Punjab and their intent to 
interfere in these two conflict areas. 
The Congress’ Rajiv Gandhi claimed that the reason for the people’s dissatisfaction 
was the confusion over Article 370 since different parties had different positions. 
According to him, if the policy was clear, that would bring about peace.146 
According to home minister Sayeed, there was “concrete evidence and information 
regarding large number of training camps being run on the other side of the border to 
                                                             




train the militants” and “its (Pakistan’s) further attempt to internationalise the issue has 
added a new dimension to the situation”.  Stressing that the issue was an “internal 
matter of this country”, the minister sought to exclude Pakistan as well as any third 
party from any legitimate stake in the resolution of the conflict.147   
Even where political mistakes were admitted, these were in relation to how Pakistan 
took advantage of the situation to create unrest. Sayeed recognised that the situation in 
Kashmir was the result of “inadequate political and administrative response to a series 
of developments in the valley which spurred public disenchantment” and these 
“provided a fertile ground to the fundamentalist, subversive and anti-national forces to 
re-group themselves with the aid and assistance of forces operating from across the 
border”.148 
 Essentially, the discourses on causes during this early phase of the conflict sought to 
minimise genuine political grievances against the Indian state and played up the role of 
Pakistan in creating unrest. The conflict was represented as driven by an external 
enemy, Pakistan, and this was attributed to being the primary cause.  
Identity 
An analysis of the discourses suggests two broad identities as understood by the 
political elite in New Delhi—one, the ‘fundamentalists’ who engaged in ‘terrorist’ 
activities against the State, and two, the ‘misguided youth’ who had been left out of the 
development process.149 The ‘terrorists’, on the other hand, were largely considered to 
be passive actors without agency and acting merely on the orders of Pakistan as the 
following statement of the home minister shows:  
Under compulsion, a large number of people are dragged from the state, taken 
across the border, given training; given weaponry and at gun-point they are 
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asked to go and hit a particular target. We could get this information that 
Pakistan is fully involved in this from some people who have been caught.150 
The Annual report of the Home Ministry for 1989-1990 also mentioned the activities of 
‘subversive and fundamentalist elements with active aid and support from across the 
border.’151 This is reiterated in the 1990-91 report where the ‘secessionist and 
fundamentalist’ elements are once again mentioned in relation to their abetment by 
Pakistan.  
The categorisation of these actors as ‘terrorists’ legitimized the use of force and 
narrowed the space for alternative engagement.  The annual report for 1990-91 of the 
home ministry stated that the government had announced a new initiative of holding 
talks with any group as long as it was within the framework of the Constitution. It 
stated that overall there had been an increase in ‘lawless activities’ in the state and that 
the government was willing to talk with local people provided they ‘shun violence and 
declare their allegiance to the integrity and sovereignty of the country’.152 This signifies 
that militants are not just defined by violence; they must also necessarily respect Indian 
sovereignty. This was reiterated by Opposition parties as well. The BJP, through its 
leader Advani, warned the government not to involve those groups in Kashmir in the 
‘political mainstream’ who did not give full recognition to the Indian constitution.  153  
The identification of a Kashmiri militant, in the imagination of the State, was therefore 
one who resorted to violence and opposed the Indian constitution. This emerged 
whenever an offer of talks was made by the Centre. No longer was giving up arms a 
prerequisite for talks as loyalty to the state was equally important in proving worthy of 
dialogue. The argument resonates across other conflicts such as the issue of Irish 
power-sharing, Palestinian statehood and Algerian independence, that if no 
compromise is made, the militants could be defeated.    
Policy 
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The appointment of Jagmohan as governor to Kashmir was the result of the then VP 
Singh’s government commitment to tackle what it saw as a politically dysfunctional 
state that had fallen into the hands of criminals and was being further exacerbated by 
Pakistan. The appointment was made against the wishes of Kashmir chief minister 
Farooq Abdullah who resigned in protest. By December, there was pressure on the 
government from certain parties such as the BJP to bring the state under President’s 
Rule.154 The imposition of Governor’s Rule and the dismissal of the state assembly in 
1990 provoked heated debates in the Indian Parliament but in its annual report for 
1989-1990, the ministry of home affairs stated simply that ‘governor’s rule had to be 
promulgated’ after Farooq Abdullah resigned.155 The policy of the Governor’s 
administration, it went on to state, was to check and curb terrorism in the valley and 
control law and order to restore normalcy in the state. The report thereby ignored the 
fact that Abdullah resigned in protest against the imposition of Jagmohan as Governor 
and that the government had known this would happen.156 
That talks with Pakistan were completely delegitimized was also evident when one MP 
stated that “This government should stop talking about Simla Pact…I would like to say 
that Pakistan should be declared a terrorist country and should be treated 
accordingly.”157  
‘Pakistan’ then served as a nodal point for organising discourses and gave the conflict a 
heightened sense of urgency, elevating it to a ‘national threat’. The idea of a national 
security threat then legitimized and prioritised the military option and the home 
minister’s statement that “the situation in Kashmir calls for firm and resolute measures 
for reasserting the authority of the State and restoring normalcy” indicated that 
imposing the authority of the Indian State was paramount and therefore required the 
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military to do so.159 This also feeds into the policy of sending Jagmohan as governor in 
spite of his unpopular earlier tenure in the state. Known for his hard-line approach, his 
immediate reaction was to dismiss state assembly and call in the military and 
paramilitary forces.  
The idea of ‘restoring normalcy’, an oft repeated phrase across all time periods, is 
typical of state discourses on conflict, for the ambiguity of the term serves not only to 
appear rational, but also hinges on an idea of normalcy that goes hand in hand with the 
integrationist policy of joining Kashmir with the ‘mainstream’.  
Another prominent nodal point around which official discourses were structured was 
Article 370 of the Constitution.160 While dealing with the special status of Kashmir 
within the Indian Union, the discourses reflect a tendency to equate this constitutional 
provision with India’s secularism. This enabled the political elite to rationalise or de-
rationalise Kashmir’s unique relationship with India depending on which side of the 
political spectrum they belonged to. What was common to both however was the 
acceptance of the legitimacy of India’s sovereignty over Kashmir.  
For the BJP, the acceptance that J&K had any unique status was the problem. They 
believed that by accepting that J&K was anything other than a normal and fully 
integrated part of the Indian Union, it was leaving open a door of hope for militants. 
The BJP believed that scrapping the provision would help in removing the 
‘psychological barrier’ in the minds of the Kashmiris and bring them into the ‘national 
mainstream’.161 As a policy, Advani admitted that even if the BJP were in power at the 
Centre it would not be able to abolish Article 370 since a two-thirds majority was 
needed to do so and this did not exist either at the Centre or in the state.  They raise this 
issue so as to cast the historic blame on the Congress.  They then, also, seek to 
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distinguish themselves from Congress by demanding a more hard line stance on 
Pakistan and on internal security. 162 
It was regarded as a useless policy that should be done away with:  
I would like to point out that Article 370 has not served any purpose 
during these 40 years. Had it been so, we should have come across some 
results at least. Article 370 has brought the situation in the Valley to 
such a pass. They have been alienated. Government is not able to solve 
Kashmir even after retaining Article 370 all along; why not it accept our 
proposal of abrogating Article 370 for a couple of years and see for itself 
the result.163 
The ‘protection that we have given to them’ mentioned in Singh’s speech above 
indicated a patronising attitude towards the ‘Kashmiri Muslims’, rather than a political 
pact that was not merely ‘given’ but negotiated with the then Kashmiri leaders. In 
effect, both the Congress and the BJP, in their opposing conceptualisation of Article 
370, considered the constitutional provision to be either a protection handed down and 
to be maintained or a useless policy which served to alienate Kashmir from the rest of 
India. In spite of their differences on the validity of Article 370, the idea that the 
Kashmir was a part of the Indian union and the latter’s sovereignty supreme was the 
common factor that ensured that both were actually concerned more with establishing 
New Delhi’s legitimacy rather than addressing the core right to special autonomy that 
was guaranteed to the state due to its peculiar historical relationship with India and not 
due to preserving secularism as some of the political discourses were making it out to 
be.   
What also marked official discourses of the Indian state during the early years of the 
conflict was the denial of deep-rooted political grievances, and instead an 
acknowledgement of certain short terms policies that had left Kashmir out of the 
progress of the rest of the country. Development as a nodal point was one of the ways 
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in which the problems in Kashmir were perceived, though this was at this stage of 
lesser importance than other issues.   
Addressing the Parliament in 1991, home minister SB Chavan stated that: 
We would like to see a number of projects in that area so that not only the 
problem of unemployment may be solved to some extent but they should get the 
feeling that like the projects that are located in other parts of the country, 
similarly, in J&K also there are certain projects which are being located. Let the 
young men get this feeling that there is total administration in that area. 164 
Dialogue as part of a security strategy has been a contentious issue amongst the 
political elite in India. As the case in Kashmir shows, the prospect of dialogue was 
entertained only if certain conditions were met, and sometimes even this could be 
anathema for some political parties and delegitimised for it could ‘demoralise the 
security forces.’165 In a parliamentary debate in 1991, the BJP’s ML Khurana blamed 
the Congress for saying it would hold a dialogue with the militants as it would lower 
the morale of the military and para-military forces in the state. By linking talks with 
militants with lowering the morale of the security forces, the Opposition was carefully 
choosing to play on the deep-rooted national sentiment towards the Indian armed 
forces, and thus delegitimised dialogue for the greater good of Indian nationalism and 
defence.  
At other times, dialogue was legitimised only so long as a solution was found ‘within 
the framework of the Constitution’. In response to the government’s releasing detainees 
for talks, BJP MP ML Khurana said,  
I am having all the reports as to how and which terrorists were released for 
having talks with them… It should be ascertained well before the release 
whether the man being released is sincere and helpful to bring about peace. 
There is an indiscriminate release of terrorists and wrong signals are given 
whether talks are being held with the terrorists, whether election is being held or 
not….They are trying to disintegrate India in collusion with Pakistan…The 
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government should make an announcement that there cannot be any negotiation 
with them unless they agree to talk within the framework of the constitution and 
unless they surrender arms and renounce the path of violence.166 
By 1992, the denial of political agency in Kashmir was referred to in the context of 
elections, a nodal point that would become more prominent in the next phase. At this 
stage, suggestions of re-starting a ‘political process’ in the state, taken at its simplest to 
mean the conduct of polls, were beginning to be put forward as a solution to end the 
conflict. For Congress MP Digvijay Singh, a political process was the most important 
strategy in Kashmir.167 He said that political forces in the valley had been isolated or 
had left leaving the Kashmiri Muslims and the Army and para military forces to deal 
with the situation themselves. Unless a political process was begun, he said, there 
would be no improvement. The appointment of Jagmohan in 1990 was blamed on the 
VP Singh government under the pressure of its ally BJP. This he said sent the message 
to the people that the government was using confrontational tactics and thereby isolated 
even moderate Kashmiri Muslims.  
The discourses on causes, identity and policy mutually reinforced the representation of 
the conflict during this stage as bereft of genuine political demands. The Kashmiri 
militant was one who was sponsored by Pakistan, and who was necessarily anti-
national due to his rejection of the Indian Constitution. The dismissal of the state 
government was articulated as necessary, and enabled the Centre to launch a brutal 
crackdown in the state.  Essentially, during this phase, state discourses on causes, 
identity and policy show how the conflict was represented as a secessionist conflict and 
driven by terrorists who were endangering India’s national security. The stationing of 
military and paramilitary forces was deemed as the rational step for protecting India’s 
security and talks with ‘terrorists’ was delegitimised until they gave up violence and 
pledged their loyalty to the Indian Constitution. 
Internationalisation, Human Rights and Dialogue: 1993-1995 
Key Events 
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January 1993 In Sopore, security forces killed more 
than 50 civilians, leading to widespread 
protests in Kashmir 
October 1993 Pakistan PM Benazir Bhutto appealed to 
the UN and international community to 
note the crises in Kashmir; Hazratbal 
incident   
1993 Formation of the All Parties Hurriyat 
Conference (APHC), and umbrella 
organisation for various Kashmiri parties  
May 1994 JKLF leader Yasin Malik released from 
prison and renounced violence 
1994 Pakistan tried to pass a resolution at the 
UNHRC meeting in Geneva condemning 
human rights violations in Kashmir 
1995 India allowed access to the ICRC to 
detainees in Kashmir; US Ambassador 
visits Kashmir 
May 1995 Charar I Sharif incident 
 
Causes  
As Pakistani leaders accused India of human rights abuses in Kashmir and extended 
support publicly for the ‘right to self-determination’ of the Kashmiri people, the issue 
became internationalised to the extent there was mounting pressure on India to respond. 
In a departure from earlier positions, the Indian state approached Pakistan with 
offensive diplomacy, claiming all of Kashmir as its territory. So far the Indian state had 
been insisting on the Shimla Agreement as the basis for resolving all India-Pakistan 
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relations.168 In February 1994, the Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution 
condemning Pakistan’s interference in Kashmir and reiterated that the whole of 
Kashmir, including Pakistani held territory, referred to in India as Pakistan-occupied 
Kashmir (PoK), was an integral part of India.169 
In his Independence Day speech to the nation, PM Narasimha Rao said that the 
“unfinished task of partition” was to get the Pakistan-occupied territory of Kashmir 
back and asserted that Kashmir would always remain an integral part of India with, 
without or in spite of” Pakistan.170 In his speech, he also drew the attention of the 
international community to Pakistan’s role in the conflict:  
Pakistan has been busy raising the Kashmir issue at every opportunity. I have 
been saying that India’s outstretched friendly hands are always there… they talk 
of unfinished tasks. I can also say that it is our unfinished task to free the parts 
of Kashmir which have been occupied by Pakistan….I must concede that 
normalcy has not been restored in Kashmir. This is because of the support given 
to elements in the Valley by Pakistan. After today India need not show any 
proof about that nation’s involvement in terrorist activities in Kashmir… With 
you, without you, in spite of you, Kashmir will be an inalienable part of India.  
171   
By 1993 a number of new nodal points introduced certain changes in the discourse, 
while others remained consistent with the earlier phase. Pakistan now became even 
more prominent in the discourses as a prime reason for the violence as the Indian 
political elite drew attention to those militant outfits sponsored by Pakistan.  
Identity 
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During this phase, the discourse was clear in acknowledgement of the need to 
differentiate between local and Pakistani groups operating in the state. The release of 
Yasin Malik after four years in prison was an attempt by the Centre to fill the 
leadership void and channel the anti-Pakistan feeling that had swept the Valley towards 
a political dialogue. His release also coincided with his declaration of non-violence as 
the preferred method for achieving the goals of his party. The release of Shabir Shah, 
another ‘militant’ who had been arrested for his separatist agenda, came soon after, a 
desperate bid by the government to get local leaders to start a political process. 
Home minister SB Chavan said, 
Now the movement is being controlled not by the local militants but foreign 
mercenaries… Even in the Hurriyat, there are 70 to 74 small organisations 
which are their members. If each one of them was to say ‘why discuss with 
Yasin Malik only? We have equal right’…So we do not have anyone in the 
representative character who can possibly claim ‘I represent Kashmir’…After 
the elections are over there would be an elected representative government.172 
This discourse appeared frequently amongst the political elite. For instance, Congress 
MP Mani Shankar Aiyar said: 
It is now becoming clear that it is the Jamat e Islami, it is the Harkat ul Ansar, 
and it is the Hizbul Mujahideen who are the three pro-Pakistan elements who 
constitute the enemy. Apart from these three, everybody else, whether he likes 
the National Conference or hates the Congress, as far as we are concerned, are 
Kashmiris, they are Indians. It is only against the enemy or increasingly only 
against the enemy that force is being used… in so far as dialogue is concerned, 
the real problem with Kashmir is whom to talk to… At any given point of time, 
the Hurriyat consists of sometimes 27 factions, sometimes it is reduced to 15, 
then it grows to 30. But how much do these factions represent, whom do they 
represent, what segment of the population they represent we do not know. And 
it was the government’s coherent policy to attempt to discover through the 
ballot box who represented what. Now that process has been derailed at least in 
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terms of time. We have not succeeded in having the state assembly elections by 
July 1995 which was our original objective. 173 
The two statements above show that the Indian state wanted to portray that it was 
sincere in its efforts to engage in dialogue but was helpless given the various factions 
amongst the Kashmiris and thus legitimised and rationalised the need for elections to 
determine the issue.  
The government iterated time and again during this phase that the people were tired of 
the insurgency and pointed to the involvement of foreign groups as proof that the 
conflict was not based on genuine local grievances. The home minister SB Chavan said 
regarding the aspirations of the people,  
…The people are totally disillusioned by the disinformation campaign spread 
by Pakistan. They say: We are neither interested in merging with Pakistan nor 
do we ask for any Azadi.; we would like to be with the mainstream…For the 
last ten years we have experienced what is being called jihad. In the name of 
jihad, forcible extortion from the people has taken place. They have misbehaved 
with women. They have forcibly entered the houses and forced the people to 
give them food….there is not even an iota of doubt in the minds of the people 
that these are people who are not interested in any kind of religious activity. 
Now the people have understood the game that it is Pakistan which is 
instigating these people, sending them here so that they can be used as 
mercenaries who will be creating a problem in this area. 174 
That the people did not want azadi was also echoed by BJP leader Vajpayee: 
The common man wants peace. He is fed up. He does not want separation from 
India. The slogan of freedom might have tempted some youth but now they 
understand that this freedom does not mean anything. Pakistan will not allow 
them to remain free.175 
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Thus, the people’s feelings of betrayal by Pakistan were appropriated to mean a support 
for the Indian government. The identity of the Kashmiris was mentioned in the 
discourses but this was mentioned more in a cultural context than political. For 
instance, MP E Ahmed says “we have to respect the Kashmiri people, their 
Kashmiriyat feeling…people from Andhra Pradesh have the pride of Andhra, the 
people of West Bengal having their own pride…then why not the Kashmiri people.”176  
Home Minister SB Chavan responded to this saying, 
I do not remember that we have ever said or ever objected to Kashmiris calling 
themselves to having special status of Kashmiriyat…the people at large have 
lost faith in the terrorist activities, merger with Pakistan or independence of 
Kashmir… the necessity is to create conditions where they should be allowed to 
carry on with their professions. They should be able to earn their own 
livelihood. 177 
This was a discursive attempt to project the local Kashmiri at par with the rest of the 
Indians in terms of their regional identity. For the government, being Kashmiri was at 
par with being Bengali, Tamil or Marathi; it tried to project the Kashmiri identity as an 
extension of the dominant Indian identity rather than accepting that Kashmir had had a 
unique relationship much different from other regional identities.  
Thus, discourses on identity differentiated between the ordinary Kashmiris who were 
fed up of the Pakistan sponsored militancy and wanted to go about their lives just like 
the rest of the Indians, and the militants who were largely foreign, or the local Kashmiri 
groups which according to the political elite, were Indian, and which were so many that 
only elections could determine their representativeness.  
 
Policy 
In New Delhi, the Congress government under Narasimha Rao continued with ongoing 
policies of force and opening talks with moderates but there was a change in other 
directions. The government now began talking of normalisation and political process 
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and released some top Kashmiri activists in an effort to hold state elections. This phase 
also saw India reacting to Pakistan’s allegations of human rights abuses by allowing 
international monitors such as the ICRC and also to turn the focus on Pakistan by 
highlighting its role in the conflict. By Sept 1994, the Indian political elite were also 
making public statements of the redundancy of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. 
According to the Times of India the minister of state for external affairs, Salman 
Khursheed, was quoted as saying that the 1948 UN resolutions were dead.178 This 
coincided with UN chief Boutros Boutros Ghali’s visit to the subcontinent and any 
attempt to revive UN mediation on Kashmir was firmly rejected by India.179  
Another shift in the discourse is reflected in the way dialogue is perceived. In the 
previous phase, while dialogue had been suggested occasionally, it was not considered 
yet to be a ripe moment for talks. As the discourses now showed, the need for talks was 
felt only in the context of polls-in other words; engagement in itself was deemed to be 
worthless unless it was seen as enabling elections- a strategy the Indian state prefers in 
its management of internal conflicts. This commitment to elections can be viewed as an 
assertion of the Indian state’s identity as a democracy and also as a way for it to filter 
out the legitimate Kashmiri voices amongst what it saw as a proliferation of Kashmiri 
groups claiming representation of the Kashmiris.  
With Prime Minister Rao keen to conduct elections in the state, there was a need to 
develop a consensus on how talks would proceed. However, this did not go down well 
with a number of Opposition parties. In a discussion on March 29 1993, BJP’s ML 
Khurana cautioned the Parliament over Farooq Abdullah’s statement to the media that 
he wanted to restore the pre-1953 status and also that to resolve the Kashmir issue a 
meeting of India, Pakistan and Kashmir had to be convened.180 Khurana branded both 
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these ideas as “dangerous” and that “to change the policy on Kashmir would be 
dangerous.” Further he argued that,  
The government should learn a lesson from Punjab. Punjab is returning to 
normalcy only because the Government has not held talks with terrorists. If the 
government holds talks with terrorists of Kashmir then the forces engaged in 
their efforts to overpower them would not succeed. If the government adopts a 
dual policy, then it would prove dangerous. We should not let the government 
take a U-turn.181 
Looking at the above statement, it is clear that a significant part of the political elite 
considered dialogue as anathema, and viewed the refusal to talk with ‘terrorists’ as a 
successful security strategy. 
Most radical of changes that occurred during this period was the government’s 
willingness to discuss the issue of autonomy. In an interview to India Today appearing 
on May 31, 1993, Governor KV Krishna Rao said his policy was to “be soft on the 
public and hard on the militants” and admitted that while elections was the aim, the 
immediate task was to restore normalcy and bring down militancy. He went on to say 
that “if the militants feel that they have the public’s support let them give up the gun 
and take up the ballot.” Thus, a political space for the ‘militants’ finds its way into 
official policy but only through the avenue of elections. The necessity of this as the first 
step towards any possible resolution is made clear when in response to the quantum of 
autonomy; he said that “autonomy can be determined only after determining who the 
real elected representatives are.”   
In October 1994, minister for internal security Rajesh Pilot after visiting Jammu, said 
that the government was willing to discuss the quantum of autonomy with all political 
parties in the state and at the national level and that it would talk with any group which 
was ready to give up violence, in his words, the government had an “open mind” on 
autonomy. He also said that the government was committed to holding elections to 
enable the people to have their own government and stated that the people were fed up 
with the criminalisation of militancy.182 References of the international context were 
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part of the discourse of the political elite in India. Referring in September 1994 to the 
Irish Republican Army’s  (IRA) announcement to halt violence and accept the offer of 
talks, union internal security minister Rajesh Pilot asked Kashmiri militants to take a 
cue.183 
However, autonomy continued to be contested not just between parties but within the 
government as well. According to home minister SB Chavan, “I am opposed to 
granting any autonomy to the state before the polls are held.” This statement, issued to 
clarify that Pilot’s mention of autonomy in Kashmir was a personal opinion, is 
indicative of a rift within the ministry over nuances of policy. The difference in views 
also extended to the role of Farooq Abdullah with the home minister against any active 
role “He should not persist in his threats to boycott polls or he will end up being left in 
the cold” and Pilot firmly in support of bringing him on board saying “he is a 
nationalist and heads a party which still has some say in Kashmir.”184 Clearly, even at 
this stage, consensus within the government on crucial policy matters was lacking as 
contesting discursive representations of actors and demands clashed with each other for 
a dominant space.   
The release of Yasin Malik and Shabir Shah were important policy decisions. That 
dialogue with these groups was legitimised marks an important shift from the earlier 
phase. This was also important for it showed the government’s willingness to 
acknowledge an internal dimension to the conflict and one that would require some 
level of dialogue to normalise the situation.  
Congress MP Sudhir Sawant in a debate in the Lok Sabha on May 8 1995 stated 
categorically that: 
The question in Jammu and Kashmir is not the question of whether the people 
want to be a part of India or not. The question is of a right of a State to secede 
from the Union. We cannot afford it. America fought a Civil war on this very 
issue…India will have to use whatever force is there at its disposal to prevent 
any state from seceding from the Union. Nobody, no power from outside has 
got any business to interfere in India’s internal affairs. These are messages 
                                                             
183 APHC for UN Intervention, Hindustan Times, 9 September 1994.  
184 India Today, November 30, 1994 
136 
 
which should go loud and clear because there are certain attempts to distort 
images.185  
Development as a solution to the youth’s despair also entered as a nodal point around 
which policy discourses were framed. The Centre released a 200-crore package for 
J&K aimed at restoring the shattered economy of the state, including for rural 
development, primary schools, healthcare and rebuilding infrastructure damaged by 
militancy. Home minister Chavan’s speech in the Lok Sabha made the development 
policy of the government clear:  
I hold the view that the people of Kashmir should get a feeling of confidence. A 
large number of youngsters are involved but they are totally disillusioned now. 
More employment opportunities will have to be created and we have started 
with the para military forces. A large number of them have been recruited and 
we would also be giving orders to all big public sector undertakings where the 
possibilities do exist, to absorb as many of them as possible.186  
Article 370 continued to be a prominent nodal point but was debated again on starkly 
opposing views. For home minister Chavan,  
I have made the government’s position very clear that Article 370 is going to 
remain till the people of Kashmir say we do not want this Article and you may 
remove it…Kashmir is a sign of our secular polity and if by any chance 
Kashmir is to be separated then we have no right to talk in terms of secular 
polity in this country. We will never allow Kashmir to be separated from 
India…Kashmir is part and parcel of India.187     
On the other hand, Vajpayee asserted:  
I think Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed autonomy and it continues to do so. 
Regarding the extent of autonomy and the reasons for giving more autonomy to 
the state, it can be done in consultation with the elected representatives after 
peace is restored and elections are held there. Development activities have not 
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been affected due to lack of so called autonomy. The benefits of autonomy were 
reaped by a handful of leaders and not by the common men, be it the case of 
subsidy or the case of Article 370. The then PM Jawaharlal Nehru did not say 
Article 370 was inviolable and it cannot be done away with.188 
Hence, the discourse on Article 370 remained largely consistent with the earlier phase 
and continued to reinforce the idea of Kashmir being an inherent part of the Indian 
Union.  
The years 1993-1995 saw a change in the discourses of the Indian state in certain areas 
of causes of the conflict; it now launched an open offensive against Pakistan. The 
international context of Pakistan drawing attention to human rights violations in 
Kashmir was reflected in the discourses of the Indian state as it sought to blame 
Pakistan for the mayhem and vociferously reiterated that the whole of Kashmir was a 
part of India. There was a change in the discourses on identity as the local, Kashmiri 
militant was separated from the Pakistani, foreign militant and the former’s identity 
therefore deradicalised. This was also reflected in the policy of the Indian state in 
releasing certain Kashmiri militants and beginning to consider the possibility of 
dialogue with them. n effect, while the discourses of the time opened up space for 
engagement, the continuation of other embedded discourses foreclosed the possibility 
for any resolution. This phase ‘normalised’ the Kashmiri identity to the extent that it 
paved the way for elections as a means to give the people a voice according to the 
terms and conditions of the Indian state. The silence of the discourses of the people’s 
right to self-determination and the failure to acknowledge the separateness of the 
Kashmiri identity vis-à-vis other regional identities weakened the prospect of any 
meaningful resolution. Talks held with various groups could not break any ground 
because of the government’s insistence on the Constitution as the mechanism for 
resolution.  
Co-optation and “Normalisation”: 1996-1999 
Key Events 
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1996 Hurriyat Conference demands tripartite 
talks with India and Pakistan to solve the 
Kashmir dispute 
May 1996 Parliamentary elections; United Front 
government formed under Deve Gowda, 
assures maximum autonomy to J&K  
September 1996 Legislative elections held, bringing to 
power a government in Kashmir under 
National Conference’s Farooq Abdullah  
1998 New government at the Centre headed by 
PM Atal Behari Vajpayee 
June 1998 Farooq Abdullah instituted Regional 
Autonomy Committee proposes 
devolution of power at various levels 
1997-1998 Series of talks between India and 
Pakistan 
1999 Kargil War 
 
Causes 
No longer were the causes of the conflict, rooted in the historical conditions of the 
state, considered to be important as the Indian state attempted to move on from past 
issues. Making his speech to the Lok Sabha on July 12, 1996, PM Deve Gowda said, 
“We have come to the stage of handing over state to its elected representatives. 
Debating on the past history starting from 1958 to what happened till 1996 is not going 
to bring any peace in in the state of J&K.” It is this profound statement that shaped the 
ideology of the state vis-à-vis its relations with Kashmir as the latter’s history was 
pushed to the backburner. The report of the Ministry of Home Affairs for 1998-99 
emphasised that there was an overall improvement in the situation since the 1996 
elections. It noted: 
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Significant change in the nature of militancy; foreign mercenaries from across 
the border now dominate the scene thereby giving Pakistan a stronghold over 
prominent secessionist militant groups which are being used by the ISI for 
bringing in a communal divide, for ethnic cleansing and for extending the arc of 
militancy to Jammu and beyond.190 
While Pakistan continued to feature in state discourses on Kashmir and its interference 
consistently articulated, the discourse grew louder in the wake of the Kargil War in 
1999. Home Minister LK Advani, in a discussion on the internal security situation said 
that the genesis of militancy in Kashmir lay in the 1971 war:  
It is my own analysis that after the Simla Agreement while working contrary to 
what it had promised us, Pakistan initiated steps towards going nuclear. After 
that, proxy war started. The proxy war is an outcome of their defeat in 1971 war 
and when they felt that they were not succeeding in proxy wars also as 
gradually India was checking it, that resulted in Kargil war. After Kargil, it has 
encouraged proxy war and terrorism. 191  
The report of the home affairs ministry too noted that:  
Pakistan has always considered the partition of 1947 incomplete as per its 
concept of two-nation theory with Jammu and Kashmir being the main focus of 
its attention. it has made repeated attempts though in vain to annexe the state-
first by pushing in ‘kabailis’ (tribesmen) with the active support of regulars 
followed by three wars and an impudent intrusion in Kargil in 1999. Each time 
the Indian nation has given them a befitting reply. Pakistan’s President General 
Zia ul Haq launched a proxy war against India after Pakistan found it was 
making no headway in a frontal war. The proxy war began surreptitiously by 
misguiding disgruntled youth in the state and exploiting their sentiments. As a 
result large-scale exfiltration took place from the valley to Pakistan (1989-
1990)…approximately 1500-2000 foreign mercenaries are presently operating 
in J&K who have been pushed in by Pakistan…these mercenaries belong 
mostly to Pakistan, PoK and Afghanistan which highlights the alarming role 
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being played by Pakistan as a centre for Pan-Islamic fundamentalist 
militancy.192 
The state assembly elections in 1996 mark an important shift in the state’s discourses. 
Having established a perceived sense of legitimacy through an elected state 
government, the Centre’s discourses now moved on to focus on other issues that 
normalised and indeed largely equated the status of Kashmir at par with the rest of the 
states. An important shift also occurred in India’s relations with Pakistan as it sought  to 
alienate Kashmir and bring other issues to the table in talks with Pakistan. The elections 
also ushered in changes in the way the conflict in Kashmir was now perceived by the 
Indian State. On the one hand, it insisted that 1996 had brought to an end the internal 
causes of the conflict and that the Centre had been able to assuage the peoples’ 
grievances, while on the other it noted that Pakistan was continuing its proxy war in 
Kashmir. The separation of the two dimensions of the conflict was a subtle reflection 
that with an end to the violence of the early 1990s, the situation had largely been 
resolved.  
Identity 
Religion, previously an underlying theme of the conflict, was used in the Othering of 
Pakistan:  
Our boys have seen Benazir Bhutto’s version of Islam and the treatment meted 
out to the Muhajirs and also the face of Indian secularism no matter how many 
its weaknesses. They have also seen how Hindus opposed the BJP after the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid and voted out their state governments.193  
It was also brought up by Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah: “Pakistan leaders have 
made a mess of Pakistan in the name of Islam. For Allah’s sake, don’t let them make it 
worse in Kashmir than they have already done by misleading you.”194 
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As in the previous phase, the youth of Kashmir who had joined the conflict were 
treated as passive actors, manipulated by the evil neighbour. In the words of Prime 
Minister IK Gujral in the Lok Sabha on July 28, 1997:  
It is not that the insurgency has ended but by and large I think both the 
governments-the state and the Centre, have been able to get the better of the 
insurgency…our policy has a further dimension also but previously also we 
have been trying to get back those estranged youth who I believe have been led 
astray by the false propaganda against India…the main point is that we are 
always willing to talk to those young men who are our own children and who 
are our own boys who have been led astray. Naturally it is implied and 
understood that they must give up arms and they must come back home…if in 
the family the sons go astray or get alienated, it is my duty as the head of family 
to invite them back, try to remove their doubts and suspicions… there is no 
compromise on two issues-secular unity of India and also the integrity of India. 
Jammu and Kashmir is a part of India. The whole state of Jammu and Kashmir 
is a part of India and shall continue to be so. 
The Indian State was likened to a chief patriarch, thereby implying that it was its duty 
to bring back the “misled” youth of Kashmir. That the people had moved on from the 
causes of the conflict and were no longer caught in the past was reiterated by a 
government minister: 
Earlier people used to go on strike to support the terrorists. Today they go on 
strike on the issues of tax, livelihood, and other basic problems. This is a big 
achievement. ..The people have fully disassociated from the terrorists. 195 
  
                                                             





If autonomy was important, it was an issue that would be discussed only after elections 
were held. PM Gowda, in the Lok Sabha on July 12, 1996:  
My concern is that elections must be held and the power should go to the 
people. Then, the question of autonomy will be discussed with the elected 
representatives. With whom should the Central government discuss now?  
Regarding talks with militant groups, he said  
Some of the militant youths have approached me. They are also prepared to 
participate in the elections and they tried to explain certain problems… I told 
them to first go before the people, show their sincerity to the people, and if the 
people voted for them then they will also be called for discussion as far as the 
autonomy and other issues are concerned.196  
The legitimization of engaging with ‘militant youths’ was now dependant on their 
participation in elections, without which the Indian state found no reason to discuss 
with them the issue of autonomy. Unlike the earlier and oft-repeated position that 
dialogue would be held with anyone who gave up violence, elections was now an 
important criteria in determining eligibility for dialogue.  
Under Gowda, talks with Pakistan had resumed after a gap of more than four years. 
While crucial in itself, a key feature of the political discourses of the time was the idea 
of differentiating between Kashmir and other issues while dealing with Pakistan and 
the beginning of a discursive change that sought to bring into Indo-Pak talks other 
issues apart from Kashmir, and indeed even a deliberate attempt to keep Kashmir out.  
In August, BJP leader Vajpayee suggested that a 10-year embargo be put on the 
Kashmir issue to enable India and Pak to improve their bilateral relations. He also said 
that “the only issue on which India can negotiate with Pakistan is the Pakistan-occupied 
Kashmir”.197  
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In April 1997, external affairs minister, IK Gujral met his Pakistani counterpart. In 
response to a question that talks had broken off in 1994 because for Pakistan, Kashmir 
was the core issue, Gujral said that “for us there is no core or non-core issue. We are 
willing to discuss everything including Kashmir.” He also said,  
India’s basic position on Kashmir-that it is an integral part of India and that a 
democratically elected government has been installed-cannot change. And 
whatever concessions there are in terms of autonomy is an internal issue 
between the Centre and the elected government…As we did in China, we 
should put the issue on the backburner and proceed onto other things…I am 
willing to make concessions on anything, except the sovereignty or the secular 
character of our nation. That is non-negotiable. There will not be another 
partition of India. 
By the time a new government was set to be formed at the Centre under the Prime 
Ministership of Atal Behari Vajpayee, this idea had firmly planted itself in the state’s 
discourses. In his speech to the Lok Sabha on March 28, 1998, soon to be appointed 
PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee said,  
I had told Pakistan not in the capacity of PM but as a leader of opposit ion that 
you keep aside the issue of Kashmir for some days and open your gate in the 
fields of commerce and economic cooperation and other areas. We produce 
certain items which Pakistan needs and a few items are produced in Pakistan 
which we need. We have not been able to create that atmosphere but I am 
confident it will happen when situation will be conducive.198 
The return to ‘normalcy’ was a key feature of this phase, the state assembly elections 
having bolstered India’s claims of democratic governance in Kashmir. The Indian 
leadership wasted no time in conveying to Pakistan that its internationalisation of 
Kashmir in the previous phase was in vain, as the state had come to the point of 
normalisation:  
Peace has been restored there. Elections were held. A large number of tourists 
are going there. The tour of Amarnath is going on peacefully. It is said that 
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Kashmir is a flash point. Yes if Pakistan wants to take some steps to draw the 
attention of the world by masterminding petty disturbances…Pakistan is not 
satisfied with its boundaries. Pakistan wants to change the status quo. The rulers 
of Pakistan are unable to digest the fact that the a state with a majority of 
Muslims should live with India.it is their problem if they have not accepted 
secularism…We told Pakistan that we were prepared to negotiate about 
Kashmir but other matters related to it should also be included in the 
negotiation…but Pakistan is not ready for that. They are not interested in 
negotiation…one of the measures of the CBMs put up by Pakistan is that the 
government of India should talk to Hurriyat Conference by recognising it as the 
representative organisation of Kashmir. No Indian can accept this proposal.199  
As the above speech shows, India took exception to Pakistan’s insistence that the 
Hurriyat was the sole representative of Kashmir. The Hurriyat had refused to 
participate in the 1996 state elections and there was a growing distrust between the 
Centre and the Hurriyat; the latter keeping up its anti-India agitation. It reached out to 
Pakistan and to the US to pressure India into accepting its demands but there was little 
by way of direct talks between the Hurriyat and Centre at this stage.   
As the above discourses on causes, identity and policy show, the years 1996-1999 were 
crucial to transforming the conflict from the violence of the earlier phases to what the 
Indian state now considered a fairly ‘normalised’ situation. The internal conflict, for the 
Indian state, was virtually over as elections had brought to power an elected state 
government. The National Conference was now viewed as the legitimate representative 
of the Kashmiri people, and Kashmiri groups such as the Hurriyat were sidelined and 
token messages of talks continued to be vocalised by the Centre as per previously 
articulated conditions of adherence to the Constitution.      
2000-2007: Reconsidering autonomy and reaching out to separatists 
Key Events 
2000 J&K state government adopts resolution 
calling for implementation of the State 
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Autonomy Committee Report 
2000 Ceasefire with the Hizbul Mujahideen 
April 2001 KC Pant appointed as the Centre’s 
interlocutor in Kashmir  
2001 Agra Summit meeting between the Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan 
December 2001 Attack on the Indian Parliament 
September 2002 State Assembly elections, Mufti 
Mohammed Sayeed sworn in as CM of 
J&K 
April 2003 PM Vajpayee visited Kashmir  
2003 India announced its willingness to talk 
with the APHC 
May 2004 New government at the Centre led by 
Manmohan Singh  
2004 PM announced reduction of troops in 
Jammu and Kashmir  
2006 Round Table Conferences instituted by 




Amongst the most important discursive changes occurring in this period was a change 
in the meaning of autonomy and a greater willingness to discuss the issue albeit at New 
Delhi’s terms. As the elected state government in Jammu and Kashmir passed a 
resolution calling for the implementation of the State Autonomy Committee Report in 
2000, in New Delhi, pandemonium broke out. The report essentially sought to restore 
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Kashmir to its pre-1953 status and reverse all those constitutional provisions that had 
been extended to the state ever since. In New Delhi, the political elite sought to 
redefine autonomy on its own terms and rejected the report. Vajpayee said he had 
conveyed his views to Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah “I told him that if they demand 
more political and financial powers that is a different matter. But there is no going back 
to the pre-1953 position.”200 This was the beginning of considering alternative 
meanings to autonomy; greater political and financial powers were acceptable and 
legitimate, but autonomy in the pre-1953 sense was unthinkable.  
In the Lok Sabha, the dominant way in which autonomy was debated was in making it 
an issue of nation-wide application rather than an issue particular to Kashmir. On July 
25, 2000, e.g., MP Somnath Chatterjee stated: “The question of autonomy is not 
restricted to Jammu and Kashmir alone. Different shades of autonomy and different 
concepts of autonomy are being put forward. There have been demands for a long time 
for this. The Sarkaria Commission has given its report.” 
The Annual Report of the Home Ministry 1999-2000 went on to note that: 
Constitutionally J&K enjoys more devolution of powers than other states 
because not all items in the Union List or the Concurrent List of the 7th 
Schedule to the Constitution are applicable to J&K. There is no state list for 
J&K and powers to legislate on residual matters vests with the state unlike the 
rest of the country…The government is however committed to continuing the 
endeavour to evolving a broad consensus on the implementation of steps for 
wide ranging devolution of powers to the states that leads to efficiency in 
administration, acceleration in development and the fullest realisation of 
creative potential of all sections of society. Government is of the firm 
conviction that national integration and devolution of powers to the states must 
go together.  
With the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, on the J&K state 
legislature building and on the Indian Parliament in December, a new discourse on 
Kashmir and terrorism was taking shape amidst the Indian political elite. Finally 
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vindicated about their position on the threat of terrorism, a new initiative of bringing 
Kashmir under the global war on terrorism was under way. Now, the attack on the 
Indian government was equated with the attacks on the World Trade Centre indicating 
a heightened sense of urgency in the world about the danger of terrorism:  
PM Vajpayee, in the aftermath of the Agra Summit, identified Pakistan sponsored 
terrorism as the single most important factor in the Kashmir conflict:  
Pakistan was also reluctant to acknowledge and address cross-border 
terrorism…no objective will be achieved by going into the controversy whether 
Jammu and Kashmir is a prime issue or not. We cannot ignore the cross-border 
terrorism and insurgent activities prevailing in the state. The activities being 
carried out in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of foreign mercenaries and 
foreign funding is nothing but terrorism. Killing of innocent men women and 
children cannot be termed as jihad or a political movement…therefore, 
Pakistan’s refusal to stop cross-border terrorism is the biggest hindrance in 
creating a positive atmosphere for a mutually agreeable solution to the 
problem.201 
After the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the terrorism discourse 
only grew stronger: 
December, the 13th, has been likened to America’s September 11 and that is 
true. The attack on December 13 on our Parliament was an attack, though 
smaller in scale than the attack on the United States of America, but far more 
symbolic in as much as it was an attack on the democratic temple of India’s 
polity.202 
By 2003-04, even as relations between India and Pakistan witnessed a thaw, the 
relationship of India and Kashmir also saw greater initiatives as PM Vajpayee visited 
Kashmir and reached out to the people in a bid to woo their ‘hearts and minds’. By 
offering the people greater economic incentives, as well as talking about regional and 
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sub-regional federalism, the causes of the conflict were represented as economic and 
political dissatisfaction-issues that were common to other states in India as well. The 
new government formed in 2003 led by Manmohan Singh continued to frame the issue 
in similar terms, suggesting a continuation of official representations of the conflict.  
Identity 
India expressed willingness to talk to the Hurriyat in 2000, amidst growing 
international pressure to release Hurriyat leaders who had been detained. The 
announcement came in the wake of US President Bill Clinton’s visit to the region in 
March. This was followed by a ceasefire announcement by the Hizbul Mujahideen in 
July 2000, which overshadowed any possibility of talks with the Hurriyat as the 
government scrambled to respond to this new development. Though the announcement 
was revoked in August, the initiative was welcomed by all sections of the political elite, 
and was followed in November by the announcement of a ceasefire by PM Vajpayee.  
On August 8, the government stated in the Lok Sabha,  
Having welcomed the move towards peace made by a senior Hizbul 
Mujahideen leader during a press conference on 24 July 2000 and having taken 
cognizance of the support extended to the peace initiative by the people of J&K 
as also recognising the need for restoration of peace in J&K, the government 
extended the offer to HM leadership to come over ground and establish contact 
with the Union Home Secretary to discuss modalities necessary for initiating a 
dialogue and preparing grounds for restoration of peace. This process has 
started. The government would like to invite all militant groups and political 
leaders to come forward to restore peace and normalcy in the state of J&K.203 
The above statement reflects a recognition by the Indian government of the legitimacy 
of the Hurriyat and HuM but the latter continued to be referred to as a terrorist outfit, 
and this offer of talks was conditional upon their renouncing violence.  
In April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Kashmir and reached out to the people 
and to Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. After his visit, he addressed the Lok 
Sabha: 
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I went to Jammu and Kashmir on a two-day visit on April 18-19, 2003…I 
assured the people of Jammu and Kashmir that we wish to resolve all issues-
both domestic and external-through talks. I stressed that the gun can solve no 
problem; brotherhood can. Issues can be resolved if we move forward guided by 
the three principles of insaniyat (humanism), jamhooriyat (democracy) and 
Kashmiriyat (Kashmir’s age old legacy of Hindu-Muslim unity). In my speech I 
spoke of extending our hand of friendship to Pakistan. At the same time I also 
said that this hand of friendship should be extended by both 
sides…unemployment is the greatest problem facing the youth of Jammu and 
Kashmir. We have decided to facilitate creation of one lakh opportunities for 
employment and self-employment over the next two years. 204  
The discourses on identity during this period show how the government considered the 
problems of the ordinary Kashmiri to be settled through democracy and humanity, with 
an emphasis on economic issues as the root of their dissatisfaction. The unemployed 
youth were sought to be assuaged through creation of employment opportunities.  
Policy 
The release from jail of senior Hurriyat leaders in April-May 2000 was an attempt to 
reach out to the separatists but talks ultimately fizzled out because of the Indian 
government’s refusal to consider the possibility of tripartite talks between India, 
Pakistan and the Hurriyat that the latter demanded. Further, the Indian government’s 
insistence on the Constitution was in contrast to the Hurriyat position of maintaining 
that Kashmir was a disputed status. In November, the Prime Minister announced a 
ceasefire with the Hizbul Mujahideen and this was extended into the first quarter of 
2001. A statement by PM Vajpayee on December 20, 2000:  
Following my announcement of 19 November during the holy month of 
Ramzan, our security forces would not initiate operations against the militants 
also expressing a hope that along the LoC too infiltration will cease, there have 
been some encouraging developments…The Government is heartened by the 
response of the citizens, political parties and other organisations in the state of 
J&K. Our peace initiative has been widely welcomed there. A distinctly 
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different and more optimistic mood now prevails in that state…As part of our 
continued commitment to the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, the 
government will initiate such exploratory steps as are considered necessary by 
it, so that the composite dialogue process between the governments of India and 
Pakistan could be resumed. Let me inform the house that the government’s 
unwavering commitment to meeting the challenge of terrorism remains 
undiluted. 
In April 2001, KC Pant was appointed the first interlocutor of Kashmir by the Indian 
government and asked to hold talks with all sections in the state. The mission failed as 
the Hurriyat refused to meet him. KC Pant said in relation to the APHC staying away 
from talks, “In this situation, if any group does not want to assist in the peace process, 
it will have to answer to the people of the state as to whether it is not being 
obstructionist.”205  
Meanwhile, Indo-Pak talks were put on high priority and meetings between the leaders 
of the two countries resulted in widening the discourse on bilateral relations beyond 
Kashmir. In the Lok Sabha, July 24, 2001 PM Vajpayee said,  
At the retreat in Agra President Musharraf and I had extensive one to one 
talks…I emphasized the importance of creating an atmosphere of trust for 
progress on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir. I took up 
other specific issues which would help the process of peace….I focussed on 
terrorism being promoted in the state of Jammu and Kashmir…President 
Musharraf focussed exclusively on Jammu and Kashmir…I had to abandon the 
quest for joint document mainly because of Pakistan’s insistence on the 
settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a pre-condition for the 
normalisation of relations…Pakistan wants to evolve the solution of Jammu and 
Kashmir problem as per the wishes of Kashmiri people… Most of the 
Kashmiris have their elected representatives who present their legitimate 
demands before the Government. We are ready to consider demands and 
ideologies which may even come from representatives of a small section of the 
Kashmiri people provided they are ready to give up the path of violence. With 
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these feelings we have offered talks with the representatives of the All Party 
Hurriyat Conference.   
The government was dissatisfied with Pakistan making Kashmir the main focus of talks 
and the failure of the Agra Summit came as a blow to the peace process. Vajpayee’s 
statement above also reflects that international pressure to engage with the Hurriyat 
may have possibly worked and the government made attempts to reach out to them. 
Importantly, the government reiterated that the elected government of Jammu and 
Kashmir was the legitimate representative of the people and that it was the best channel 
for communication with New Delhi.  
Making the government’s position on Pakistan clear to the international community, 
home minister LK Advani said in the Lok Sabha:  
I hope that our Kashmir problem will not be resolved with third party 
intervention. We have always believed it as our bilateral problem. Whether it be 
a direct or proxy war with Pakistan the problem is ours and only we would 
resolve it… during my talks with the representative of various countries 
whether it be Britain, America, France or any other country, I always stressed 
that though terrorist organisations are dangerous, those rogue or terrorist states 
who have terrorism as part of policy of their government and are sponsoring 
terrorism are even more dangerous and these countries have kept on extending 
financial and moral help to terrorist organisations all through these years and it 
has continued unabated…in 21st century, more especially after 11 September 
incident, the entire world admits now that it is a new kind of war.206 
Thus, the speech above indicates India was unwilling to allow any third-party 
intervention over Kashmir and was willing to fight its war alone but cautioned the 
international community against extending any form of support to “rogue or terrorist” 
states, implying Pakistan. There was a heightened sense of securitisation as the home 
minister asserted “internal security is no less important than defence.”207 
                                                             




A major change in policy took place in 2003 when, after years of refusing to talk to 
Kashmiri separatist groups, India announced it was prepared to hold negotiations with 
the APHC. The failure of the two interlocutors appointed to hold talks with all groups 
in Kashmir made the Centre take the initiative to directly engage with the Hurriyat. By 
the end of the year pro-talk Hurriyat leaders were sending feelers that they were ready 
to talk to the Indian government provided a similar opportunity was given to them to 
talk to Pakistan as well.  
India was taken by surprise when in October 2004 Musharraf came out with a proposal 
for both India and Pakistan to consider the option of identifying some regions of 
Kashmir on both sides of the LoC, demilitarize them and grant them the status of 
independence or joint control or under UN mandate. The reaction in Delhi was muted 
as they were conveyed to the media rather than in formal talks and were rejected by 
Manmohan Singh. In November 2004, a month after Musharraf made public his 
proposals, Prime Minister Singh announced a reduction in troops in Kashmir. A 
statement by the external affairs ministry laid out that: 
During the past several months, the Indian Army and other security forces 
deployed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir have achieved success in bringing 
about an improvement in the security situation in the State. Effective counter-
infiltration measures and mobilising the support of the people in the war against 
terrorism have led to a visible improvement in the situation. This is reflected in 
the increased tempo of economic activity, continuing increase in tourist arrivals, 
and a general sense of security among the people. In recognition of the 
improvement in the situation in the State, the Government has decided to reduce 
the deployment of troops this winter.208  
This was the first time since the insurgency broke out in 1989 that a reduction in troops 
had been finalised and came in the run up to Singh’s visit to Kashmir. In Kashmir, the 
Prime Minister said he was there to “reach out to the hearts and minds of the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir” and to help assist the long-term development of the State. 
Further, “I have come to you to say that we can make that new beginning, with dignity 
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and self- respect. Every one of us has a right to live a life of dignity and self-respect. 
That is our commitment to each and every individual.”  
He reiterated his government's commitment to “an unconditional dialogue with anyone 
and everyone in the State who abjures violence.” However, he said, “Kashmir cannot 
wait until these dialogues arrive at a satisfactory solution. The challenge is to begin 
peace building in Kashmir now. I want the journey of development to begin here and 
now.” Calling for a “new vision of development for Jammu and Kashmir”, the PM said, 
“Kashmir needs financial resources. Kashmir needs physical infrastructure, Kashmir 
needs better connectivity in all directions.” His aim he said was not to offer a 
“package” but a “plan. A plan to reconstruct the economy, reform the government, 
regenerate entrepreneurship, revitalise the institutions of civil society and redefine the 
political paradigm and context in the sub-continent.”209 
This talk of a “new vision” and a “plan” aimed to accelerate the pace of development in 
Kashmir, but the issue of autonomy was glaringly absent. In 2006, Prime Minister 
Singh launched a series of round table conferences on Kashmir and called on parties of 
all hues-political and civil society to participate to resolve the issues facing the state. In 
February 2006, the first round table conference took place. Most separatist and hard-
line groups such as both factions of the Hurriyat and the JKLF refused to participate.210 
Decentralisation appeared as the key theme for resolving political issues in the state as 
PM Singh said: 
We want the people to be physically secure and this can only happen if violence 
and terrorism ends permanently. We want the people to be economically secure 
and this can only happen if the tremendous potential of the state is channelized 
and every citizen has access to quality education and health care. We want 
every group to be politically secure and this can only happen once power is 
decentralized to the villages...this vision of empowerment and comprehensive 
                                                             
209 http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=82 Accessed on 1/10/2013. 
210 The Hurriyat was divided into the pro-talk moderate faction headed by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and 
the hard-line pro-Pakistan faction headed by Syed Ali Shah Geelani in 2003.  
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security is related to good governance and people's active participation in 
formulating policies and monitoring their implementation.211  
‘Regional federalism’ was introduced as a solution to the different aspirations of Leh, 
Jammu and Kashmir and autonomy was sought to be discussed within the parameters 
of the Constitution:  
One common view that has emerged from this conference is the absolute 
necessity to maintain the unity of the state while at the same time providing 
adequate space for the full blossoming of regional and sub-regional identities… 
I am requesting the Home Minister to form a high level group of officials to 
examine all current cases of detention and see whether it is possible to release 
all detenues against whom there are no serious cases… A variety of views have 
been expressed on the issue of autonomy and self-rule. I recognise that there are 
many differing views and perception on this issue. There is a need to evolve a 
common understanding on autonomy and self-rule for the State of Jammu & 
Kashmir and I am confident that working together with all groups, both within 
and outside the mainstream, we can arrive at arrangements within the vast 
flexibilities provided by the Constitution, arrangements which provide real 
empowerment and comprehensive security to all people of Jammu & 
Kashmir.212  
At the end of the second round table dialogue in May 2006, PM Singh set up five 
working groups to take forward the various issues that were part of dialogue. These 
were: a group to work out confidence building measures to rehabilitate and improve the 
living conditions of all sections of the people in the state, another working group to 
discuss strengthening of cross-LoC relations, the third working group would look into 
economic development, the fourth working group would work on measures to improve 
governance and the fifth working group was entrusted with the improvement of Centre-
state relations.    
By the end of 2007, the government had still not managed to make headway with the 
Hurriyat and other separatist groups, and though the dialogue process with Pakistan 
                                                             




continued, core issues remained unresolved. On the other side, improvement in Indo-
Pak relations in matters of trade and economic and societal contact had offered new 
ways of engagement and in Kashmir; political discourse widened the space in which 
autonomy was debated even if in ways acceptable to the State. In essence, during this 
period, the government made a number of policy changes with regard to its position on 
dialogue, but due to the rigidity on the Constitution, reluctance on allowing tripartite 
talks, and stress on abjuring violence, talks with Kashmiri groups failed to move 
forward. Autonomy entered as an important theme in the official discourses, but in the 
context of greater decentralisation and federalism and legitimised only if it fell within 
the parameters of the Indian Constitution. The phase also reflects how the Indian state 
considered economic development to be one of the main issues to be prioritised.  
2008-2010: A return to the past? 
Key Events 
2008 Mass protests in the Valley following a 
state government order for transferring 
land to a Hindu religious trust 
2009 Bodies of two Kashmiri women found; 
protestors in Kashmir blamed the Army 
for their killing  
2010 Anti-India protests followed the death of 
a Kashmiri youth through Army firing 
 
Causes 
Between June and September 2008, mass protests erupted after a state government 
order transferring forest land in the state to a Hindu religious trust-the Amarnath Shrine 
Board which organised the annual Hindu pilgrimage in the state. The deal polarised 
J&K society on religious lines and Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley saw a huge 
uprising against the order. Police and paramilitary firing, meant to disperse the angry 
stone pelting crowds, left more than 30 people dead and hundreds injured and 
contributed to the anti-India feeling in Kashmir. Pro-independence slogans echoed in 
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the Valley for the first time in more than a decade. While the state government 
ultimately revoked the order, counter protests in Hindu-majority Jammu further 
widened the religious rift. Visiting Kashmir in October, Prime Minister Singh said,  
The Amarnath pilgrimage is a matter of pride for us. It is a shining example of 
religious harmony. It represents one of the finest examples of our composite 
culture where Hindu pilgrims have been looked after by their Muslim brothers 
for hundreds of years. It is regrettable that there was violence because of 
differences on a piece of land that was transferred to the Amarnath Shrine 
Board. I had expressed this concern in my Independence Day speech also. I 
express my sympathy with the friends and relatives of those who lost their lives 
in the violence. I also feel sad that curfew had to be imposed on many occasions 
causing a lot of problems to the people. But it was necessary to do so to prevent 
violence and loss of life and property.213  
In the Lok Sabha, the debates were fractured along two lines-members of the UPA 
coalition blamed the previous NDA government of setting up and giving the Amarnath 
Board a free hand in the state while non-UPA members accused the government of 
buckling under pressure and giving in to the demand of the Kashmiri Muslims while 
letting Hindu agitations in Jammu go unheeded.214 Causes for the violence were also 
pinned to the role of Pakistan as the following statement by leader of the Opposition 
LK Advani showed:  
When the Government of the State – it was the PDP Minister who gave that 
order – and when he decided to set up a similar Shrine in Amarnath and provide 
land for temporary use of the pilgrims, there was a hue and cry of a nature 
behind it that I have no doubt that the ISI might be there. I do not know. The 
allegations were that it was the ISI which did it. But the situation was such that 
the Congress-PDP Government succumbed to it.…215 
                                                             
213 http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=703 Accessed on 1/10/2013 
214 See for example speeches of Mehbooba Mufti for the former and Maneka Gandhi for the latter in 
the debate on July 22, 2008.  
215 Lok Sabha, July 21, 2008, Monsoon Session, Government of India.  
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Mass protests in 2009 and 2010 were likened to acts of terrorism, delegitimizing them 
from any genuine grievance. In October 2009, for instance, a senior official of the 
Indian Army stated that the main issue in Kashmir was the “agitational terrorism” that 
was being on its streets-referring to the mass protests over the Amarnath controversy in 
2008 and the Shopian incident in 2009.216 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) chief 
NK Tripati described the street protests and stone pelting by the Kashmiri youth as 
“gunless terrorism” largely sponsored by separatists and Pakistan; stripping non-violent 
protests of any legitimacy or agency.217  
Identity 
After more than a decade of relative peace in the Valley, the years from 2008 to 2010 
saw an unprecedented wave of anti-India protests due to a series of events during these 
years. While the government sought to placate the masses and mentioned their sense of 
grievance, the identification of Pakistan and separatists made its way into official 
discourses. The annual report of the home ministry of 2008-09 also alluded to the role 
of ‘separatists’ in fuelling the agitation and spreading ‘propaganda’: 
Unfortunately, in June, 2008, a major controversy arose around the issue of 
transfer of forest land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) for the purpose of 
making arrangements for the Amarnath Yatra. Certain decisions taken by the 
Government in this regard led to major controversies which, in turn, were 
sought to be exploited by the separatist elements through large scale 
propaganda. All this snowballed into a two month long agitation both in the 
Kashmir Valley and the Jammu regions, and also created serious polarization 
between the two regions of the State…”  
The annual report of the home ministry for 2010-11 also hinted at the role of separatists 
as it mentioned how: 
The agitation has drawn ideological support from the separatists…On a few 
occasions there was firing, from within the crowd who could have been 
                                                             
216 http://ibnlive.in.com/news/army-fears-spillover-terror-in-kashmir/104354-3.html Accessed on 
1/10/2013 
217 http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2010/Feb/4/pak-sponsoring-gunless-rebellion-crpf-72.asp 
Accessed on 1/10/2013 
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militants… The security forces have resolutely faced the stone pelting by 
misguided youths with commendable restraint… 
The participation by Kashmiri youth in the mass protests was viewed as pointless; and 
instead they were urged to return to their normal lives. Following the events of 2010, 
PM Manmohan Singh said,  
I can feel the pain and understand the anger and frustration that is bringing 
young people out on to the streets of Kashmir. Many of them have seen nothing 
but violence and conflict in their lives and have been scarred by suffering… Let 
us make a new beginning. I appeal to the youth to go back to their schools and 
colleges and allow classes to resume. I ask their parents: what future is there for 
Kashmir if your children are not educated?218 
In the Lok Sabha in August 2010, Home Minister Chidambaram spoke of the grave 
situation in Kashmir and appealed to the parents “Your children's safety and welfare is 
our paramount consideration as it must be yours... Mindless violence and destruction of 
public property will not lead to any solution.”219 This patronizing appeal to parents, 
evident in both statements above, reflect the government’s representations of the 
participants as children, or non-adults, who needed to be guided by their parents instead 
of indulging in ‘mindless’ agitations.   
Policy 
There was no radical change in policy to deal with the crises. PM Manmohan Singh 
continued to talk of ‘dialogue’ as a means of resolving the issue: 
The recent incidents in J&K show that there is some resentment towards the 
Government among a section of the youth here on certain issues. It has always 
been our belief that even the most difficult issues can be resolved through 
dialogue. This is the reason why we started a series of round table conferences. 
The Government will welcome dialogue with all sections of people. This also 
                                                             
218 PM Singh’s speech to the All Party Delegation from J&K on August 10, 2010 
http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=916 Accessed on 1/10/2013 
219 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmXojp2AYgiSq3kkx2ddw4BG__SQ 
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includes those who have so far opted to stay out of the political process. I urge 
that whoever has complaints and grievances should come forward for a 
dialogue. At an appropriate stage, I would also be happy to meet such people.220 
 
In 2009, yet another controversy engulfed the state when the bodies of two women 
were found in Shopian in Kashmir. Alleging their rape and murder by security forces, 
widespread protests erupted in the Valley. Eight people died and several hundred were 
injured in the clamp down by security forces. The Indian state upheld the role of 
security forces in Kashmir and refused to budge on the issue of AFSPA revocation. 
“We must have faith in our Army and security forces. Just because there are one or two 
black sheep in the forces, let us not demean them,” Chidambaram said in July 2009, 
referring to agitations launched against the paramilitary forces and for their withdrawal. 
“The government would review the demand for withdrawal of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act at an appropriate time.221 
Matters came to a head in 2010, when, in reaction to the killing of an innocent 
Kashmiri youth by security forces, mass anti-India protests broke out in the Valley. 
More than a hundred Kashmiris-mostly young boys, died in security force firings. 
Annual home ministry report of 2010-11 stated the government’s policies:  
The summer of 2010 in the State of J&K has witnessed unprecedented violence 
in the Valley in the form of protests and agitations turning violent and the 
security forces being attacked. The use of stones by a section of the youths has 
been a unique feature of violent attacks on the security forces. This form of 
agitation generated a cycle of violence and disturbed the law and order situation 
in the State particularly since June, 2010…Government of India approved an 8-
point plan to be implemented to ease the situation. This includes appointment of 
interlocutors for sustained dialogue; release of students/youths detained for 
stone pelting; review the cases of all PSA detenues; review the deployment of 
security forces in the Kashmir valley; ex-gratia relief to the families of the 
                                                             
220 http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=703 Accessed on 1/10/2013 
221 http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/terror-threat-hasnt-diminished-
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deceased persons at 5 lakh per person killed in the civil disturbances since 
11.06.2010; appointment of special task forces to examine developmental needs 
of Jammu and Ladakh regions; reopening of all schools, colleges and provision 
of Additional Central Assistance of 100 crore to the State Government to 
restore the damaged infrastructure of schools and colleges. 
Prime Minister Singh also emphasised economic incentives as a solution but political 
dialogue was also considered necessary without going into what this entailed: 
I am convinced that the only way forward in Jammu and Kashmir is along the 
path of dialogue and reconciliation… We must promote economic activity and 
create opportunities for employment. We must build physical and human 
resource infrastructure. But I recognize that the key to the problem is a political 
solution that addresses the alienation and emotional needs of the people. This 
can only be achieved through a sustained internal and external dialogue… We 
are willing to discuss all issues within the bounds of our democratic processes 
and framework… Let us recognize that repeated agitations whether violent or 
otherwise only obstruct this process… We understand the prevailing public 
sentiment on the issue of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Eventually the 
J&K Police has to take on the burden of normal law and order duties. They do 
not require special powers to discharge their functions. We will help to 
accelerate the process of strengthening and expanding the J&K Police so that 
they can function independently and effectively within the shortest possible 
time…222  
As with the early 1990s, little attention or thought was given to the genuine political 
frustrations and angst of the Kashmiri youth, and their agitations were termed as 
‘obstructions’ in the path to peace. In September, the Prime Minister pointed to the role 
of parties with agendas for politicizing the unrest:  
I have said this earlier and I say it again - the only path for lasting peace and 
prosperity in Jammu and Kashmir is that of dialogue and discussion. It is indeed 
tragic that some of our people have forsaken this path during the recent days. I 
                                                             
222 PM Singh’s speech to the All Party Delegation from J&K on August 10, 2010 
http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=916 Accessed on 1/10/2013 
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was shocked and distressed to see young men and women- even children- 
joining the protests on the streets. While some of these protests may have been 
impulsive or spontaneous, it cannot be denied that some incidents were 
orchestrated by certain groups. What we have seen over the past three months 
must persuade us to reflect and deliberate on the way forward. We have to talk 
to each other. And those who have grievances against the Government have to 
talk to the administration. But it is also true that meaningful dialogue can 
happen only in an atmosphere free from violence and confrontation. 
Discussions can take place only if we have calm and public order. The Central 
and State Governments have already appealed to the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir, especially the youth, to eschew violence.223 
The discourses of the political elite in 2010 were similar in rhetoric as earlier; violence 
was seen as the work of separatists and of Pakistan, the youth being mere puppets in 
their hands. Moreover, their protests were seen to be obstructions in the path to peace 
and it was suggested that the youth needed employment and economic opportunities. 
AFSPA was finally acknowledged as a matter of controversy but there was a greater 
emphasis on the need for the security forces to maintain ‘law and order’ and therefore 
the issue of revocation indefinitely postponed.  
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Conclusion   
That the events of 2010 saw in Kashmir a similar anti-India movement as in the early 
1990s was no surprise. Without having resolved the political issues at the core of the 
conflict, the various measures to ‘normalise’ the situation in the state could not have 
brought about genuine peace in Kashmir.  
The pattern of state response in Kashmir has been one of management rather than 
genuine resolution. The discourses of the State point to an ideology of tight control and 
inflexibility-giving very little space for alternative discourses and engagement. Core 
issues such as autonomy have become a subject matter of committees, interlocutors and 
reports, with very little movement on actual implications and implementation of 
autonomy. No consensus has been achieved on what autonomy for Kashmir really 
means; instead, as the discourses show, over the years there has been a move to 
consider Kashmir as any other state in India. In this capacity, then, federalism and 
decentralisation have replaced autonomy as the mantra.  
For the Indian state, elections seemed to be the solution to the problem in Kashmir and 
feature as an important tool in its conflict management repertoire. Development and 
employment were the other tools with which to resolve conflict. Negotiations and 
dialogue appear frequently in the discourses, but deciding who to engage with and on 
what terms has been more of the stumbling block. At some point the Hurriyat and 
separatists were sought to be engaged with only if they participated in elections, but as 
the analysis shows, talks were later legitimized with the same. The insistence on 
keeping internal issues separate from the external issue with Pakistan has meant that 
simultaneous progress on both fronts has been near impossible. Moreover, the 
insistence on any dialogue being within the framework of the Indian Constitution has 
been an obstruction for all those Kashmiri groups challenging the validity of the 
constitutional arrangements.  
The internal dynamics of the state itself has been politicised through the prism of 
religion-a potent tool in contemporary India. The tendency to see Kashmir as the 
beacon of Indian secularism has often meant that religious identity has been prioritised 
over the Kashmiri political identity. In recent years, the dissatisfaction of the youth has 
been framed in economic terms, suggesting employment as a solution to their 
grievances and thus legitimizing economic demands.  
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More broadly, two themes run across the discourses on the conflict in Kashmir-
democracy and paternalism. Democracy, represented in terms of elections and an 
elected state government in Kashmir, is seen as a solution to the crisis, and is projected 
as a legitimate avenue to present demands to the Indian government; on the other hand, 
a general paternal attitude exists amongst the political elite as it deals with the 
Kashmiris as it emphasises the need to bring back the misguided youth and negotiate 
with any disparate groups on its own terms.  
Returning to the research questions, the discourse analysis of the Kashmir conflict over 
time shows how the conflict has been transformed in the discourses from being a 
secessionist conflict to a political and economic one; politically as a demand for greater 
autonomy and economically as a demand for employment. The spectrum of identities 
range from the foreign/Pakistani jihadi or terrorist to the misguided youth. In between 
exist the Kashmiri terrorist, the pro-liberation Kashmiri parties and the Kashmiri 
nationalist parties which are part of the Indian political mainstream. Talks are 
legitimized only with those groups that are willing to give up violence and pay 
allegiance to the Indian constitution. The continuation of this policy discourse across all 




Chapter 5: A discourse theoretical analysis of the Naxal 
conflict 
Referred to as the ‘Maoist’, ‘Naxalite’, or ‘left wing extremist’ conflict, the naxal 
challenge has in recent times moved from being an entirely state-centric to a national 
issue, as the Centre has shown increasing interest in addressing the problem. The naxal 
conflict is different from the conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir, as the issue is not limited 
to a particular state but is spread out geographically, and is also not confined to border 
regions. Further, the key actors in the conflict are not religious minorities, but belong to 
the lowest castes and tribes of rural India. Despite these differences, the naxal conflict 
is a useful case to analyse changes in the state’s discourses as well as to draw 
comparisons from the discourses on the Punjab and Kashmir conflicts. Moreover, do 
these differences make legitimisation of force harder for the State? How do conflict 
representations and policy options legitimise the preferred security strategy? 
While much of the current literature on the naxal conflict focuses on the groups and 
ideologies, causes of the conflict and state government responses, this chapter shall 
analyse the Centre’s response to the issue over a ten year period from 2000 to 2010. 
The relatively short time period is analysed as a phase in itself. A careful analysis of the 
discourses of New Delhi on the issue is carried out and divided under sections on 
causes, identity and policy representations.  
In particular, this chapter will answer more definitely: 
How is the naxal conflict understood by the Indian government? Has this changed over 
time? 
What are the policy options weighted by the Indian government in dealing with the 
conflict? Does this change over time?  
How was India’s security strategy against the Naxalites legitimised? 
Background of the conflict 
Since colonial times, peasant rebellions had been a common feature in India, including 
in Bengal, as the Indian peasantry sought to rebel against colonial exploitation. With 
India’s independence in 1947, the colonial legacy of inequitable land distribution 
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policies continued and with it, the tillers continued to face exploitation at the hands of 
the landowners (Gupta 2007). In 1967, a peasant uprising against land owners and land 
policies erupted into violence in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. It is from 
this district that the term ‘Naxalism’ originated to refer to similar armed peasant 
movements across the country. Even prior to this, Andhra Pradesh witnessed a 
Communist party-led peasant uprising in 1944, and a similar uprising took place in the 
state in 1968. Organisational and ideological support for the uprising in Naxalbari came 
from the militant wing of the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) which later 
split from the parent party to form the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist, also 
called CPI (ML) (Mehra 2000). Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, stalwarts of the 
communist movement in Bengal during the 1960s, were greatly inspired by the Chinese 
communist movement and its pattern of leading revolution from the villages. When the 
CPM decided to join parliamentary politics, the CPI (ML) took charge of the 
movement. As the peasants resorted to violence against the landowners in Naxalbari, 
the police was sent in and clashes between the rebels and the police led to a brutal 
suppression of the former.  
By mid-1972, the movement was almost entirely crushed. The movement in Andhra 
Pradesh was likewise crushed by the time the Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency came 
to an end in 1977. During the Emergency, a number of leaders of the Naxalite 
movement were jailed under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In 1972, Charu 
Mazumdar died in police custody. The Naxalite movement, despite its origins in rural 
Bengal, was led by educated, urban youth from middle and upper middle class families, 
and could not unite the myriad movements in other parts of the country. Once the 
leadership was crushed, the movement was largely over.  
Since the Emergency, Naxalite parties such as the CPI (ML), Maoist Communist 
Centre (MCC) and People’s War Group (PWG) have made efforts to mobilise through 
front organisations, which dealt with workers and peasant’s rights in mainstream 
politics, and armed wings which had a long term agenda of organising armed 
revolution to achieve radical changes (Basu 2011). Since the 1980s and 1990s, there 
has been a proliferation of Naxalite groups across states like Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, 
Orissa, Maharashtra, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. The pace and pattern of 
development projects in these states also served to alienate people from their traditional 
livelihood, and in many cases, caused displacement of people to make way for the 
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construction of dams, mineral refineries and factories. The goal of the CPI (M) is to 
capture state power through armed struggle and an overhaul of the existing political 
system (Ramana 2006).  
 The most recent report of the Home Ministry indicates that front organisations of these 
left wing extremist groups are active in 20 states of India, of which the CPI (M) is the 
most dominant and violent.225 The worst affected states are Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Orissa and Bihar. While Naxalism has largely been an issue specific to the state 
governments, in recent times, it has assumed national significance with the Centre 
taking a keener look at the problem.  
 




                                                             
225 Annual Report 2013-2014, available at 
http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1314.pdf. Accessed on September 30, 2014.   
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Towards a discourse analysis of the management of the Naxal conflict 
As the above background shows, there has been a long history of the Naxal conflict and 
it has spread from a small district in West Bengal to across 20 states in India. From 
being a state-specific issue it has now become a ‘national’ security problem and to that 
extent occupies a prominent place in the Centre’s discourses on security.  
Below, some of the most significant events related to the naxal conflict between 2000 
and 2010 are laid out. Discourses have been selected around these events and analyses 
is presented around the themes of causes, identity representations, and government 
policy discourses.   
Key events 
2000 Creation of two new states: Jharkhand and 
Chhattisgarh with significant tribal 
populations 
 
2001 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance; 
CPML People’s War and Maoist 
Communist Centre and their formations 
and front organisations notified as terrorist 
organisations under the provision of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001. 
2004 CPI(ML) and the MCC merged to form the 
CPI (Maoist) 
2005 Peace talks between Maoists and AP 
government; in Chhattisgarh, Congress 
government instituted Salwa Judum-an 
armed resistance group of local tribals to 
fight against the Naxalites. 
2006 PM Manmohan Singh calls it the biggest 
internal security threat; Chhattisgarh state 
government appoints KPS Gill as security 
adviser; Naxal Management Division 
168 
 
created within the Ministry of Home 
Affairs to deal with the issue from a 
security and development perspective. 
 
2009 Formation of GoI’s first inter-state military 
offensive against the Maoists-Clear, Hold 
and Develop. It took its cue from the US 
Army Counter Terrorism Handbook which 
had a chapter Clear, Hold and Build. 
Home Secretary GK Pillai said in Oct 
2009 that within 30 days administration 
would be restored in these areas; CPI (M) 
banned as a terrorist organisation 
2010 76 security personnel killed in Dantewada 
district in Chhattisgarh-one of the deadliest 
attacks by the naxals; in July, Maoist 
leader Azad was killed; in Chhattisgarh 
CM says links between Maoists and LeT, 
similar sentiments echoed by J&K CM 
 
Causes 
The creation of the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh in 2000 was the result of 
administrative and socio-political convenience. While not directly related to the issue 
of Naxalism, the creation of these states did mean that demographically they had large 
tribal populations. At this stage, the onus of the naxal issue fell on individual state 
governments, though this was gradually giving way to an increased focus of the Centre 
on the issue. In 2001, even as worldwide events such as the terrorist attacks in New 
York and subsequent attention to terrorism increased, in India, there was an attempt to 
link the Indian Maoists with the Maoists in Nepal as a senior government minister 
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claimed that there were “reports that Indian left extremist groups and Maoists of Nepal 
are in contact with each other.”226 
The annual report of the home ministry for 2001-02 noted that that the “Efforts are 
being made by the left wing extremist outfits towards actualisation of the Compact 
Revolutionary Zone envisaged by the MCC, CPML-PW and CPN (Maoist) of Nepal 
for linking up the strongholds of the CPML-PW in Telengana and Dandakaranya and of 
the MCC in Bihar and Jharkhand with those of the CPN (Maoist) in Nepal.” That the 
government believed that the Maoists were uniting in India and Nepal also elevated the 
problem from a local issue to an international one.    
There was a near unanimous view in the parliament that the roots of the naxal issue 
were to be found in economic causes. A senior member of the opposition Congress 
party said that unemployment affected terrorism. While talking of Kashmir, the north 
east and naxal affected states, he said that many educated youth were facing lack of 
employment opportunities, and “are quite easily misled by the people who want to 
mislead them. This economic problem generates terrorism.”227 This was echoed by 
other MPs such as Gutha Sukender Reddy from Andhra Pradesh who said that “one of 
the reasons why Naxalism has assumed such a serious proportion is the unemployment 
problem among the youth.”228 He also said that “Naxalites have no faith in democracy. 
They believe in gaining power through the barrel of the gun…these extremists have 
made life miserable.” Further, he said, “where there is poverty, there is unrest. The 
government should implement effective economic policies and programmes and see 
that economically backward areas witness adequate economic development.”  
In 2004, the merger of the CPI (ML) and MCC to form the CPI (Maoist) also stoked 
added concern amongst the political elite who were convinced that there was a more 
sinister plan to wreak havoc on India’s national security. There was also some concern 
about “compact revolutionary zones” set up by Naxalites to which MoS Jaiswal said 
that “available reports indicate that Naxalite outfits have been making attempts to carve 
                                                             
226 Minister of state in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Vidyasagar Rao made the statement in Parliament 
on December 18, 2001, Winter Session, Government of India.  
227 Shivraj Patil, Lok Sabha, December 17, 2002, Winter Session, Government of India.  
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out a compact revolutionary zone spreading from the Nepal border through Bihar and 
the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh.”229 
This concern with the links of the Naxals with Nepalese groups was a consistent feature 
of the discourse, and suggests that it formed an important part of the discourse on 
causes of the conflict. It implies that the government never considered the issue to be 
purely internal. The internal issue was linked to economic dissatisfaction but links with 
foreign groups made the issue a greater threat.    
At the second meeting of the standing committee of chief ministers on Naxalism in 
April 2006, PM Manmohan Singh said, “The problem of Naxalism is the single biggest 
internal security challenge ever faced by the country.”230 This statement represented 
how the conflict had now been elevated in terms of its threat perception. He also said 
that the Naxalites were trying to establish “liberation zones where they are dispensing 
or claiming to be dispensing basic state functions of administration, policing and 
justice. It is a cause for great concern that civil administration and police are 
periodically absent in some of these areas.” That the PM alluded to political 
shortcomings as a possible cause for the conflict suggests that some of the demands and 
grievances were considered legitimate, but the violence perpetrated by naxal groups 
was a major cause for concern and entirely delegitimized. There was a heightened 
sense of urgency as the PM said that there had been a “qualitative change” in the 
character of the movement: “They were earlier restricted to using local weapons, acted 
in small groups and indulged in isolated attacks. The naxal movement is now 
characterized by growing militarisation, superior army style organisation, better trained 
cadres, attacks on large targets through large scale frontal assaults, better coordination 
and possible external links.” Further,  
 
Naxalism is directly related to underdevelopment…it is the tribal areas that are 
the main battleground of left wing extremism today. Exploitation, artificially 
depressed wages, iniquitous socio political circumstances, inadequate 
employment opportunities, lack of access to resources, under developed 
agriculture, geographical isolation, lack of land reforms – all contribute 
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significantly to the growth of the Naxalite movement. All these factors have to 
be taken into consideration as we evolve solutions for facing the challenge of 
Naxalism.231 
 
A detailed discourse of the causes can be found in a Planning Commission report of 
2008, when in March, an expert group published their report titled ‘Development 
challenges in extremist affected areas’.232 The report recognised that “The directional 
shift in Government policies towards modernisation and mechanisation, export 
orientation, diversification to produce for the market, withdrawal of various subsidy 
regimes and exposure to global trade has been an important factor in hurting the poor in 
several ways” and that “it should not cause surprise that a large section of the people 
are angry and feel alienated from the polity.” It also referred to the causes as follows:  
Apart from poverty and deprivation in general, the causes of the tribal 
movements are many: the most important among them are absence of self-
governance, forest policy, excise policy, land related issues, multifaceted forms 
of exploitation, cultural humiliation and political marginalisation. Land 
alienation, forced evictions from land, and displacement also added to unrest. 
Failure to implement protective regulations in Scheduled Areas, absence of 
credit mechanism leading to dependence on money lenders and consequent loss 
of land and often even violence by the State functionaries added to the problem.  
Such a lucid explanation of the causes of the conflict also put the onus of responsibility 
on the State; though the report also noted that the Naxalites were exploiting the 
situation for their own ends,  
The Naxalites exploit the situation for their own political gain by giving the 
affected persons some semblance of relief or response. Thereby they tend to 
legitimise in the eyes of the masses their own legal or even illegal activities… 
their hostile attitude towards the electoral process has meant that they have not 
had much effect on the political system and the functioning of the local bodies. 
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Instead they have concentrated on establishing their organisations as 
alternatives.  
For the government, the litmus test of the legitimacy of rebel groups thus was their 
participation in the electoral process, and, in this case, the reaction of the Naxalites was 
proof of their undemocratic functioning and delegitimised their means.  
The government also blamed the Naxalites for hindering the pace of development. In 
September 2008, PM Manmohan Singh said that  
Naxalism and Left Wing Extremism continue to pose a challenge to 
development and the social and economic uplift of people in some of the most 
backward regions of our country. The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar 
and Orissa figure prominently in the list of areas that are affected. What is 
especially disturbing is the extent to which these extremists have improved 
techniques and the kind of improvisations that they have succeeded in making. 
…233 
The annual report of the MHA for 2007-08 mentioned that  
Naxalites typically operate in the vacuum created by functional inadequacy of 
field level governance structures, espouse local demands, and take advantage of 
prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among 
the under privileged and remote segments of population. Simultaneously, 
systematic efforts are made by them to prevent execution and implementation of 
development projects, deliberately target critical infrastructure like railways, 
roads, power and telecommunications, and to try and create an environment, 
through violence and terror, where the governance structures at field levels are 
shown as being ineffective. 
The above quote shows how the government differentiated between the genuine 
economic dissatisfaction of the local population and the Naxalites who they considered 
as exploiting these grievances for their own ends, which were to create an environment 
of ‘violence and terror’. These means were delegitimised, and their violence was seen 
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as being a deliberate attempt to malign the government by thwarting development 
projects.  
A glance at the discourses on the causes of the Naxalite conflict detailed above reflects 
some clear patterns. The causes were pinned to prevailing economic policies and 
patterns of development and not just to ‘law and order’ issues that could be left to the 
state governments. Poverty and unemployment were regarded as being the primary 
motivators for leading the poor to take up arms against the State. These were the 
reasons why the Naxalites were able to garner support amongst the population. The 
attempt to link the Naxalites with foreign support worked to give the issue added 
urgency but was not considered a primary cause for the conflict. The concern with 
‘compact revolutionary zones’ in the aftermath of the merger of two separate sections 
of the Naxalites also and with their growing strength and capacity ever since ensured 
that the issue became one of the most prioritised national security issues. No longer was 
the Centre content to leave the conflict purely in the hands of individual state 
government but took a keener interest at the issue.  
Identity 
In terms of identifying who the Naxalites were, the government had already banned the 
front organisations and knew both the main organisations and where they operated. The 
Naxal groups were termed ‘terrorist organisations’ and their reach was seen to have 
been expanded to 9 states across India. The annual report of the home ministry for 
2001-02 noted that “left wing extremist movement remained a cause for concern with 
countrywide Naxalite violence increasing during the current year…among the states 
affected by the menace, Bihar and Jharkhand witnessed an increase in Naxalite 
violence.” It also noted that the “MCC and the CPML-PW continued to spearhead the 
Naxalite movement and accounted for around 85.9% of countrywide Naxalite violence 
and resultant deaths despite their inclusion in the schedule 18 of POTA as terrorist 
organisations.” The report also lay out that 53 districts in 9 states were affected by left 
wing extremism, worst of them being Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh 
and Orissa.  
Interestingly, the government also identified the Naxalites as essentially ‘our own 
people’ and as those gone astray.  The Centre drafted a surrender policy for “left wing 
extremists” in 2000 and had circulated it amongst state governments for their views. 
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According to a senior home ministry official, “the primary objective of the policy is to 
contain left wing extremist violence by weaning away the misguided youth and able 
bodied men and women who have drifted to the extremist fold and to bring them back 
to the mainstream.”234 The framing of the Naxalites as ‘terrorist organisations’, 
‘extremists’, and ‘misguided youth’ at varying times suggests the inability of the 
government to fully comprehend the legitimacy of the Naxals. Opposition MPs 
questioned the government on this treatment. Home minister Shivraj Patil said in the 
Lok Sabha, replying to a query about why the government was treating them as 
brothers: 
If a man does not get food, employment, and a house and there is no one to 
support the family members and whatever support he requires is not provided to 
him and if such a person is forced to take up arms under the influence of wrath 
then it is not good to treat him as a foe and open fire on him. These people have 
been forced to take up arms due to some compulsion and we do not want to 
treat them as our foes. We want to make them realise that the path they have 
chosen is not good. I want to tell all such persons who have taken up arms they 
are not going to get anything with the help of arms and violence…but if they 
come through negotiations or any other channel or if they do something through 
the House they would be able to achieve enough…We are not taking the course 
of negotiations due to some kind of fear. We are taking this course because they 
are our own people.235 
In other words, officially the government maintained that the Naxals were not enemies, 
but rather had been ‘forced’ to take up arms. The Naxals were blamed for arousing a 
sense of false consciousness amongst the people by using violence since ideologically 
it was not able to attract attention. PM Manmohan Singh said that the Naxalite 
movement had lost most of its intellectual attraction but was “generating some notions 
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of empowerment through the use of violence and weapons” especially among 
“deprived and alienated sections of the population.”236 
The government also recognised the supporters of the naxal movement largely as 
tribals or the very poor in the areas affected by Naxalism. A 2008 Planning 
Commission report identified that “The main support for the Naxalite movement comes 
from dalits and adivasis...” In September 2008, PM Manmohan Singh said “Left wing 
extremists also appear to have a ready-made pool of disaffected elements, mainly from 
the tribal and other very poor sections of the society…”237 Further, “It is not a 
coincidence that the areas affected by Naxalite activity are also areas with a large 
representation of tribal communities. It was in recognition of this fact that many such 
States and areas have been included in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. This 
provides for a special role for Governors. Our Government has enacted the Scheduled 
Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, 
which is a path breaking initiative empowering tribal families.”238 
By asserting that the support base of the Naxals comprised largely of tribals and the 
poorest of the poor, the government was essentially denying agency to the supporters 
by emphasising their desperation as being reason for the ease with which they could be 
exploited.  
The political elite in New Delhi took issue with the claim of the Naxalites that they 
were pro-tribal. For instance, one MP said, “They claim that they are for the people and 
that they are Marxists and Leftists. But the fact is they are neither Marxists nor Leftists, 
they are anarchists. So anarchism is Naxalism. They are disturbing the development 
process. They are anti-tribal and anti-development.”239 In a similar vein, Congress MP 
Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi debated the use of the term Maoists by the media. He said, “I 
do not know why you use the term Maoists. But the name Mao Zedong is a name to the 
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whole world for his revolution…I asked the journalists, ‘You can say ‘extremist’, you 
can say ‘Naxalites’, but why do you say ‘Maoists’?”240 
They were also termed anti-national by PM Manmohan Singh, “In several parts of our 
country, there have been increasing instances of public protest against high-handedness 
of militant and Naxalite cadres, which are indeed welcome signs and need to be 
harnessed as a possible paradigm for dealing with such anti-national elements…”241 
With regard to foreign links, it was claimed by the government that “There are no 
inputs to indicate that Left Wing Extremist (LWE) groups are getting assistance in 
terms of weapons and finance from foreign countries. Further, there are no inputs to 
indicate that LWE groups have established nexus with terrorist and separatist outfits 
abroad. However, CPI (Maoist) maintains links with certain like-minded parties of 
some neighbouring countries.”242 The minister also said that there were inputs to 
suggest that “Left Wing Extremist groups, particularly CPI (Maoist), extort 
considerable levy from various mining mafia groups in the Naxal-affected States.”  
Essentially, the discourses on identity indicate that the government considered the 
Naxalites as extremists (clear from their use of the term Left Wing Extremism to refer 
to the movement) but the kind that were part of the mainstream or “our own people”. 
They were also identified as tribals, and their main support base as coming from the 
tribals and poorest sections of society. There was no altruistic aim of the Naxalites as 
far as the government was concerned and instead it considered them to be taking 
advantage of the misery of the poor and tribals and in the process hindering 
development.  
Policy 
The twin emphasis on ‘development and security’ in the Centre’s discourses highlights 
that the conflict was viewed as primarily an economic one but the policy thrust was on 
security. Since 2000, the Naxalite issue began to gain prominence in the Centre’s 
discourses on internal security. In March 2000, home minister LK Advani told the 
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Parliament that Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh had “witnessed an increase 
in left wing extremist violence” and that the Centre had in its meetings with state 
governments asked them to prepare “integrated action plans encompassing 
development and security aspects of the problem.”243 He also said that the government 
had set up a coordination centre headed by the union home secretary and with chief 
secretaries and director generals of the police forces of the affected states to review and 
monitor the plan of action.  Chief Ministers of affected states also held meetings with 
the Centre in New Delhi to review the situation. The home minister identified several 
policy decisions taken such as “providing financial support for combating left wing 
extremist activities, construction/improvement of identified critical roads, preparation 
of plans for development of affected areas to tackle the problem in a holistic manner, 
sharing of intelligence inputs on constant basis, providing help to paramilitary 
forces”.244  
At this stage, it was evident that the Centre considered Naxalism to be the 
responsibility of the state governments, but provided financial assistance and 
intelligence sharing along with the supply of paramilitary forces. For instance, the 
Centre had implemented a scheme to reimburse 50% of the security related expenditure 
incurred by states in tackling the problem of left wing extremism.245 However, that the 
issue was becoming a growing concern for the Centre was becoming more and more 
evident. According to Home Minister LK Advani, “keeping in view the overall 
dimensions which left wing extremism has assumed in some states, it has become a 
matter of concern for the central government as well.”246 He said that the centre was 
providing states with financial assistance for modernisation of the police forces in the 
affected states. He also said that meetings with chief ministers had taken place and they 
were urged to focus on inter-state coordination, intelligence gathering, responsive 
administration and socio-economic measures to cater to the needs of the poorer 
segments and redressal of peoples’ grievances. He also said that it was agreed that 
police forces of affected states should undertake joint operations.  
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By the end of 2001, a year that saw increased concern with terrorism following the 
events of 9/11 in New York and the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, the 
Naxalite issue had begun to be taken more seriously and the government noted an 
increase in the number of states facing Naxalite terror. In response to the government’s 
evaluation of the Naxalite conflict, minister of state in the ministry of home affairs 
Vidyasagar Rao said that the government was facing various internal security 
challenges, including “violence perpetrated by the left wing extremist groups in some 
states like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Orissa.”247  He also said that the state 
governments had been advised to formulate “Integrated Action Plans” encompassing 
“security and development aspects”. There was some attempt to link the Naxalites with 
the Maoists in Nepal. On December 18, 2001, the government stated in the Parliament 
that “there are reports that Indian left extremist groups and Maoists of Nepal are in 
contact with each other.” He also said that since “public order” and “police” were state 
subjects, it was for the “state governments to devise various methods and take concrete 
steps to curb left wing extremist activities in the states.” He said that the Centre was 
helping with financial support for various policies to deal with the issue.  
An attempt at talks by the Andhra Pradesh government in 2002 fizzled out when the 
ruling party could not garner support across the political spectrum. In the Parliament, 
the issue was controversial. For instance, one MP from the state said that while the 
Andhra Pradesh government tried to negotiate with the “extremists”, it was 
“unfortunate that some of the political parties have supported the extremists. Extremists 
believe in gaining power only through the barrel of the gun. That being their stand, any 
negotiation with them will never be successful.”248 Others urged the government to 
follow the example of the Andhra Pradesh government and keep the negotiation 
process going.249 For instance, MP Asaduddin Owaisi, “This naxal problem is a socio-
economic problem. It has to be dealt with talks only…”250 The lack of unanimity on 
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whether dialogue with the Naxalites was legitimate or not added to the policy confusion 
in New Delhi.  
At a chief ministers conference held in New Delhi on February 8, 2003, it was agreed 
to adopt a two pronged strategy to tackle this problem: 
On the one hand there is a need to remove all the shortcomings in intelligence 
gathering and sharing well-coordinated anti-Naxalite operations by Special 
Task Forces of the concerned states under a designated coordinator, on the 
other, a greater emphasis needs to be given by the states to accelerate 
development of the physical and social infrastructure in the affected districts.251  
The conference also underlined the fact that one of the basic reasons “for the ills of 
extremism” was the lack of good governance. Therefore, it was decided, there was a 
“need to make the administrative machinery more responsive, transparent, and 
sensitive.” It was agreed to put in place “effective public grievances redressal system 
and post committed and upright officers with stable tenure in the affected districts.”  
Further, the report noted that: 
Considering that Maoist violence in Nepal may have some repercussions on the 
internal security situation of the country particularly in view of the CPN 
(Maoist) linkages with CPML-PW and MCC, states affected by left wing 
extremist activities and those bordering Nepal have been requested to take 
immediate action to arrange intensive patrolling of the areas bordering Nepal to 
prevent ingress of Maoist elements.252  
Essentially, the twin emphasis on security and development as a policy thrust was laid 
out along with a plan to improve governance while at the same time keeping vigil on 
foreign linkages.  
It was in 2004 that the government discourses reflected a willingness to consider 
dialogue as a policy for resolving the issue. This change came about as a result of the 
state government of Andhra Pradesh engaging in dialogue with the Naxalites in 
                                                             




October, after initiating a ceasefire in June. In September, the merger of the MCC and 
PWG to form the CPI (Maoist) was made public. Talks eventually broke down due to 
differences over bearing of arms and due to hostilities in January 2005. Home minister 
Shivraj Patil said in the Lok Sabha that it was a result of direct talks that the Andhra 
Pradesh government initiated with the Naxalites that the number of deaths due to 
violence had come down. “This shows we can solve the problem through dialogue.”253 
Simultaneously, the government kept up its policy of development and security. The 
minister said, “We have asked the Planning Commission to allocate maximum funds 
for Naxalite and terrorism affected areas so that economic development can be seen in 
those districts.” The Centre also deputed to the affected states “central paramilitary 
forces, mine protected vehicles and air support wherever required for effective anti-
Naxalite operations. India Reserve battalions have also been sanctioned to these 
states.”254  
Until 2004-2005, the Centre’s position on the Naxalite issue was that it was up to the 
state governments in their individual capacity to deal with policy making, even though 
it extended help to them. From 2005 onwards, in the wake of the merger of two of the 
sections of the Naxalites, the Centre sought to bring states together to deal collectively 
with the issue and develop coordinated policies with assistance from the Centre.  
At a March 2005 meeting held to review Naxalism in the states, the Centre advised 
state governments to constitute Village Defence Committees to “put pressure on the 
Naxalites.” In the same year, the state government in Chhattisgarh instituted the Salwa 
Judum, a group of armed vigilante civilians aimed at countering the Naxalites. The 
group indulged in violence and human rights violations, and the state government faced 
flak from human rights organisations across the country and was later declared illegal 
by the Supreme Court.255 Some in the political elite questioned the arming of civilians 
against the naxals. In the Parliament for instance, a Communist party MP said,  
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The Government of India should take note of the comments made by the 
Supreme Court on Salva Judum.  I am raising this issue because Salva Judum is 
an extra constitutional authority; a civilian section is being armed, financed by 
the Government of India finances.  The Government is trying to put them 
against Naxalites in the name of one group of tribals fighting against another. 
Are we going to allow the type of private army to come up?  Is it the way the 
Government is going to stop terrorism?  Naxalism is a socio-economic issue.  
The Government has to solve the problem of poverty to finish Naxalism in this 
country.  But the Government is considering this problem as a law and order 
problem, which is not going to help.256 
This alternative policy discourse castigating the Centre’s decisions remained 
marginalised, as dominant representations of the conflict served only to approach it 
through the prism of security. By 2005, the Centre was urging states to formulate joint 
operations and step up the fight against the Maoists. The central government instituted 
a standing committee comprising of the chief ministers of 13 states affected by 
Naxalism as well as home ministry officials in April 2005. In its first meeting, it was 
decided to set up inter-state joint task forces “to facilitate coordinated and synergised 
anti-Naxalite operations across state boundaries.”257 At this meeting, it was decided that  
The states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to 
effectively combat the menace of Naxalism, suitable mechanisms for joint 
operations will be finalised, the states will strengthen and upgrade the state 
police forces also intelligence work, and the states will set up special and stable 
administrative structures at the state and district levels for better 
governance…the government remains committed to combating this problem 
through a multipronged approach on political, security and development 
fronts.258 
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A detailed response was also laid out at a chief ministers meeting on internal security in 
April 2005, when PM Manmohan Singh said,  
We cannot ignore the fact that the threat of Naxalism is geographically spread 
out to the more backward regions and districts of our country. Hence, our 
strategy to tackle this threat to law and order in these districts and regions will 
have to be to implement programmes and policies that address the pressing 
needs and demands of the people, especially the scheduled tribes and scheduled 
castes; and, at the same time, to ensure effective policing and maintenance of 
law and order. The speedy implementation of land reforms, the redistribution of 
land, the assurance of tribal rights to forest produce, implementation of 
development projects and spread of mass education and health facilities are all 
important steps we must take. At the same time, we cannot ignore the inter-
State and external dimension to Naxalism today. This requires greater 
coordination between State governments and between the Centre and States. We 
have to take a comprehensive approach in dealing with Naxalism given the 
emerging linkages between groups within and outside the country that the 
Home Minister has referred to.”259  
As the above quote suggests, the government appeared to recognise that the issue was 
multipronged but its emphasis continued to be on ‘policing’, ‘maintenance of law and 
order’ and greater coordination between the Centre and states. Further, the conflict was 
elevated to a greater threat to security given its links with groups operating from 
outside the country. 
At a review meeting of the home ministry in the aftermath of one year in office in 
2005, the government exempted the Naxal-affected States from the payment of cost of 
deployment of Central Para Military Forces on anti-Naxalite duty.  To help states 
maintain law and order and for tackling insurgency and Naxalite problem more 
effectively, 15 battalions of CRPF, 20 battalions of SSB and 12 Indian Reserve 
battalions were sanctioned. In other words, the military might against the Naxalites was 
increased and continued to be the preferred policy against the issue. A minister in the 
                                                             
259 April 15, 2005 http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/AdvSearch.aspx Accessed on August 26, 2014.  
183 
 
home affairs ministry said that the central government had adopted a multi-pronged 
strategy to deal with Naxalism which included,  
…a peace dialogue by the affected states with naxal groups willing to abjure 
violence, modernization and strengthening of the state police forces, long term 
deployment of paramilitary forces, intensified intelligence based well-
coordinated anti Naxalite operations, focused attention on integrated 
development of the affected areas and removal of socio-cultural alienation of 
people, gearing of public redressal system and creation of local resistance 
groups.260  
The emphasis on dialogue was novel, but with the condition that the groups gave up 
violence as a precondition for talks meant that it was not able to materialise.  
At a meeting of the top-level police officers of the country held in October 2005, the 
home minister said that Naxalism remained a “serious threat” to the internal security of 
the country and stressed the need to accord high priority to ensuring faster integrated 
development of naxal affected areas and also strengthening the administrative 
machinery in such areas. He said that the Centre would extend all possible assistance to 
augment local capabilities for intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms to launch 
effective police actions in a coordinated and sustained manner.261 At the same meeting, 
PM Manmohan Singh said that police forces faced multi-dimensional security 
challenges in different regions, including Jammu & Kashmir and the hinterland, 
affected by Left-wing extremism. In this context, he said that development programmes 
aimed at reducing imbalances between regions and improving the lot of the poor people 
and hoped that National Rural Employment Guarantee Act would go a long way in 
mitigating poverty in Naxal-affected areas.  He emphasised the urgent need to improve 
the quality of governance, apart from investing in social and physical infrastructure in 
Naxalite and border areas.  He said, 
No group or organization can be allowed to take the law of the land in their own 
hands and indulge in violence…I recognise that the problem 
of Naxalism cannot be solved by police action alone. While we do need 
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sustained and effective police action, we have to accelerate socio-economic 
development of the Naxal-affected areas…Development programmes of the 
government are aimed at reducing imbalances between regions and improving 
the lot of the poorer sections of our people. The National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act will go a long way in mitigating poverty in many Naxal affected 
areas. The government has also set up a Backward Regions Grant Fund to 
finance development of more backward regions. There is a proposal to provide 
rights to tribals living in forest villages so that they can have a secure 
livelihood…there is urgent need to improve the quality of governance in these 
areas…262 
The above quote of the Prime Minister demonstrates the extent to which the conflict 
was viewed as an economic one. At the same time, that the speech was made to police 
chiefs was a sign that it was not as serious a threat as some of the other conflicts where 
issues of secession or territory have appeared frequently in elite discourses. Also, the 
policy discourse seems to be more all-encompassing as it focussed on ‘socio economic 
development’ and improving the ‘quality of governance’. Despite the comprehensive 
policy goal stated by the government, however, implementation was lacking, and 
violence continued on both sides. In November 2005 MoS Jaiswal said that “the 
government is alive to the menace of Naxalism and will deal firmly with Naxalites 
indulging in senseless acts of violence. The government remains committed to 
combating this problem through a multi-pronged approach on political, security and 
development fronts.”263  
Interestingly, the government was of the opinion that Naxalism was more difficult to 
manage than the conflicts in Kashmir and the north-eastern parts of the country. Home 
minister Shivraj Patil said,  
It is correct that we have been able to check extremism in Kashmir and the 
north eastern states although we have not been able to curb Naxalite violence to 
that extent. We have adopted a multi-pronged approach. The task is to be 
carried out by state governments so we have given approximately 26 battalions 
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to the state government…we have also provided them with armed 
vehicles…police modernization…But would we be able to solve the problem of 
Naxalism with the help of the police? We will definitely use the police force 
when required but we would also take steps to address the administrative 
matters with the help of the state government like the issues of land, 
unemployment and any kind of injustice...264 
This acknowledgement by the government that it was not able to decrease Naxal violence as 
it had done in other conflict zones also denotes the difference in policy—the geographically 
scattered nature of the conflict, and the reliance largely on police forces and to a limited 
extent paramilitary forces stand in stark opposition to the use of the army and military forces 
in conflicts in Kashmir and the north east.  
In April 2006, the Centre held the second meeting of the standing committee of chief 
ministers on Naxalism. In a press release issued in the aftermath of the meeting, the 
government strategy suggested that “good governance” was to be the key in order to reduce 
the sense of “deprivation and alienation” and work with all families under poverty alleviation 
schemes. In terms of policy responses, PM Manmohan Singh said that the local police had to 
be strengthened as “they are in the vanguard of the fight against naxal violence.”265 Apart 
from police, he said that special task forces needed to be set up and intelligence gathering 
had to be improved. And coordination between states improved. Further, “such violent 
movements have huge societal costs…such extremism is a threat to our democracy, to our 
way of life.” He also said that  
Chief Ministers could consider, at the same time, in reducing the burden of debt on 
the rural poor tribals…They could initiate another wave of rural reforms, which can 
ensure employment and land to the poorest in these areas. They could promote local 
participation in governance…The police response is necessary so that the obligation 
of the Indian state to uphold public order is fulfilled. However an effective police 
response does not mean that we need to brutalise the Indian state. Legitimate needs 
and aspirations…should be examined with due care and due sympathy. We are 
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dealing after all, with our own people, even though they may have strayed into the 
path of violence.  
In other words, the central government continued to relegate bulk of the responsibility to the 
state governments even as it added that they were dealing with ‘our won people’ who might 
have ‘legitimate’ needs and demands.  
The government continued to reiterate that the issue was “not merely a law and order 
problem; the policy is to address this menace simultaneously on political, security, 
development and public perception management fronts in a holistic and coordinated 
manner.”266 The addition of “public perception management” was a new introduction in 
the policy discourse of the state, and indicated that the government was now keen to 
match Maoist propaganda with its own. Dialogue as a policy was acceptable to the 
government, but made clear that “there will be no dialogue with Naxalites unless they 
agree to abjure violence and give up arms.”267 The minister also tabled in Parliament in 
March 2006 a ‘status paper on the naxal problem’.268 The paper outlined that “the 
Naxalite leadership continues to pursue their plan to wage protracted people’s war 
through armed struggle to capture political power. In the recent past, Naxalite groups 
seem to lay greater focus on organising along military lines. They are also acquiring 
contemporary weapons. Their constant effort is to upgrade technology and 
sophistication of their weaponry and techniques.” Other ministers pointed to a 
Naxalite-politician nexus and said that “at the time of elections, some people accept the 
assistance of Naxalites in order to emerge victorious in elections.”269  
 
There was also some reference to the conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir which provided 
examples of successful counter insurgency:  
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I would just like to go back to the situation in Punjab in the 1980s and till the 
mid-1990s. It appeared that terrorism would tear this country apart. It was a 
serious threat. Still, we were able to ride the wave of terrorism, restore 
normalcy in Punjab. If we did that, it was entirely because we followed a 
democratic process. We encouraged a democratic style of Government. I 
remember that the Punjab Chief Minister became a martyr to the cause of 
restoring peace in the strife-torn State. He was assassinated. But his 
assassination proved to be a wonderful contribution to the cause of peace in this 
country and in the State of Punjab. Even in Jammu and Kashmir, which has 
seen terrorism for a very long time – almost now two decades – we are in a 
position to win this war. If we are going to win this war, it is once again because 
of a process of democratic functioning that has been there for some time now. It 
is this democratic functioning that gives the people of the State, the people of 
this country an inherent faith in the administration. 270 
By 2008, the Centre was calling for increased role for itself in dealing with the naxal 
issue and sanctioned added paramilitary forces to deal with the naxal conflict. PM 
Manmohan Singh said,  
The problem has acquired such scale in some regions that it cannot be dealt 
with by individual state Governments. We need better coordination between 
State Governments. We also need better coordination between States and the 
Centre….To deal with the challenge; many States have set up specialized and 
dedicated forces. The Central Government has, on its part, sanctioned 15 
additional battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force and created 10 
specialized Command Battalions for Resolute Action which are trained in 
jungle welfare. It has also been decided to give financial assistance to State 
Governments to raise India Reserve Battalions. The command and control 
mechanism of the Central Police Organizations is being streamlined and the 
intelligence machinery of the Centre is being strengthened. We are also giving 
special attention to modernization of State Police Forces and their training.271 
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The annual report of the home ministry of 2008-09 stated that “the view and the policy 
of the Government is that for dealing effectively with the naxal problem, an entirely 
police and security oriented approach is not enough. While it is necessary to conduct 
proactive and sustained operations against the extremists, and put in place all measures 
required for this, it is also necessary to simultaneously give focused attention to 
development and governance issues…” 
At the annual conference of police chiefs in 2010, PM Manmohan Singh reiterated that 
the naxals were ‘our own people’ and stressed that dialogue was possible if they gave 
up violence:  
While we have made good progress in terms of recruitment and setting up of 
better institutional arrangements for intelligence, investigation, coastal security 
and counter-terrorism, the problems we face remain daunting. We need to do 
much more to meet the challenge of Naxalism…We recognize that the 
Naxalites are our own people and are ready to talk to them provided they abjure 
the path of violence. We also stand committed to making special efforts to 
develop the areas affected by naxal violence, many of which are inhabited 
predominantly by our tribal brothers and sisters.272 
Following the attack by the Naxals in Dantewada in April 2010, the issue made it to 
national headlines and led to a renewed focus on the Maoist groups by the Centre. 
Home Minister Chidambaram said, “If this tragedy is not a wakeup call then nothing 
can wake up this country and this Parliament” and said that the incident should “make 
us more determined, resolute and fearless” in dealing with the adversary. He also said 
that it was important not to “fall prey to some romantic version of a Left wing 
movement”, adding “I have no fear. I do not fear the Naxals.”273 This event had the 
impact of widening the discourse on security policy to combat Naxalism. There were 
already at this stage media speculations of a plan to induct the Army in what was 
termed by the media ‘Operation Green Hunt’, essentially a military offensive against 
the Naxalites.  Although such a policy plan was denied by the home minister, it added 
to the debate on the best way of dealing with the naxal conflict. The vehement denial of 
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using the army suggests that the government had not yet managed to entirely 
delegitimise the Naxal conflict. This, along with a constant reassertion that the Naxals 
were ‘our own people’ were unable to justify the use of any widespread military force.  
On September 13, 2010, the PM held a meeting with the commanders of the armed 
forces. At the meeting he said, “Naxalism is a serious challenge to our internal security. 
We will do all that is necessary to protect each and every citizen of our country, and 
deal firmly with those who resort to violence. This is a collective task involving the 
Centre and the States. At the same time we have to accelerate our development efforts 
in the naxal affected areas and make our administrative machinery more sensitive and 
responsive to local concerns.” 
The government also introduced more centrally sponsored schemes in dealing with 
Naxalism. Many of these were aimed at development and upliftment of the tribal areas. 
In November 2010, the home minister presented a report card of the functioning of the 
ministry during the year. In his speech, he said,  
On the LWE front, the CPI (Maoist) continued its armed aggression against the 
State and innocent people...Apart from targeting so-called ‘police informers’, 
the Naxalites have now started attacking the families of policemen with the 
object of discouraging any one from providing assistance to or joining the 
police force…The Naxalites continued to target infrastructure…The 
Government’s response to the challenge of Left Wing Extremism remains a 
two-pronged approach…274 
By 2010, the military thrust reached a new high when the government introduced a 
specially trained force for combating naxal violence.  
The view and the policy of the Government is that for dealing effectively with 
the naxal problem, an entirely police and security oriented approach is not 
enough. While it is necessary to conduct proactive and sustained operations 
against the extremists, and put in place all measures required for this, it is also 
necessary to simultaneously give focused attention to development and 
governance issues…Government’s approach is to deal with Left Wing 
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Extremism activities in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, 
administration and public perception… Ten Battalions of Specialized Force 
trained and equipped for counter-insurgency and jungle-warfare operations, 
named as Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) are being raised 
as a part of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)…275  
As the above discussion on policy discourses shows, the government’s main approach 
to Naxalism has been through development and security related measures. It also 
considered the issue to be primarily the responsibility of state governments but towards 
the later years took on an increasing role in monitoring the issue and in assisting states 
with additional financial and military resources. There was certainly an 
acknowledgement of the failures of existing governance and development models and 
successive policy papers and reports gave detailed directions where these were fuelling 
the conflict, but these did not detract from the fact that the government considered the 
Naxalite groups to be illegal and indulging in undemocratic violence and against which 
military force was necessary. The rising levels of Naxal violence certainly added to the 
threat perception and left the Centre scrambling for an appropriate response but the use 
of force has been a controversial issue. The legitimization of force appears in the 
statements of the prime minister and home ministers who repeatedly call for increased 
use of force, but importantly, the use of the Army was not a legitimate policy option. 
Instead, the focus was on police and paramilitary forces. Modernisation of police forces 
and strengthening and creation of paramilitary forces as part of counter insurgency also 
give credence to this view. Dialogue as a policy was not sustained and the Centre only 
encouraged it to the extent that the groups gave up violence as a precondition. 
Implementation of some of the more radical policy measures such as reducing 
corruption and improving governance remained abysmal even as the security related 
measures materialised. By 2010, there was a new policy discourse centred on a ‘clear, 
hold and develop’ strategy that aimed at flushing out the Naxalites from the tribal areas 
before establishing control and injecting economic development packages.   
  
                                                             




The naxal conflict, though not new to the government, has in its present avatar caused 
much concern to India’s internal security. The causes of the conflict have largely been 
ascribed to economic causes and as the discourses show, poverty, unemployment and 
underdevelopment have been considered responsible for the spread of the movement. 
Detailed critiques of the development patterns were remarkable so far as they 
acknowledged the role of the policies in creating unstable economic models but the 
Naxalites were also held responsible for hindering development by targeting the 
government’s infrastructure projects. The identification of Naxalites as left wing 
extremists who were exploiting poor tribals went hand in hand with the tribals being 
‘misguided’ and the government considered it its duty to treat them as their ‘own 
people’ who needed to be brought back into the mainstream. The government also 
sought to delegitimise the Naxalites as ‘Maoists’ for they claimed that in reality the 
Naxalites were anti-tribal and anti-development.  
The thrust of the government’s policies was on the twin pillars of security and 
development, which allowed the government to deal with naxal violence with a heavy 
handed approach while at the same time channelling more and more resources for 
economic development to wean the tribals away from the Naxalites. In terms of policy 
implementation, it is clear that the security-centric approach has been predominant. 
Security policies included increasing the strength of the police and paramilitary forces 
and in equipping the states with additional military equipment, vehicles, forces and 
creating a specially trained commando force trained in jungle warfare to tackle the 
Naxalites. Discourses on causes and policy also show references to governance and 
administrative failures in the areas affected by Naxalism but these appeared more as lip 
service rather than any meaningful implementation on the ground.  
By the end of 2010 it was also clear that the Centre was beginning to take on added 
roles and responsibilities in countering the issue, in stark contrast to the earlier 
approach of leaving it to individual state governments. The ‘clear, hold and develop’ 
strategy, introduced by the home ministry in 2009, borrows much from the ‘clear, hold, 
build’ strategy of America’s counter insurgency policy document, indicating a tendency 
to view the issue from the prism of international counter insurgency. For some MPs, 
the naxal issue was far greater than terrorism: “I really feel that the threat of naxal 
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activities today is even more serious and sinister than the threat posed by terrorism 
which is imported from across the border…”276 The securitisation of the conflict can be 
seen further in the discourses towards the later part of 2010 when references were made 
to alliances between the Naxalites and the Lashkar e Toiba.277 If the government was 
open to the prospect of dialogue with the Naxalites, it was entertained only after they 
gave up violence and arms, a policy it has followed with rebels and insurgents across 
different conflict zones in the country.  
To sum up, official discourses on the naxal conflict suggest that while it is regarded 
primarily as an economic conflict, there has been an over emphasis on security related 
policies which have been legitimised as necessary due to the threat it has posed-
measured in terms of the targeting of state officials and institutions, infrastructure 
damage, links with foreign outfits albeit to a lesser degree, and to the spread of the 
movement across large parts of the country. On the other hand, due to the assessment 
that the Naxalites were essentially their ‘own people’ the use of the armed forces like 
the army and air force, and the use of legislations such as AFSPA have not been 
legitimised. Further, the role of the Centre has been limited in the fight against the 
Naxalites, even though there has in recent years been an increasing role, but the 
resistance of state governments has meant that a comprehensive, synchronised nation-
wide policy against the naxals has been lacking. The blame game between the Centre 
and state governments in dealing with the Naxal issue has persisted and added to the 
policy confusion.  It was hoped that the elimination of top leaders of the naxal 
movement in recent years would crush the movement but so far this has not been the 
case. Every case of violence by the Naxalites has been met with a renewed focus on the 
security-centric approach and is likely to continue in the absence of a clear policy of 
dialogue and inclusiveness at the national and state level.  
The typology of the conflict as an economic conflict and the identification of Naxals as 
terrorists has meant that in the absence of a acknowledging any political demand, the 
Centre relies on force to deal with the violence. The inability to distinguish between 
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moderate Naxals and extremist ones, as was done in the case of Punjab and Kashmir, 
and the lack of a contained territory from which they operate has made the conflict that 
much more difficult to manage. With both the Centre and the state governments keen to 
‘eliminate’ Naxalism, the terrorist discourse has, by focussing on violence of the 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis examined conflict resolution policies through a discourse analytical 
methodology that elucidated the process of identity formation and conflict framing 
within the discourses of the political elite. Conflict discourses provide crucial inputs 
into the dynamic process of legitimization and delegitimization. This study looked at 
three internal conflicts in India-Kashmir, Punjab and the Naxal conflict to gauge India’s 
internal security policy formation. In representing conflicts and defining them the 
Indian state was not only legitimizing its policies in these regions but also carving out 
an identity for itself. Defined sometimes by its status as a democracy, sometimes as a 
sovereign state, or sometimes as an economic superpower, for example, the Indian 
state’s perception of Self can be discerned in the process of legitimization. The process 
of assigning legitimacy is indeed a crucial part of policy making especially for conflict 
management. 
This thesis looked at the legitimization of policies through official discourses on the 
conflicts in Kashmir, Punjab and the Naxalite conflict. To do so, this study asked the 
following questions 
How are internal conflicts represented by the Indian state? 
What are the forms of identities conferred upon various actors in domestic conflicts? 
Does this change over time? 
How are policies legitimized in conflict situations? 
Is there a pattern in India’s internal security strategy? The thesis shows how through a 
discourse analytical methodology, conflict and peace processes can be better 
understood. The idea that it is through conflict framing and identity articulations that 
the state legitimizes policies, draws attention to the way discursive changes can be 
studied to understand conflict transformation.  
Conflict representation and policy legitimization 
One of the earliest processes of legitimization occurs in the representation of the 
conflict. Where Punjab and Kashmir were, in the early phase of the conflicts, identified 
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as secessionist conflicts, the Naxal conflict was from the beginning perceived as an 
economic one. This representation is important to analyse the policies that were 
instituted.  Whereas in Punjab and Kashmir elected state governments were dismissed 
and central rule established, the economic dimension of the Naxal conflict, and its 
geographically scattered nature meant that the policy thrust was on development and 
economic measures. However, what was common to all three conflicts was their 
representation as threats to national security, legitimizing a security-centric approach 
through the use of force. Violence by the naxals has resulted in the government terming 
it one of the most serious internal security threats and made force a popular policy 
approach. India’s own ambition of being an economic superpower is reflected in the 
way the discourses on conflict, in more recent years, have attributed lack of 
development and unemployment as the main causes for the conflicts in Kashmir and 
the Naxal areas.  
Broadly, the discourses on conflict causes can be seen to fall into three categories-the 
territorial/secessionist discourse, the political discourse, and the development/economic 
discourse. Each of these may be reflected in a particular conflict, or a combination of 
two. One discourse can also destabilise and give away to another hegemonic discourse, 
over time. In terms of legitimacy, the first category-that of secessionist conflicts is 
almost entirely delegitimised, the other two can be framed as having varying levels of 
legitimacy.  
As Chapter three demonstrated, in Punjab, the immediate reaction of the Indian state 
was to frame the issue as a territorial one; the demands of the Sikh actors were 
considered to be secessionist in nature and hence delegitimized. The dismissal of the 
elected state government that followed was one of the ways for the Centre to impose its 
authority and enable a security centric policy to manage the unrest.  The use of the 
Army in Operation Blue Star in 1984 is reflective of this approach. The external link in 
the Punjab conflict-that of Pakistan’s involvement, appeared frequently in the 
discourses on causes of the conflict– possibly the most delegitimising allegation that 
can be made in the context of Indian domestic politics. The assertion that it was Sikhs 
living abroad who were fuelling the conflict was also prominent. This, in addition to 
linking the dispute with Pakistan, denied the existence of genuine domestic grievances.   
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By the mid-1980s, the secessionist discourse was gradually giving way to a political 
discourse as the dominant articulation of the causes for the conflict by New Delhi. This 
came about partly due to a change in leadership at the Centre following the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards. In terms of discourse, this was 
reflected in the way the demands of the Sikhs in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution were 
transformed as being secessionist to being considered negotiable. Further, the Akalis, 
who had been the main political representative of the Sikhs in Punjab, were now 
recognised as a legitimate voice with which to negotiate, a far cry from the early 1980s 
when the discourse pointed to the demonizing of the Akalis as being hand in glove with 
extremist Sikhs led by Bhindranwale. Around this time there was also a distinction 
being made between moderate and extremist Akalis-implying that the former were to 
be negotiated with, whereas the latter were to be excluded. Akali leader Longowal, who 
had been charged with sedition in 1984 and jailed, was released in 1985 under the Rajiv 
Gandhi government and chosen as the Sikh leader with whom to negotiate. The 
separation of moderate and extremist Akalis in the mid-1980s paved the way for 
dialogue culminating in the Punjab Accord of 1985. Discursive changes in the 
aftermath of the 1985 Punjab Accord located the causes for the continuing unrest in a 
broader, non-exclusive demand for greater state autonomy. By 1985 the issues being 
raised in Punjab were increasingly being referred to as issues of federalism affecting 
other states as well. This tendency to view demands in conflict as similar to issues 
being faced at an all India level is another way of deflecting attention and moving from 
the specific to the more general. Another change in the discourse during this time was 
the policy suggestion of elections, which were finally held in 1985 and brought an 
Akali government to power until 1987. What this shows is how the conflict went from 
being framed as a secessionist conflict to a political one, and how previously 
unacceptable demands were later ready to be negotiated.  
Chapter four showed how in Kashmir, likewise, the early phase of the conflict reflected 
a tendency by the Indian state to frame it as an externally sponsored issue due to 
interference by Pakistan. This heightened securitisation was able to legitimize the 
dismissal of elected state government and impose direct rule from New Delhi. In 
representing Kashmir as a territorial conflict between India and Pakistan, secession 
became the dominant representation of the causes for the conflict, and was therefore 
outlawed. Other discourses, such as the political discourse ascribing causes to political 
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reasons, were marginalised. The inability of the Indian state to recognise political 
grievances of the Kashmiris exacerbated the distrust between the two and made matters 
worse. Through its heavy handed approach, its use of the army and paramilitary and the 
widespread human rights violations through fake encounter killings, missing and 
disappeared Kashmiri youth, and detention, the violence that began in the late 1980s 
reduced by the mid-1990s, albeit at a high human cost. If the conflict was defined as a 
territorial dispute, the Kashmiri rebels were identified as anti-national, subversive, 
fundamentalist and terrorists. The implications for policy of this identification of rebels 
meant that the State considered dialogue a possibility but made it conditional on them 
declaring their allegiance to the country and to giving up their weapons and violence. 
Talks with Pakistan were entirely delegitimized.  
The insistence on holding any dialogue within the parameters of the Constitution was 
also feeding into the denial of any legitimate political grievances of the Kashmiris. This 
is also reflected in the discourses on Article 370 of the Indian constitution which 
guarantees a special status for Kashmir. Discourses of members of the BJP reflect a 
general disdain for the special status to the point of suggesting that it be done away 
with, so as to remove the ‘psychological barrier’ that prevented the complete 
integration of Kashmir with the ‘mainstream’. What these discourses were doing was to 
deny the historically special relationship that Kashmir had with India and project 
Article 370 as a hindrance rather than a political safeguard. For the ruling Congress 
though, the discourses on Article 370 show a linking of the provision with India’s 
secular commitment. What was not questioned in either discourse was the political 
inclusion of Kashmir in India.  
This dehistoricization appears both in the discourses of the political elite on Punjab and 
Kashmir. The reimagining of these conflicts as contemporary phenomena served also to 
enable short term solutions rather than a long term commitment to conflict resolution.  
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which enables the President to dismiss an 
elected state government and impose direct rule from New Delhi in special 
circumstances, has been used frequently by the Centre in Punjab and Kashmir. The 
elections of 1985 brought to power an Akali government but as violence continued, the 
discourses once again point to the linking of the Akalis with extremists, hence, being 
untrustworthy. The dismissal of the government in 1987 reflects this change in 
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articulation. In Punjab, this created a window of opportunity for the Centre to launch a 
brutal crackdown on ‘extremists’ in Punjab in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
Legitimization of emergency President’s Rule in the early 1990s occurred through the 
assertion that violence was leading to a breakdown of law and order and the inability of 
the Akali government to control it. ‘Terrorism’ was the dominant prism through which 
the conflict was represented; and the use of police and paramilitary forces was rampant 
and resulted in severe human rights violations. By 1992-93, elections were held and 
violence quashed; for the Indian state this signalled a return to ‘normalcy’ in Punjab.    
In Kashmir, if the discourses identified Pakistan as the main cause for the conflict in 
the early 1990s, there were indications of political maladministration in the state as 
well and these discourses emerged stronger and more hegemonic by the middle of the 
1990s as violence was suppressed. This occurred simultaneously with the attempt to 
bifurcate the issue as being bilateral between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and 
on the other, an internal issue between India and Kashmir, what India termed as its 
‘domestic’ issue that was not open to outside intervention. Elections became the 
favoured mantra for the political elite as a panacea for the Kashmir problem. By linking 
the discontent in the state to political maladministration, the government was 
promoting elections as the solution to the conflict. The dominance of the political 
discourse during this time enabled the construction of the conflict as an issue of 
governance.  
 A shift in the policy discourses in the mid-1990s, reflected in the willingness of the 
Indian state to engage in dialogue, can be located in the broader context of international 
attention to the human rights violations, as well as to the success the Indian state had in 
quashing violence through force. In this atmosphere, the secessionist discourse was 
giving way to the political discourse. The proliferation of groups and weakening of the 
indigenous Kashmiri movement led by JKLF had by this time given greater credibility 
to India’s claim that the conflict was being sponsored from across the border.  Dialogue 
was a contentious issue, as some considered it to be demoralising for the security forces 
while others made it conditional on the surrendering of violence and weapons, and of 
being within the existing constitutional framework. The proliferation of groups also 
served as an excuse for the State to avoid dialogue and instead hold elections. Dialogue 
between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri groups was also ruled out for accepting a 
separate Kashmiri presence in such a trilateral engagement would mean the acceptance 
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of the issue as an international rather than bilateral or domestic one. Elections as a 
conflict management strategy are also a vital part of a State affirming and legitimizing 
its democratic credentials and has been used by the Indian state as a favoured policy. 
By the end of the 1990s this was established in Kashmir and henceforth any issue 
affecting the state was deemed to be an ‘internal matter’ to be resolved by India alone.  
The Kashmiri identity was likened to any other regional identity in India, suggesting 
that it was not a unique political identity with its own history of separateness, but at par 
with other identities that were legitimate albeit subordinate to the greater Indian 
identity. If the National Conference was framed as anti-national in the 1980s, by the 
mid-1990s, the discourse recognised the party as a legitimate political voice of the 
people of Kashmir; it was now the ‘pro-Pakistan’ groups that were demonised and 
delegitimized. The idea that the ordinary Kashmiri was being ‘misled’ by these groups 
served to further the notion that there were no legitimate reasons for the Kashmiri 
grievance. As with Punjab, the issues affecting Kashmir began to be equated with all 
India problems of autonomy and federalism.  
Reading between the discourses on identity in Kashmir, it is clear that ‘secularism’ as a 
nodal point has served much of the state’s thinking in the state. The need to protect the 
State’s idea of secularism ties in with the notion that the Kashmir conflict is seen 
primarily through the prism of religion and that the religious identity of the Kashmiris 
is given priority over other forms of identification. Moreover, the potent mix of a 
distinct religious identity, and the issue of territory, hark back to the partition of the 
subcontinent in 1947, and is hence approached through an intensive security paradigm. 
In this, Punjab and Kashmir share similar conflict management trajectories.  
Both Punjab and Kashmir show that elections form a core part of India’s internal 
security strategy. The establishment of a working state government has become 
synonymous with the return to ‘normalcy’ and a triumph of democracy. This singular 
definition of democracy as defined as elections ignores the complexities that 
democratic governance encompasses-accountability, justice and human rights. The 
establishment of elected state governments in both Punjab and Kashmir in the 1990s 
signalled the end of the conflict—in Punjab almost entirely and in Kashmir as a 
settlement of the ‘domestic’ dispute, although not in its entirety. The brutal suppression 
of violence was considered necessary in bringing terrorism to an end in Punjab, and in 
200 
 
many ways, Punjab did serve as a blueprint for future conflict management. Its 
‘success’ was measured in the reduction and elimination of violence and the 
functioning of an elected state government. 
As far as the Maoist conflict is concerned, the discourses have centred on the conflict 
being essentially about economic imbalances and lack of development affecting the 
poor and tribals.   
Further, the nomenclature of ‘left wing extremism’ also gives the impression that the 
conflict is considered to be driven by extremist ideology and is hence delegitimised. 
This is also reinforced in the discourses on the chosen means of the Naxalites-
essentially; violence is the deciding factor in delegitimizing movements. However, 
along with this, identity also plays an important role in the framing and treatment of 
these conflicts. The government’s emphasis on security and development as the twin 
pillars of policy to deal with the naxal conflict suggests that even though the root cause 
may have been identified as primarily economic in nature, counter insurgency was a 
crucial part of managing the conflict. To that end, the use of specialised police and 
paramilitary forces with specialised military equipment and force was integral to the 
policy of the State. The relative confidence that underlies the discourses of the State in 
its ability to manage the naxal conflict point to the simplification ascribed to its causes.  
One of the main differences between the naxal conflict on the one hand and Punjab and 
Kashmir on the other, was the framing of the latter two conflicts as ethnic/religious, 
with territorial secession being identified as a core demand. Further, these conflicts 
were framed as being driven by external agents-Pakistan for Kashmir and diaspora 
Sikhs and Pakistan for Punjab. Another important difference is the Centre’s 
representation of the Naxal issue as largely a state-specific issue, though in recent years 
there has been a greater involvement by the Centre in the management of the conflict. 
The early 2000s reflect a tendency of the Centre to view the Naxal issue as a ‘law and 
order’ and ‘police’ issue, and therefore under the ambit of the state governments. By 
2005 though the discourse changed and the Centre admitted it had not managed to 
contain violence to the extent that it had in Kashmir and the north eastern states. By 
2008, the Centre was calling for an increased role for itself in countering the naxal 
issue and this was soon followed by the induction of specialised central paramilitary 
forces in the naxal affected regions.  
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Identity and policy legitimization 
The identities of the actors in conflict also play a crucial role in the State’s 
legitimization strategies. Who the State negotiates with is an important indicator of the 
recognition it gives certain groups. In identifying the actors in internal conflict 
situations as secessionists and anti-nationals, the State was delegitimizing them and 
reclaiming the narrative so as to frame these conflicts as undemocratic.  
 
In Punjab, the Akalis were initially identified as a singular entity and talks held with the 
leaders, even though these made little progress. By the mid-1980s, the Centre had 
demarcated the ‘moderate’ Akalis from the ‘extremist’ ones and chose the former to 
negotiate an Accord with. The failure of the Accord to resolve the conflict once again 
had the government declare the inability of the Akalis to restore law and order in 
Punjab, delegitimizing the Akalis from political dialogue. In Kashmir, a similar tactic 
of dismissing an elected state government and installing direct rule from New Delhi on 
the pretext that the ruling party was hand in glove with the extremists and not able to 
quell violence meant that political dialogue was foreclosed. The National Conference 
was termed anti-national, but this discourse changed by the mid-1990s when the party 
decided to contest state legislative elections. The causes of the conflict began to be 
framed as issues of greater autonomy; in this lexicon, autonomy was legitimate so long 
as it was within the parameters of the constitution. There was also a recognition by the 
home minister in the late 2000s of the political failures of the Congress party in 
Kashmir suggesting a turn to the framing of the conflict as a political conflict. It is also 
pertinent to note that Kashmiri youth were identified as disgruntled youth who were in 
despair due to a lack of economic opportunities. Policy discourses now reflected a need 
for greater economic incentives to push development in the state. The Maoist rebels 
have been referred to as ‘anti national’, ‘anti-development’ and as ‘left wing 
extremists’, reflecting that the conflict has been viewed as essentially economic and 
ideological. The stress on the demarcation of the ‘extremists’ from the poor and tribals 
who they ‘take advantage of’, suggests that the government has been keen to 
delegitimise the rebels and the support base they claim. For the State, the apparent 
popularity of the Naxal movement amongst the masses is a farce, the former exploiting 
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the latter to pursue undemocratic goals and preventing development and progress 
through their violence.  
In terms of dialogue, in both Punjab and Kashmir, the government held selective 
dialogue meaning that there were bound to be spoilers. Moreover, the conditions 
imposed on dialogue, and the rigidity on negotiating only within the constitutional 
parameters foreclosed the possibility of meaningful resolution. The failure of dialogue 
was pinned on the insincerity of the rebels, and as Punjab shows in the aftermath of the 
Punjab Accord, dialogue was often seen as futile and hindering the counter insurgency 
efforts of security forces.  
As the identity discourses show, extremists can be of two kinds—religious extremists 
or fundamentalists and left-wing extremists. Thus, religion and ideology are nodal 
points around which the extremist identity discourse is fixed. Religion also serves the 
process of creating a Self-Other dichotomy. In both Muslim-majority Kashmir and Sikh 
majority Punjab, the potent mix of religion and territory created tension for the Indian 
state, as its idea of a secular Self was also threatened. In Punjab, as the discourses 
show, attempts were made to play down the separateness of the Sikhs by insisting they 
were part of the larger Hindu fold, and the Sikhs were blamed for claiming otherwise. 
In Kashmir, the Otherness was far more stark, as the Muslim Kashmiri could not be 
subsumed under the Hindu Self. The appeals to then highlight the inadequacies of 
Pakistan’s version of Islam in order to portray the tolerant, peaceful version of Islam in 
secular India.  
Identity discourses also show a process of differentiating between the militants and the 
‘ordinary people’ and the latter are, across the three cases, represented as being passive 
actors who were being exploited by the former. In the case of the Naxalite conflict, in 
delineating the ordinary people from the Maoists, the government has been keen to 
stress the exploitation of the former’s genuine economic grievances by the latter 
through illegitimate means. That the Centre recognised that the tribals and poor in the 
naxal affected states were facing economic hardship allowed for a developmental 
approach to the conflict-essentially by introducing schemes and packages to ensure 
economic growth and employment. However, the Naxalites were also referred to as 
‘our own people’ perhaps suggesting that the inability to fix a separate religious/ethnic 
identity onto them made it easier for them to be part of the ‘Indian mainstream’.  
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 Patterns in India’s internal security strategy 
The reactive nature of India’s approach to conflict, primarily through the use of force is  
legitimised through the framing of the conflicts as national security threats led by anti-
national extremists. In more recent years, the conflicts in Kashmir and Naxal areas have 
been ascribed to economic dissatisfaction, and policies reflect this need to push greater 
economic development and create employment for ‘misguided youth’. Further, the 
Indian state’s national identity-defined as secular and democratic - is constructed and 
maintained in the discourses on insecurity and security.  
In studying India’s internal security policy from a discourse analytical perspective, 
patterns of legitimization and delegitimization have been observed. The representation 
of conflicts and identities are crucial in this process. Conflicts that are represented as 
secessionist are completely delegitimized, and are approached in a security-centric 
manner also encompassing dismissal of elected state governments and imposition of 
President’s Rule for extended periods of time. The transformation of such conflicts to 
political issues, or economic or development related conflicts, widens the policy 
options but elections and the establishment of an elected government appears to be the 
preferred approach and one that leads to an apparent resolution of the conflict for the 
State. Alongside this, economic and development packages are considered to be the 
answer to the problems affecting the people in these conflict settings. The identification 
of rebels as terrorist, anti-national, or extremist makes them ineligible for negotiations, 
albeit the State has often emphasised its willingness to talk if such groups gave up 
violence. What is also considered legitimate is if the talks are held within the ambit of 
the Indian Constitution. Common to the state’s strategy is the demarcation of moderates 
and extremists, and the readiness to engage with the former while delegitimizing the 
latter, often through detention and arrests. Where former ‘extremists’ have been 
legitimized is when they have given up violence and joined the ‘mainstream’ by 
contesting elections, thereby affirming their democratic credentials to the State. 
Another important way of delegitimizing movements has been through reframing the 
mass popularity that these movements enjoy as the actions of misguided or 
economically frustrated youth or the poor/tribals. Ascribing them a degree of passivity 
lends to the State’s discourse that these people have been exploited or have chosen such 
a path out of sheer desperation, and that it was the paternalistic State’s duty to therefore 
bring them back to the ‘mainstream’.  
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The use of violence is considered necessary in the fight against violent extremists and 
irrespective of the causes ascribed to these conflicts, is a legitimate policy option. The 
difference in degree though depends on the type of conflict it faces—the State found it 
easier to use the Army and special powers in territorial/secessionist conflicts as in 
Punjab and Kashmir whereas, in the Naxal areas, the use of the Armed forces has been 
a matter of contention amongst the political elite. This is not to suggest though that 
force has not been used in Naxal areas; in recent years, the creation of specialised 
paramilitary forces and the training of police units has been extensively promoted, and 
widespread human rights violations by the security forces has gone hand in hand with 
this coercive power. As an internal security threat, the Naxal conflict has been 
particularly perplexing for the Indian State—delegitimising it as an undemocratic and 
violent conflict has not weakened it and as an ideological conflict, the State has been 
compelled to match the ‘Naxal propaganda’ with its own. Moreover, the frequent resort 
to elections as a conflict management strategy is not a relevant policy option for the 
Naxal conflict, as the avowed goal is to revolutionise rather than participate in the 
existing political framework.  
The patterns in India’s internal conflict strategy suggest that discourses are not linear; 
there is no simple transformation of conflict from secessionist to developmental. 
Conflicts can go from being represented as secessionist or terrorist to political and back 
again, as can be seen in both Kashmir and Punjab. Discourses are circular and complex 
processes, that can move in either direction. This is an important observation, as it 
holds promise for presently entrenched conflicts such as Kashmir where even though it 
is seen as a terrorist motivated, or Pakistan sponsored conflict, it has the potential to be 
represented as a political issue, thus deserving of a political solution.  
For the Indian state, ‘normalcy’ exists when it has succeeded in crushing violence and 
has established an elected state government. At this stage, the conflict is deemed 
resolved, as the case of Punjab shows. Likewise, in Kashmir, whatever outstanding 
issues remain, are largely external and involve Pakistan, any other issues are indicative 
of demands similar to other states, such as issues of autonomy and economic 
development. The argument in the state’s discourses of the late 1990s that “tourists 
have returned” and that hence “peace has returned” also suggests how Kashmir 
205 
 
occupies a territorial significance in the mind of the Indian political elite.278 The 
internal conflict is represented as resolved and the state government is considered the 
legitimate representative of the Kashmiri people and the  channel through which their 
demands are voiced.    
Conflict discourses and the potential for future research  
To sum up, this thesis showed how conflict framing plays an important role in 
legitimizing policies. The typology of conflicts, as well as the range of identities that 
actors are conferred, have much to do with the management and resolution strategies of 
the state. Elite discourses reflect the ways in which certain types of conflicts and certain 
identities of rebels are outlawed, how these change over time and the accompanying 
policies that are in the process legitimized and delegitimised. While violence by rebels 
is always delegitimized, the policy response is also influenced by the conflict typology 
and the identity of the rebels. 
In terms of typology, secessionist conflicts are entirely delegitimised; political and 
economic conflicts on the other hand can take on varying levels of legitimacy 
depending on the actors and their tactics as well. So, for instance, economic conflicts 
led by ‘left wing extremists’ could still be delegitimised due to their use of violence. 
Using force against ‘extremists’ is then a legitimate policy option, but even here a 
distinction can be observed between religious extremists and left-wing extremists. 
Moreover, the existence of religious extremists in border areas is almost always sure to 
guarantee the use of the Army, as territorial integrity becomes more important than 
human security. Dialogue with such extremists is actively discouraged as the discourses 
show. The operation of left-wing extremists such as the Naxalites, on the other hand, 
are also constructed as national security threats albeit to a lesser extent. That the Naxal 
conflict has been represented as India’s most serious internal threat has not been able to 
legitimise the use of the Army, is also indicative of the tension felt by the state in 
portraying them as the Other. This spectrum of identities creates multiple Self-Other 
dichotomies—as various perceptions of Self and Other tussle with each other in 
legitimizing and delegitimising policy options.  
                                                             
278 PM Vajpayee’s statement in the Lok Sabha, August 4, 1998.  
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A deradicalisation of identities takes place through the separation of moderates from 
extremists; so the transformation of the Punjab conflict can be gauged at one level 
through the recognition of a moderate faction of the Akalis, just as in the case of 
Kashmir, This also occurs simultaneously with the process of framing the conflict as a 
political rather than a secessionist issue. Territorial demands then transform into 
demands for greater autonomy, and are represented in political discourses as being all-
India issues of federalism rather than historically political issues specific to these 
conflicts.  
Underlying these conflict discourses is an affirmation of the State’s own identity. That 
the State represents itself as democratic, united, sovereign and secular even if these are 
unrealised ideals is clear in the conflict discourses.  Its tendency to view Kashmir and 
the Naxal conflicts in more recent years as issues of economic development feeds into 
its projection of India as an emerging economic superpower. The earlier rigidity on 
state autonomy that existed in the 1980s has given way to more flexibility since the 
coalition era that began in the early 1990s. To that extent, the multiplicity of regional 
political parties is no longer considered a threat to the Centre.  
What does this mean for the future of conflict resolution in India? Does the rise of 
Hindu nationalism in recent times, and the sweeping majority of the BJP in the 2014 
general elections in India signal a shift away from the previous policies of the Congress 
led government? Looking at the discourses of Prime Minister Modi on Kashmir, it is 
clear that there is a continuation of the discourse on causes of the conflict-as being a 
‘proxy war’ waged by Pakistan and that the issue in Kashmir was that of ‘terrorism’.279 
Moreover, at the internal level, it continues to be stressed that what the Kashmiri youth 
needed was economic development and that development was the ‘sole solution’ to all 
problems.280 Despite its historical opposition to Article 370, it is unlikely that there will 
be any scrapping of this constitutional provision, since the Indian state can continue to 
exert its power and hegemonize the terrorism/development discourse to its advantage.  
                                                             
279 See Prime Minister Modi’s speech to the armed forces during his visit to Leh on August 12, 2014. 
Available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx Accessed on May 27, 2015.  
280 See press release in the aftermath of Modi’s inauguration of a hydropower station at Kargil on 
August 12, 2014 available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx Accessed on May 27, 2015.  
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The naxal conflict, likewise, exhibits discursive continuity by the Indian state. 
Speaking at a project inauguration in the state of Chhattisgarh, PM Modi said that 
‘violence has no future’ and that ‘development is the only road to solve your problems’. 
Further, drawing on the conflict in Punjab and how it had ended he said, ‘this (Maoism) 
too will end.281  
In terms of future research, while this  study provided a detailed analysis of India’s 
internal security policy, in concentrating on the discourses of the elite, there are 
limitations in understanding the challenges elite discourses face. A broader study in 
which discourses of the media, NGOs and rebels themselves are analysed would greatly 
enhance the understanding of India’s internal security policy. The interaction of these 
alternate discourses with each other, and the resulting changes these undergo would be 
closer to looking at the larger picture and context within which the discourses jostle 
with each other to achieve legitimacy. It might also be helpful to use a similar analysis 
to study the conflicts in the north-east as well as a detailed analysis of the Naxal 
conflict over a longer time period. Discourse analysis is still an underutilized 
methodology for studying conflicts and conflict resolution. This study showed how 
such a methodology can be applied in the study of conflicts and the processes through 
which democracies exert control within their borders. 
  
                                                             
281 PM Modi’s speech in Chhattisgarh mentioned “When bloody battles were on in Punjab, did anyone 
think that it could end? I am sure that the people who have taken the wrong path on this land will also 
sooner or later see humanity emerge from within them” - See more at: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-narendra-modi-to-visit-dantewada-
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